He who cannot not be a tyrant, who cannot not be a murderer, who cannot not be a liar, who cannot stop the habit of violence, lying or greed, is no longer a conscious Self, no longer there even to itself, but a blind force of nature playing itself out as violence, lying or greed.
'Peace' is when governments cooperate in killing their own citizens with vaccine mandates.
'War' is when governments cooperate in killing each other’s citizens with bombs.
'War' is when governments cooperate in killing each other’s citizens with bombs.
Every person has the moral authority to do what is morally right, and no authority, under any circumstances, to do what is morally wrong. We must therefore understand the legal system as an attempt to formalise what is morally right, and this moral right is the only logical basis of authority; authority cannot be a product of the authoritative system (begging the question). The idea of having the authority to do what is objectively wrong is absurd, contradictory in its essence.
The ‘ruling power’ does not matter to consciousness, like an earthquake does not matter to consciousness.
Forwarded from Normal Chat
“Is deriving a right from a natural state a logical fallacy? How can we move from something being natural to it being right? It would seem to beg the question or be an appeal to nature fallacy.”
As a matter of principle, it does not follow from how something is constituted that it ought to be that way (a fallacy), but this is not quite the context of the question: "rights are possessed by all humans by virtue of being human." The intended meaning of 'natural' in Locke is not just 'how' something is but how it 'essentially' is, and if the essence is uniquely valuable then it already contains an Ought. Another way, if the essence of being human is to value rational agency then we ought not to act in a way that contradicts what we essentially value, or we would be destroying ourselves. The possibilities of how this contradiction can arise in action can then be inversely formulated as human rights; to violate a human right is to act in a way that contradicts what we essentially value. This is not how Locke argued but this is one way in which the essence can ground what ought to be done, not just because it ‘is’ that way, but because it is essentially normative. Conversely, values that are not essential but contingent are not normative because they can be rejected without consequences or inconsistency, amounting to a change of preferences.
As a matter of principle, it does not follow from how something is constituted that it ought to be that way (a fallacy), but this is not quite the context of the question: "rights are possessed by all humans by virtue of being human." The intended meaning of 'natural' in Locke is not just 'how' something is but how it 'essentially' is, and if the essence is uniquely valuable then it already contains an Ought. Another way, if the essence of being human is to value rational agency then we ought not to act in a way that contradicts what we essentially value, or we would be destroying ourselves. The possibilities of how this contradiction can arise in action can then be inversely formulated as human rights; to violate a human right is to act in a way that contradicts what we essentially value. This is not how Locke argued but this is one way in which the essence can ground what ought to be done, not just because it ‘is’ that way, but because it is essentially normative. Conversely, values that are not essential but contingent are not normative because they can be rejected without consequences or inconsistency, amounting to a change of preferences.
If the weapon operator knows that civilians are going to be killed by the intended use of the weapon aimed at a military target, and the operator chooses to use the weapon nevertheless, then the operator is ‘deliberately targeting civilians’ as well as the legitimate military target. The reason for the use of the weapon does not negate the fact that civilians are deliberately targeted for that reason.
Spiritual consequences nowadays do not have the same social currency they had in the Middle Ages. This is probably the case because people still think about ‘spiritual consequences’ in medieval terms, Pfizer failed to conduct clinical trials of spiritual consequences, CERN is confusing spiritual consequences with physics, and philosophers are too busy explaining how spiritual consequences are actually the greater good, even if we have to kill a few people for the majority to agree with this judgment.
Explaining the spiritual consequences in symbolic, religious terms has lost its persuasive power. The language of spiritual consequences must be updated to be meaningful and persuasive in contemporary terms. Why should you not kill people even if you can legally get away with it? This needs to be explained better.
The media controversy around ceasefire vs no ceasefire is a psychological diversion from the ongoing crimes against humanity. Focussing on 'humanitarian ceasefire' - a short pause in fighting - while tolerating the systematic and deliberate killing of civilians as unfortunate but legal, is a way of legitimising war crimes while pretending to care.
Email to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Attn. Mr Volker Türk
Dear High Commissioner and the OHCHR,
I am a philosopher/ethicist, previously published on the question of vaccine mandates and associated discrimination in peer reviewed literature. I submit that discrimination on the basis of vaccination status violates fundamental human rights, including the right to life, on the following grounds:
1. Vaccine mandates imply that all humans are born in a defective, inherently harmful state that must be biotechnologically augmented to allow our unrestricted participation in society, which amounts to discrimination on the basis of healthy, innate characteristics of the human race. This devaluation of the innate human constitution is not only universally dehumanising, but it perverts the very concept of human rights; discrimination against the unvaccinated implies that being born human is no longer a guarantee of full human rights. The present argument is fully developed here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/4/240.
2. Vaccines are known to occasionally cause deaths of healthy people. When an employee is required to receive vaccination as a condition of employment, that employee is economically coerced to participate in an activity where a percentage of employees are expected to die ‘in the course of employment’ as a direct result of the mandated activity. It may be objected that infectious pathogens also kill people, but these two categories of deaths are not ethically equivalent. Infection with a pathogen is not mandated, whereas deaths resulting from mandatory vaccination are mandated deaths, a legalised killing of some people for the prospective benefit of the majority. Critically, any discrimination against the unvaccinated amounts to a violation of the right to life, because a small percentage of the targeted population are expected to die as a result of this coercive treatment. The community does not have the right to kill innocent people to achieve a higher standard of health, even if a higher standard is achievable by killing innocent people. Any widespread or systematic practice of deliberately killing innocent people for the benefit of the majority fits the definition of crimes against humanity.
I ask the OHCHR to issue official guidance on this question and adopt a resolution, taking into account the arguments presented above.
Sincerely,
Michael Kowalik
Attn. Mr Volker Türk
Dear High Commissioner and the OHCHR,
I am a philosopher/ethicist, previously published on the question of vaccine mandates and associated discrimination in peer reviewed literature. I submit that discrimination on the basis of vaccination status violates fundamental human rights, including the right to life, on the following grounds:
1. Vaccine mandates imply that all humans are born in a defective, inherently harmful state that must be biotechnologically augmented to allow our unrestricted participation in society, which amounts to discrimination on the basis of healthy, innate characteristics of the human race. This devaluation of the innate human constitution is not only universally dehumanising, but it perverts the very concept of human rights; discrimination against the unvaccinated implies that being born human is no longer a guarantee of full human rights. The present argument is fully developed here: https://jme.bmj.com/content/48/4/240.
2. Vaccines are known to occasionally cause deaths of healthy people. When an employee is required to receive vaccination as a condition of employment, that employee is economically coerced to participate in an activity where a percentage of employees are expected to die ‘in the course of employment’ as a direct result of the mandated activity. It may be objected that infectious pathogens also kill people, but these two categories of deaths are not ethically equivalent. Infection with a pathogen is not mandated, whereas deaths resulting from mandatory vaccination are mandated deaths, a legalised killing of some people for the prospective benefit of the majority. Critically, any discrimination against the unvaccinated amounts to a violation of the right to life, because a small percentage of the targeted population are expected to die as a result of this coercive treatment. The community does not have the right to kill innocent people to achieve a higher standard of health, even if a higher standard is achievable by killing innocent people. Any widespread or systematic practice of deliberately killing innocent people for the benefit of the majority fits the definition of crimes against humanity.
I ask the OHCHR to issue official guidance on this question and adopt a resolution, taking into account the arguments presented above.
Sincerely,
Michael Kowalik
The statement 'cannot not do it' looks like an example of logical double-negation (formally, not-not-X), which should be equivalent to 'can do it', but this is obviously not correct. The negation occurs twice in the statement but each instance of 'not' relates to a different object. In 'cannot' the 'not' relates to 'can', to the ability to perform an action, whereas the second 'not' relates to 'do', the action itself (not-X, not-Y). As such, the statement has the meaning of 'has no capacity to resist doing it', which is evidently different from 'can do it' (X, Y) that indicates merely the capacity to 'do it' and says nothing about the capacity to 'not do it'.
It is in the commercial interest of the defence/military sector, including weapons manufacturers, to ensure that all war crimes are diligently prosecuted, to the full extend of the law. This is the only way that this industry can deem itself socially responsible or ‘ethical’ and maintain any form of public legitimacy. I understand their moral justification: if two groups of people are determined to kill one another then let them do it, give them enough rope, give them bazookas, and as long as they do not hurt anyone else it is only their stupidity and their loss. But if they do not play by the rules, if they injure, disposses or abuse non-combatants, those who do not intend to kill others or do not engage in hostilities, then giving them powerful weapons is causing more social harm. Let them fight with sticks and stones, like the savages that they are.
Imagine if all CEO’s, politicians and celebrities who claim to want world peace volunteered to be human shields on both sides of every armed conflict. War would become impossible. Skin in the game.
Warhol came up with easiest way to populate 15 minute digital prisons, by offering every subscriber 15 minutes of fame. Everyone would get their turn at instant stardom, with the entire mass hypnosis media apparatus deployed in their favour… for 15 minutes. 60% of the population would subscribe without even bothering to read the T&C’s, and they would be happy.
David Enoch is to my knowledge the most intellectually competent Israeli philosopher, someone I have a lot of respect for, despite disagreeing with him on a number of questions in moral philosophy. I will leave this article to speak for itself, except making one observation: like the laws of logic, the moral principles applicable to war are no different to the moral principles in all other circumstances; there can be no two moralities, no two different moral standards, hence the concept of a ‘very difficult to understand morality of war’ must be rejected. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/11/10/david-enoch-argues-that-much-of-the-public-discourse-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict-is-depressingly-simplistic
‘I cannot talk to you while your tattoos are screaming at me.’