❗️ 🇷🇺 🪖 New command, old problems: about the Dnepr group of troops

After Colonel General Oleg Makarevich took over as commander of the Dnepr group of troops back in November, we examined the challenges inherited by Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky. It has been two months since then, and we can now evaluate the changes and remaining issues.

✅ The situation along the left bank of the Dnieper River in the coastal zone has relatively stabilized. During the beginning and middle of autumn, Ukrainian units frequently launched attacks on settlements near the river. Although the enemy is still present in Krynki, the settlement has been turned into a sort of "corral," diminishing the offensive capabilities of Ukrainian formations (including their "elite" units), although not without losses on the Russian side.

✅ Local commanders have altered their approach to engaging units in assaults, although not completely. Suicidal orders like "recapture the Antonovsky Bridge at any cost" are no longer heard. Instead, flexibility and reasonable ingenuity have taken precedence to preserve the lives of personnel. However, it should be noted that these changes were not brought about by favorable circumstances.

❗️However, there are still numerous problems, and in some cases, the situation has even worsened.

⛔️ The air defense situation in the Kherson region is a matter of great concern. Over the past six months, the problem of repelling mass attacks by UAVs, missiles, and rockets has been addressed on a national scale and in specific areas. While there are resources available in the Kherson region, their utilization is hindered by various bureaucratic issues.

As a result, enemy planes and helicopters have become increasingly audacious, occasionally flying over Krynki and launching attacks on rear areas using guided and unguided missiles. Unfortunately, our forces have been unable to shoot them down because they are awaiting permission. To approve a target within the group, whether it is an air defense missile system position or a concentration of personnel, a slide with photo or video evidence and coordinates must be presented. Ultimately, everything depends on when the headquarters considers the information and makes a decision, which often becomes irrelevant. On some days, the number of targets can exceed a dozen. Unfortunately, on January 6, we personally witnessed how the process of coordinating a fire strike involving 5 armored vehicles, 7 self-propelled guns, and 2 tanks on the right bank of the Dnieper took half a day, only for the information to leak completely to the enemy, rendering the targets irrelevant.

⛔️ There is also a lack of electronic warfare equipment. We are unsure of the reasons, but the troops have electronic warfare systems (although not enough for everyone, efforts are being made to address this issue). Ukrainian drones operate on frequencies that are no longer a secret, and a significant number of Ukrainian Armed Forces drones fly over Russian military personnel on the front lines.

⛔️ The human factor remains the most challenging aspect. While it is possible to gradually equip the front line with various weapons and systems, dealing with the rigid thinking of decision-makers is more difficult.

Until officers understand and realize that implementing fire strike plans or relying on slide-based reporting and decisions days after the fact are not applicable in wartime, we will continue to face recurring situations.
#VSRF #Krynki #Russia #Kherson
@rybar

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