On the illusion of altruism
Whenever we do things for others and expect nothing in return, our primary motivation is still to serve our values and preferences. If our actions are aligned with what is objectively right, relating to others reflexively, as beings of the same kind, then our agency is consolidated with the structure of being, we become more conscious and integrated as agents. Conversely, for those who receive the practical benefits of our right actions, those benefits are merely contingent and temporary, and do not of themselves improve the integrity of their agency or the degree of their consciousness. As such, the benefits to Self of doing what is right are more fundamental and valuable than any benefits of our actions for others. Another way, doing what is right changes and improves who we are, our degree of existence, which cannot be erased by new circumstances, whereas the same actions change and improve only the conditions of existence for others, which may be erased by new circumstances, while the beneficiaries stay as they are.
Whenever we do things for others and expect nothing in return, our primary motivation is still to serve our values and preferences. If our actions are aligned with what is objectively right, relating to others reflexively, as beings of the same kind, then our agency is consolidated with the structure of being, we become more conscious and integrated as agents. Conversely, for those who receive the practical benefits of our right actions, those benefits are merely contingent and temporary, and do not of themselves improve the integrity of their agency or the degree of their consciousness. As such, the benefits to Self of doing what is right are more fundamental and valuable than any benefits of our actions for others. Another way, doing what is right changes and improves who we are, our degree of existence, which cannot be erased by new circumstances, whereas the same actions change and improve only the conditions of existence for others, which may be erased by new circumstances, while the beneficiaries stay as they are.
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We are entitled to no reward from others for doing what is right; the effect of the rightness of action on who we are is already the ultimate reward, with no outstanding debt to be settled. For the same reason, wrong actions do not require punishment beyond how the action degrades the wrongdoer.
Our preferences and the underlying values are coextensive with what makes us feel good about ourselves. Our preferences and values change only when they no longer make us feel good about ourselves. This motivational calculus can be contextually inconsistent when our conscious agency is not integrated or is inconsistent with the world as we know it, which is precisely the effect of bad moral choices. The more fragmented we are the harder it is to discern what makes us better.
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Irrespective of whether a person is torturing animals for fun or risking their own life to save a drowning child, each is motivated by the satisfaction of their own preferences, which are expressions of their perceived self-interest. The normative difference between the two cases is the rationality of our preferences. Irrational preferences are inconsistent with the necessary conditions of conscious agency and ultimately contrary to self-interest, damaging the agent. Rational preferences are consistency with the conditions of conscious agency and thus sustain or enhance the agent. The integrity of our conscious agency is conditional on relating to other beings of the same kind in the right way.
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I just found out today about the Racheal Gunn (Raygun) controversy. I watched her “dance” at the olympics and the first thing that struck me is how similar her “style” is to Dr William Bay and Moniker Smit, as if they were part of the same production. This is only my subjective impression;)
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Science is a business model, and like any business it chases profit, which is a form of energetic consumption with the unconscious aim of growing itself at the expense of anything else. If the market demands illusions, Science will transform those illusions into a real ritual, supported by a custom mythology (‘theory’).
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Logical consistency is a meta-language that cannot be spoken
Formalisation of logical consistency must itself be logically consistent, both within its form and with the presuppositions of its formalisation, in order to make sense. Formalism is subordinate to logical consistency, not vice versa.
Logical consistency is a meta-language that cannot be spoken because it is an intrinsic aspect of consciousness; its structure.
Formalisation of logical consistency must itself be logically consistent, both within its form and with the presuppositions of its formalisation, in order to make sense. Formalism is subordinate to logical consistency, not vice versa.
Logical consistency is a meta-language that cannot be spoken because it is an intrinsic aspect of consciousness; its structure.
The fact that all languages are, for the most part, translatable, and otherwise explainable, implies that there is one, universal meta-language that regulates meaning. Whenever we speak a language and make sense, we already think according to the rules of the universal meta-language, which itself cannot be spoken, since it does not consist of words, but may only be deduced as the structure of sense.
Sense can be defined as the integrity of thought. When multiple elements can be related simultaneously, in one thought, this is an instance of sense. When multiple elements cannot be related simultaneously, in one thought, that which cannot be integrated is non-sense. Non-sense cannot be thought as one.
Sense can be defined as the integrity of thought. When multiple elements can be related simultaneously, in one thought, this is an instance of sense. When multiple elements cannot be related simultaneously, in one thought, that which cannot be integrated is non-sense. Non-sense cannot be thought as one.
One argument against free will is that all our thoughts appear as if out of nowhere, seemingly involuntarily.
I argue that there is no reason to conclude that all our decisions or even all our imaginations come from the outside of agency, even if many do. One piece of evidence in favour of genuine agency is that some choices take great effort to overcome our spontaneous inclinations. For example, choosing to overcome addiction despite the physiological compulsion, or choosing not to kill when every practical reason tells us to kill. One could argue that the choice of making an effort also comes from somewhere else, but this creates an even bigger explanatory burden: the reality of something external to consciousness that is manifested within it as consciousness, as itself. If the world as we know it, including any deterministic black box from which thoughts emerge is only a concept made and integrated with other concepts by consciousness, in consciousness, then the only real box is consciousness, which was always already us. On this account any external substitute for agency must be taken as our own agency, therefore free will.
I argue that there is no reason to conclude that all our decisions or even all our imaginations come from the outside of agency, even if many do. One piece of evidence in favour of genuine agency is that some choices take great effort to overcome our spontaneous inclinations. For example, choosing to overcome addiction despite the physiological compulsion, or choosing not to kill when every practical reason tells us to kill. One could argue that the choice of making an effort also comes from somewhere else, but this creates an even bigger explanatory burden: the reality of something external to consciousness that is manifested within it as consciousness, as itself. If the world as we know it, including any deterministic black box from which thoughts emerge is only a concept made and integrated with other concepts by consciousness, in consciousness, then the only real box is consciousness, which was always already us. On this account any external substitute for agency must be taken as our own agency, therefore free will.
An informal proof of Free Will
We are conscious of making choices and of conceptualising the terms of choice differently from anyone else, subjectively, which gives rise to objective disagreements about the correctness of choice, therefore we are making choices that are not determined by any objective conditions of choice. We call this indeterminacy ‘free will’.
We are conscious of making choices and of conceptualising the terms of choice differently from anyone else, subjectively, which gives rise to objective disagreements about the correctness of choice, therefore we are making choices that are not determined by any objective conditions of choice. We call this indeterminacy ‘free will’.
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Every religion rejects the possibility of altruism (and this makes sense)
All religions stipulate some kind of metaphysical reward for moral behaviour, which precludes the possibility of altruism: selfless sacrifice for the benefit of others. The founders of religions may have understood that altruism is impossible because it does not motivate, and that its moral code had to appeal to self-interest before it could be at all persuasive.
This has implication for the dogma of “Christ dying for our sins”. If selfless sacrifice is logically impossible then a different interpretation is necessary. I suggested elsewhere that “the premise of Christ 'dying for our sins' should be understood as 'God died so that we may sin, with impunity', because only when everything is permitted we will find out who we really are, to what levels of depravity we are willing to stoop, or raise above. Only absolute moral freedom can reveal our moral essence, which is a cumulative effect of all our thoughts and actions, and this in turn implies that secularism and atheism could be a way of realising 'the last judgement'. Through our actions we judge ourselves.” https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/transcendental-theology-for-non-believers
All religions stipulate some kind of metaphysical reward for moral behaviour, which precludes the possibility of altruism: selfless sacrifice for the benefit of others. The founders of religions may have understood that altruism is impossible because it does not motivate, and that its moral code had to appeal to self-interest before it could be at all persuasive.
This has implication for the dogma of “Christ dying for our sins”. If selfless sacrifice is logically impossible then a different interpretation is necessary. I suggested elsewhere that “the premise of Christ 'dying for our sins' should be understood as 'God died so that we may sin, with impunity', because only when everything is permitted we will find out who we really are, to what levels of depravity we are willing to stoop, or raise above. Only absolute moral freedom can reveal our moral essence, which is a cumulative effect of all our thoughts and actions, and this in turn implies that secularism and atheism could be a way of realising 'the last judgement'. Through our actions we judge ourselves.” https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/transcendental-theology-for-non-believers
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The common sense of every idea that signifies the objective realm implies that moral conflicts are not determined by the prior commonality of sense, therefore must be caused by something subjective, some new augmentation of sense that originates in the subjectivity of the agent and not in the world of objectivity: therefore free will.
The same (common, objective) information cannot have opposite deterministic meanings (X and not-X) at the same time.
The same (common, objective) information cannot have opposite deterministic meanings (X and not-X) at the same time.
There are some fascinating implications to Christmas that nobody seems to have noticed (correct me if I am wrong):
1. If Jesus is the Son of God/Yahweh, who is worshipped by the Jews, then Christians are now the true and theologically correct Jews (and nobody else is).
2. If Jesus is the rightful King of Israel then it cannot be the case that Israel rightfully belongs to people who reject Jesus as the King of Israel;)
1. If Jesus is the Son of God/Yahweh, who is worshipped by the Jews, then Christians are now the true and theologically correct Jews (and nobody else is).
2. If Jesus is the rightful King of Israel then it cannot be the case that Israel rightfully belongs to people who reject Jesus as the King of Israel;)
Deterministic Consciousness is precluded by Russell’s Paradox
Consciousness is by definition reflexive, it contains itself, and contains nothing in excess of itself, therefore always a totality of itself: totality of all ideas that do not contain themselves (since ideas are not conscious of themselves). But if consciousness contains itself, as dictated by the premise of reflexivity, then it is not an idea and therefore does not contain itself: Russell’s Paradox. The contradiction is eliminated only by consciousness changing its self-conception (identity) in time, so that it contains itself only as an idea of its past, different from its present totality that cannot be grasped as one until it also becomes the past, and so on (essential incompleteness). The totality cannot change its identity deterministically, as then it would remain the same totality and result in Russell’s Paradox, hence consciousness is necessarily non-deterministic.
Another way, every thought, insofar as it has definite content, is already in excess of this content, is about that content, and this aboutness is not included in the content.
Something I wrote on this topic in 2018: https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/russells-paradox-contra-determinism
Consciousness is by definition reflexive, it contains itself, and contains nothing in excess of itself, therefore always a totality of itself: totality of all ideas that do not contain themselves (since ideas are not conscious of themselves). But if consciousness contains itself, as dictated by the premise of reflexivity, then it is not an idea and therefore does not contain itself: Russell’s Paradox. The contradiction is eliminated only by consciousness changing its self-conception (identity) in time, so that it contains itself only as an idea of its past, different from its present totality that cannot be grasped as one until it also becomes the past, and so on (essential incompleteness). The totality cannot change its identity deterministically, as then it would remain the same totality and result in Russell’s Paradox, hence consciousness is necessarily non-deterministic.
Another way, every thought, insofar as it has definite content, is already in excess of this content, is about that content, and this aboutness is not included in the content.
Something I wrote on this topic in 2018: https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/russells-paradox-contra-determinism
Substack
Russell’s Paradox Contra Determinism
Causal determinism, the idea that the present state of the world is fully determined by its antecedent states, is generally considered incompatible with causa sui thought, the idea that thought is not fully determined by the antecedent states of the world…
This is good reporting, but stops short of explaining HOW the capital gains discount and negative getting translate into dwelling prices (and into general inflation) from the monetary perspective. The answer: investors, no matter how rich, started taking out credit for investing in property, a cost which can be used as a tax offset for other income, and kept the bulk of their savings invested in the stock market, thus multiplying their income capacity several times. Every time they took out credit, the money supply expanded by the same amount (money was literally created as credit), which inflated all prices, but in particular the housing market since it was the primary commodity backing the credit explosion. The winners are, in ascending order, the rich, the banks and their offshore bond-holders. https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2024/feb/15/the-awful-truth-at-the-heart-of-australian-housing-policy
The laws of physics are technically not laws but abstract models, fundamental conventions for explaining causality. They should not be confused with objective reality.
We cannot meaningfully refer to anything outside of consciousness; it is everything that can be conceived of. The hypothesis of existence outside of consciousness is logically analogous to the hypothesis that there is more of something than everything: a contradiction.
Anarchism/Voluntarism is impossible without all people agreeing to be anarchists/voluntarists. Any dissenters would be either exercising coercion (if they were powerful enough) or be subject to coercion (not to voluntarily form powerful organisations that could threaten anarchism/voluntarism). Total consensus is a practically impossible condition to satisfy.
On the other hand, everything we do in some way restricts the freedom of others. For example, if you stand on some spot then nobody else can stand on the same spot, and if you assert your right to stand on that spot then you designate yourself the ruler of that spot, contra the freedom of others. It follows that anarchism/voluntarism is logically impossible, not merely practically impossible.
On the other hand, everything we do in some way restricts the freedom of others. For example, if you stand on some spot then nobody else can stand on the same spot, and if you assert your right to stand on that spot then you designate yourself the ruler of that spot, contra the freedom of others. It follows that anarchism/voluntarism is logically impossible, not merely practically impossible.