βοΈ Amid the second anniversary of the start of the Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine, a number of Western countries and associations launched a new set of sanctions against Russia, as expected.
π’ The most significant package of restrictive measures was introduced by the United States. More than 500 Russian citizens and organisations were included in the list of blocked entities. Secondary sanctions against a number of companies from third countries cooperating with Russia can be considered equally common.
π’ As for the EU, the new sanctions have their own characteristic: 87 organisations and 105 individuals were included in the lists of blocked persons. However, even here the structure of the distribution of sanctions changes little. The new secondary EU sanctions have become peculiar. A number of companies from Turkey, Thailand, Kazakhstan, China, Serbia, India, Singapore, Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka have been listed in Annex IV of Regulation 833/2014.
π’ The UK has extended blocking financial sanctions to a number of large Russian industrial companies. The country has also decided to introduce secondary sanctions against Russiaβs partners from third countries, but unlike Brussels, it has applied the mechanism of blocking sanctions to them. They include companies from Turkey, China, the UAE and Switzerland.
π’ The lists of blocked persons have also been expanded or are about to be expanded by Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
In quantitative terms, the number of Russian companies and citizens subject to restrictive measures was indeed high. However, the latest wave of sanctions does not bring qualitative changes - their impact on the Russian economy and its relations with foreign partners is unlikely to be fundamental, writes Ivan Timofeev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/new-sanctions-against-russia-taking-a-swing/
#Multipolarity_and_Connectivity #sanctions #UnitedStates #EU #UK
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π’ The most significant package of restrictive measures was introduced by the United States. More than 500 Russian citizens and organisations were included in the list of blocked entities. Secondary sanctions against a number of companies from third countries cooperating with Russia can be considered equally common.
π’ As for the EU, the new sanctions have their own characteristic: 87 organisations and 105 individuals were included in the lists of blocked persons. However, even here the structure of the distribution of sanctions changes little. The new secondary EU sanctions have become peculiar. A number of companies from Turkey, Thailand, Kazakhstan, China, Serbia, India, Singapore, Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka have been listed in Annex IV of Regulation 833/2014.
π’ The UK has extended blocking financial sanctions to a number of large Russian industrial companies. The country has also decided to introduce secondary sanctions against Russiaβs partners from third countries, but unlike Brussels, it has applied the mechanism of blocking sanctions to them. They include companies from Turkey, China, the UAE and Switzerland.
π’ The lists of blocked persons have also been expanded or are about to be expanded by Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
In quantitative terms, the number of Russian companies and citizens subject to restrictive measures was indeed high. However, the latest wave of sanctions does not bring qualitative changes - their impact on the Russian economy and its relations with foreign partners is unlikely to be fundamental, writes Ivan Timofeev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/new-sanctions-against-russia-taking-a-swing/
#Multipolarity_and_Connectivity #sanctions #UnitedStates #EU #UK
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Valdai Club
New Sanctions Against Russia: Why Their Impact Wonβt Be Fundamental
Sanctions continue to distort normal market relations. They increase costs and force businesses to switch to grey schemes. However, the political goals of the sanctions remain unrealised: they do not affect Russiaβs foreign or domestic policy, writes Valdaiβ¦
π Todayβs world has added another level of complexity to the US β Latin America relationship.
The five monopolies that Egyptian scholar Samir Amin identified as the source of strength of the US-led world order: weapons of mass destruction, mass communication, monetary and financial systems, technology, and access to natural resources, are beginning to break down.
New trading arrangements as well as the de-dollarisation efforts coming from BRICS+ call into question the financial control; advances by Russia and China have curbed US technological superiority; and even Washingtonβs control over certain natural resources is diminishing.
This means that the United States will now have to rely even more heavily on its military strength and its information apparatus to exert control over what it believes is its natural sphere of influence.
The US information and military presence is likely to increase, but any true agenda of development and autonomy in the region can only be pursued through the efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean nations themselves, not via a partnership with Washington, writes Carlos Ron, Venezuelaβs Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for North America and President of the Simon Bolivar Institute for Peace and Solidarity Among Peoples.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-impact-of-the-coming-us-elections-on-latin/
#Return_of_Diplomacy #LatinAmerica #UnitedStates
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The five monopolies that Egyptian scholar Samir Amin identified as the source of strength of the US-led world order: weapons of mass destruction, mass communication, monetary and financial systems, technology, and access to natural resources, are beginning to break down.
New trading arrangements as well as the de-dollarisation efforts coming from BRICS+ call into question the financial control; advances by Russia and China have curbed US technological superiority; and even Washingtonβs control over certain natural resources is diminishing.
This means that the United States will now have to rely even more heavily on its military strength and its information apparatus to exert control over what it believes is its natural sphere of influence.
The US information and military presence is likely to increase, but any true agenda of development and autonomy in the region can only be pursued through the efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean nations themselves, not via a partnership with Washington, writes Carlos Ron, Venezuelaβs Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for North America and President of the Simon Bolivar Institute for Peace and Solidarity Among Peoples.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-impact-of-the-coming-us-elections-on-latin/
#Return_of_Diplomacy #LatinAmerica #UnitedStates
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Valdai Club
The Impact of the Coming US Elections on Latin America
The United States seems to be embarked on a heated rematch between two leaders who, despite their different personalities, respective supporter bases and ideological standpoints, have very little to offer in the way of a new relationship between the Unitedβ¦
πΊπΈβοΈ In the United States, both houses of Congress approved the bill H.R. 8038, titled β21st Century Peace through Strength Actβ.
In Russia, the bill received resonance in connection with the legal mechanism for the confiscation of Russiaβs sovereign assets. Previously, there were no such mechanisms in the arsenal of US sanctions policy towards Russia.
The new federal legislation gives the president a mechanism that was previously absent from the executive branch. The head of state, by his decrees, may freeze, but not confiscate, the property of a foreign state.
In the future, this legal mechanism can be expanded, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/on-a-new-mechanism-for-the-confiscation-of-russian/
#Multipolarity_and_Connectivity #confiscation #sanctions #UnitedStates
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In Russia, the bill received resonance in connection with the legal mechanism for the confiscation of Russiaβs sovereign assets. Previously, there were no such mechanisms in the arsenal of US sanctions policy towards Russia.
The new federal legislation gives the president a mechanism that was previously absent from the executive branch. The head of state, by his decrees, may freeze, but not confiscate, the property of a foreign state.
In the future, this legal mechanism can be expanded, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/on-a-new-mechanism-for-the-confiscation-of-russian/
#Multipolarity_and_Connectivity #confiscation #sanctions #UnitedStates
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Valdai Club
On a New Mechanism for the Confiscation of Russian Sovereign Assets: Consensus Between the US Administration and Congress
The new federal legislation gives the president a mechanism that was previously absent from the executive branch. The head of state, by his decrees, may freeze, but not confiscate, the property of a foreign state. In the future, this legal mechanism can beβ¦