Official and volunteer translators of Islamic State (IS) propaganda have made attempts to rebound in 2026, after laying the groundwork in the second half of 2025.

An article released on Tech Haven on June 1 by Al‑Iman Media Center, a new, unofficial Islamic State–linked propaganda outlet, titled “The Alienation of Muslims in China,” offers a stark and highly charged portrayal of the situation facing Uyghur Muslims…

While organizational terrorist networks in Russia have degraded, attack plots continue to stem from individual supporters, munasir foundations, and unofficial groups adapted to the new multi-spatial security environment.

In the ongoing clashes in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has increasingly relied on FPV (First-Person View) kamikaze drones against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The coordinated attacks carried out across Mali on April 25 may mark one of the most significant turning points in the country’s conflict since the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement and arguably since the battle of Tin Zaouatine in July 2024

On 19 January 2026, Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) carried out an attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul, Afghanistan, killing and wounding a number of Chinese nationals.

In the spaces left uncovered by the collapse of the Syrian state order and the post-Assad political transition, jihadist violence has not disappeared: it has fragmented, adapted, and sectarianized.

Since December 2025, the Islamic State (IS), its Khurasan affiliate (ISKP), and aligned pro-IS media outlets have been waging a coordinated propaganda campaign around the Bondi Beach attack in Sydney, in which a father and son opened fire on a Jewish Hanukkah…

The Russia-Ukraine War has become synonymous with drone warfare. Online, any mention of the Ukraine War will bring on an onslaught of comments around how cheap and easy-to-use drones have forever changed the nature of war. Regardless of whether the fundamentals…

During the war that began between Iran and the Israeli–U.S.

Islamic State–Sahel (IS‑Sahel) has been building out a support corridor that runs from its core zones in the Sahel through northern Morocco into Spain, using small, compartmented structures to cover recruitment, financing, logistics, and external operations…

Preamble

The latest capture of an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) regional leader is a significant achievement, but it indicates larger questions needed to be asked about the province’s global role in Islamic State (IS).

The coordinated attacks across Mali on 25 April 2026 marked a major turning point in the country’s conflict.

In mid-July, the city of Carcassonne, France, became the stage for a violent clash when members of the “Moroccan Cartel New Generation” (Cartel Mocro Nouvelle Génération, CMNG) gang carried out a shooting attack against their rivals.

Islamic State (IS) sought to take advantage of the World Cup for attacks, but no plots have been reported.

The moment an artificial intelligence (AI) lab publishes an open-weight model, it relinquishes the ability to recall it. The following is a preliminary assessment of what open-weight models mean for terrorist misuse.

When the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) split from its predecessor organization, Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram in 2016, it began developing a more systematic media strategy.

What follows is our researcher’s latest July 2026 interview with TPNPB spokesman, Sebby Sambom, conducted by Uday.

The following interview was conducted by Militant Wire researchers, Tom Lord (The WannabeWonk), Harold Chambers, and Uday, with a member of the elite guerrilla unit, the Cobra Column, fighting alongside the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).