#GitHub has added an online #IDE (so far in a limited number of public beta):
https://github.com/features/codespaces
https://github.com/features/codespaces
GitHub
GitHub Codespaces
GitHub Codespaces gets you up and coding faster with fully configured, secure cloud development environments native to GitHub.
#GitHub #linter
https://github.blog/2020-06-18-introducing-github-super-linter-one-linter-to-rule-them-all/
https://github.blog/2020-06-18-introducing-github-super-linter-one-linter-to-rule-them-all/
The GitHub Blog
Introducing GitHub Super Linter: one linter to rule them all
Setting up a new repository with all the right linters for the different types of code can be time consuming and tedious. So many tools and configurations to choose from and often more than one
DevTestSecOps
#testing #Playwright Highlights: - browserContext.clearCookies() can now be used to delete cookies by filter - a new option in retain-on-first-failure tracing - it is now possible to get information about tags during the testInfo.tags test - new locat…
Also, this new version of Playwright broke my #Github actions last night with the error
I solved it by updating package.json and package-lock.json, but somehow I didn't like doing it with my hands. Will this happen with every update? I mean, updating packages/configurations and all that. 🤔
Error: Playwright Test did not expect test.describe() to be called here. ... Error: No tests found. 😡I solved it by updating package.json and package-lock.json, but somehow I didn't like doing it with my hands. Will this happen with every update? I mean, updating packages/configurations and all that. 🤔
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#GitHub #hack
https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/popular-github-action-tj-actionschanged-files-is-compromised/
https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/popular-github-action-tj-actionschanged-files-is-compromised/
Semgrep
🚨 Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files is compromised
Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files has been compromised with a payload that appears to attempt to dump secrets, impacting thousands of CI pipelines.
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#Microsoft #GitHub #AWS
Interesting move:
https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-github-amazon-ai-cloud-capacity-2026-6
Interesting move:
https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-github-amazon-ai-cloud-capacity-2026-6
Business Insider
Microsoft is resorting to its biggest cloud rival to deal with GitHub AI capacity issues
Microsoft is adding AWS capacity to GitHub after AI-driven growth strained infrastructure and triggered a series of reliability issues.
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DevTestSecOps
#GitHub #way
#postmortem #GitHub
On August 17, 2026, from 13:28–21:15 UTC (7h 47m), GitHub.com experienced elevated errors and latency across Issues, Pull Requests, APIs, Actions, and Copilot. At peak, web/API error rates were approximately 20%, while archive and raw-content downloads reached approximately 50%. SAML/OIDC authentication, SCIM, and Team Sync were also affected, as well as Actions workflows in GHEC with Data Residency that depend on public workflow step definitions hosted on GitHub.com. Most services recovered by 16:36 UTC as our Central US datacenter recovered; Actions was degraded until approximately 18:03 UTC; and Copilot Token Service fully recovered by 21:02.
Some of the failing traffic was moved from Central US to Northern Virginia where it was served successfully until the network failure in Central US was debugged and resolved. Delayed replies to a single internal endpoint triggered a latent retry bug in VS Code that amplified traffic by approximately 10x and caused delayed recovery for the Copilot Token Service.
The immediate cause of the failure was network saturation on load balancers in Central US due to a new peak in traffic. Originally this was caused by an Istio sidecar pod reaching its concurrency limits and failing to auto scale correctly because of a misconfigured policy that watched host service but not sidecar limits. One failure cascaded to more and eventually four HAProxy nodes exhausted their flow limits, degrading the gateway auth path and causing widespread authentication latency and failures. The problem was worsened by optimistic retry logic which overloaded internal load balancers. Pausing HAProxy on those nodes simultaneously produced immediate broad recovery.
The retry storm in Northern VA was fixed by 1) temporarily reducing gateway retry logic with a PR and 2) blocking inbound Copilot Token Service token requests at the load balancers with a 403, and then gradually ramping back up traffic per-site to allow callers to succeed.
Residual Copilot authentication failures continued because client retry behavior amplified load: a failed token operation could generate many extra requests and enter a retry loop. Copilot Token Service traffic increased from a normal 7–9K RPS to 70–100K RPS. Reducing gateway authentication retries and blocking retry-triggering responses stabilized Copilot Token Service and completed recovery.
Complicating factors that impeded recovery included a number of scraping attacks on codeload endpoints.
To prevent recurrence, our follow-up actions include:
- Correcting autoscaling policies to account for service-mesh sidecar concurrency and capacity.
- Auditing Istio request, concurrency, and scaling limits across affected services.
- Reviewing retry limits and backoff behavior across gateways and clients.
- Addressing the VS Code retry behavior that amplified Copilot token traffic.
- Improving load-balancer capacity monitoring and regional failover safeguards.
https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/zkxwbgr0cnmx
On August 17, 2026, from 13:28–21:15 UTC (7h 47m), GitHub.com experienced elevated errors and latency across Issues, Pull Requests, APIs, Actions, and Copilot. At peak, web/API error rates were approximately 20%, while archive and raw-content downloads reached approximately 50%. SAML/OIDC authentication, SCIM, and Team Sync were also affected, as well as Actions workflows in GHEC with Data Residency that depend on public workflow step definitions hosted on GitHub.com. Most services recovered by 16:36 UTC as our Central US datacenter recovered; Actions was degraded until approximately 18:03 UTC; and Copilot Token Service fully recovered by 21:02.
Some of the failing traffic was moved from Central US to Northern Virginia where it was served successfully until the network failure in Central US was debugged and resolved. Delayed replies to a single internal endpoint triggered a latent retry bug in VS Code that amplified traffic by approximately 10x and caused delayed recovery for the Copilot Token Service.
The immediate cause of the failure was network saturation on load balancers in Central US due to a new peak in traffic. Originally this was caused by an Istio sidecar pod reaching its concurrency limits and failing to auto scale correctly because of a misconfigured policy that watched host service but not sidecar limits. One failure cascaded to more and eventually four HAProxy nodes exhausted their flow limits, degrading the gateway auth path and causing widespread authentication latency and failures. The problem was worsened by optimistic retry logic which overloaded internal load balancers. Pausing HAProxy on those nodes simultaneously produced immediate broad recovery.
The retry storm in Northern VA was fixed by 1) temporarily reducing gateway retry logic with a PR and 2) blocking inbound Copilot Token Service token requests at the load balancers with a 403, and then gradually ramping back up traffic per-site to allow callers to succeed.
Residual Copilot authentication failures continued because client retry behavior amplified load: a failed token operation could generate many extra requests and enter a retry loop. Copilot Token Service traffic increased from a normal 7–9K RPS to 70–100K RPS. Reducing gateway authentication retries and blocking retry-triggering responses stabilized Copilot Token Service and completed recovery.
Complicating factors that impeded recovery included a number of scraping attacks on codeload endpoints.
To prevent recurrence, our follow-up actions include:
- Correcting autoscaling policies to account for service-mesh sidecar concurrency and capacity.
- Auditing Istio request, concurrency, and scaling limits across affected services.
- Reviewing retry limits and backoff behavior across gateways and clients.
- Addressing the VS Code retry behavior that amplified Copilot token traffic.
- Improving load-balancer capacity monitoring and regional failover safeguards.
https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/zkxwbgr0cnmx
Githubstatus
Incident with GitHub.com
GitHub's Status Page - Incident with GitHub.com.
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