Michael Gill https://philpapers.org/rec/GILIAV-2 argued that the common usage of moral terms may not be uniform and determinate enough for it to make sense to analyse moral language. Others argue that if Gill is correct then no objective moral norms are possible, since they too would be non-uniform and non-determinate. I argue that for objective moral norms to be universally true it is not necessary for the common usage of moral terms to be uniform and determinate, but only that some moral terms can be determined as logically necessary and provable, for any rational agent.

A further problem with Gill’s argument is that it is unclear why moral terms should be differentiated from non-moral terms, since both can be related to phenomenological associations: ‘to kill a human’ is as phenomenologically meaningful as ‘to cut down a tree’. Gill’s argument therefore attaches to all claims of objectivity, all possible norms, including the meaning of reality, truth, sense, and language itself. Nevertheless, if we can relate to one another, perceive one another, communicate using language and associate our speech with common phenomenological associations, then at least some moral terms must be universally comprehensible too.

Finally, as Simon Engström argues, Gills argument implies that since we understand moral concepts differently then our disagreements about moral norms are only ostensible (which contradicts his premise that our disagreements are real). Inexplicably, Gill assumes that his terms ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘variability’ are not affected by indeterminacy and variability, which permits him to draw a normative conclusion for other moral agents.

Those who deny moral realism, deny the reality of moral status, therefore renounce their moral status. I accept their choice.

‘Meaning’ is akin to mutually facing mirrors, whereby relations between the reflection and the reflected are reciprocally contextualised as selfhood and otherness. A single mirror cannot do this, but mutually facing mirrors cannot evade it.

New paper against compulsory vaccination, BMJ: https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2024/10/28/jme-2024-110236.abstract Prof. Steinhoff makes several fine distinctions to counter the arguments defending vaccine mandates and gives favourable consideration to my arguments that were presented in the same journal.

Here’s a conspiracy theory. One guy strikes up a friendly conversation with you on your vacation, offers to show you around, very friendly. His co-conspirator sneaks up behind you and snatched your passport, phone and wallet, then rides off on his scooter. The friendly accomplice yells at him, calls him a thief, and chases him until both disappear from sight. This is roughly how governments work, but on industrial scale.

An alternative framing for the problem of a self-defined moral standard is whether the something you believe is your highest value is actually what you value the most. You could be mistaken in interpreting the hierarchy of your own values, and engage in what is called a performative contradiction: acting in a way that implies that you value X more than Y but believe that you value Y more than X. For example, in everything that you do you desire for your agential capacities to succeed, to fulfil your intentions, but not being aware of how your agential capacities are intertwined with those of other agents you commit to values that harm your agential capacities and interests.
The concept of ‘my own standard’ does not capture the errors of our own reasoning, and this alone suffices to defeat moral subjectivism.

Another framing for the argument why ideology or ‘my values’ cannot possibly justify our actions, especially when those actions purport to be moral, is that belief cannot even hypothetically ground a normative principle (Setiya, Kieran. Explaining Action. The Philosophical Review, 2003). Setiya shows that beliefs provide only the explanation of our reasons to act, not their justification; explanations are not ‘reasons’, let alone valid (logically consistent) reasons. Another way, beliefs (about values) require justification on the basis of logically consistent reasons, and the appeal to validity/consistency is engaging with a principle that is independent of subjective beliefs.

There is critical difference between the statement “I value X” and “X is valuable”; the former is explanatory, the latter is normative.

When we choose/agree to obey a rule, we are responsible to others for obeying the rule. The obeying action is our action and as such it invokes our responsibility to determine whether the rule is morally right for ourselves and for others. This creates a problem for moral subjectivists/relativists: if we make our own rules (as subjectivists claim) then we are morally responsible to others for obeying those rules, both according to our own moral standard and according to their moral standard, and if these standards are different then the subjectivist is faced with a moral contradiction. If a moral subjectivist would claim that his moral standard should have priority over those of others when he acts with respect to others, this would imply that the moral standard of others also has priority when they act to enforce the responsibility they are owed by the subjectivist, which brings us to the same impasse, making moral responsibility for action contradictory and indeterminate. Another way, the moral subjectivist is logically inconsistent in believing that his moral standard should determine his responsibility to others because responsibility implicates multiple parties and, still on the subjectivist view, this implies mutually exclusive (inconsistent) moral standards.

This reminds me of the news bites during Covid vaccine rollout showing top athletes dropping dead on the field while the official narrative was Safe & Effective, Safe & Effective.

“if the vaccination enthusiasts call for mandatory vaccination, an apposite reply of a vaccine refuser would be: ‘Let me get this straight: You want to intentionally coerce me into definitely accepting a foreign substance into my body that I would like to keep out of it, so that you can avoid merely accidental or likely contact with a substance you would like to keep out of yours? You are a true paragon of autonomy and fairness, aren’t you?’” From the paper cited above, by Uwe Steinhoff

Mandatory or coerced vaccination is a form of physical assault, rationalised as prevention of harm. According to Uwe Steinhoff this does not negate the right of the person who is preventively assaulted from self-defence against the preventive assault: “while there is no justified self-defence against justified self-defence, there is justified self-defence against justified preventive attack.” jme.bmj.com/content/ear…
Mask mandates, coercing people to cover their nasal openings and mouth with a mask, is also a type of (allegedly) preventive assault, which does not negate the person’s right to self-defence against this assault.

The strategic purpose of every provocation is to protect (or advance) the most valuable asset, the primary purpose, the ultimate vulnerability.

If you wish to buy an autographed Hardcover edition of my new book “Moral Ontology: a thesis on the interdependence of sense, integrity and agency”, follow this link (this offer is available to buyers in Australia only): https://buy.stripe.com/00geX1dB7fB6bvO9AD ($50 AUD including regular domestic delivery).

Philosophical proponents of moral subjectivism are the ultimate populists (irrespective of whether they actually believe their own arguments). They assert to the little people that what each already believes in is, in the relevant sense, ‘right’; that our own biases and prejudices, our preferences and feelings, are the only standard of right vs wrong, good vs evil. “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”. The silent part they do not articulate is: “now fight to the death to realise your preferences against the preferences of others.” Moral subjectivism is an appeal to the lowest common denominator. Or it may all be just a psychology experiment, working out your mental dynamics, the limits of your moral intuition, for the benefit of those who own you.

There are two possible scenarios in the American reality TV elections: 1) Trump must not win because the world as we know it will end, or 2) Trump must win because the world as we know it will end. There is clearly only one candidate in this election. The election is: Trump Vs Not-Trump.

An excerpt from my new book.

It is useful to frame every fallacy as a violation the fundamental laws of sense: non-contradiction or identity. This is precisely what Makes a 'fallacy'; if no violation of the fundamental laws, then no fallacy. For example, the ad hominem fallacy equivocates between the identity of the person (X) and the identity of their argument (not-X), which implies that X is not identical to itself. This also implies that X and not-X are simultaneously true, in the same respect, therefore contradiction. By demonstrating the invalidity of arguments directly from the fundamental laws we can eliminate the risk of misunderstanding of fallacies, or confusing valid arguments with fallacies. For example, identifying a performative contradiction (when an action Y of person X affirms not-Y) may seem like an 'ad hominem' fallacy, since it attaches to the meaning of what X does in order to invalidate their argument, but it does not equivocate. For example, using language to persuade someone that language has no meaning (M) implies that M and not-M are simultaneously true.

Democracy is an alibi of the oligarchy.

Here is an idea for a movie; historical fiction. It is the year 2015. In a corporate boardroom somewhere high in Manhattan there is a meeting of Hollywood script writers, media moguls, some high ranking military personnel, Henry Kissinger, Steve Bannon. Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton are standing together near a massive window overlooking the city, engaged in a friendly conversation and occasional laughter. The meeting is about the 2016 presidential elections. Kissinger opens the meeting, explains that he is acting on behalf of Global Leaders, who believe it is the right time to make some big political moves (which are not explicitly articulated). In order to fulfil their ambitious plans they need to manufacture public consent, especially in the United States of America. Kissinger then produces the script that this executive committee is obligated to follow. The plan is for Hillary Clinton to run for President in 2016. The campaign is supposed to be of the highest calibre, to the effect that Hillary should win in a landslide. Nevertheless, the election is to be rigged, making Donald Trump the 45th president. Trump is supposed to appeal to the lowest common denominator of the working class and express their basest biases and amplify their grievances. The 46th presidency is to be played in the opposite direction. Trump is by then expected to moderate his administration and gain popular support to the effect of wining the 2020 election in a landslide, since he is to be pitched against the “senile pervert”. Kissinger assures the audience that “we will run plenty of plausible conspiracies and present (via 3rd parties, of course) such incriminating evidence that should preclude Biden from being tolerated by any decent American citizen. That election is to be ‘stollen’ in favour of Biden, this time in an obvious fashion, in order to provoke the sense of injustice among the working-class majority. It is only then that Trump will have sufficient trust and support that will allow him to win in 2024 and implement our ambitious programme in full…. ;)

Psychiatry has only one plausible therapeutic aim: to re-establish the integrity of the rational consciousness of the patient. In order to fulfil this aim in a scientific fashion, one must have a consistent theory of rational consciousness, which psychiatry does not have. It follows that psychiatry pursues illegitimate aims that are neither scientific nor therapeutic.