🇺🇸🇷🇺 From attempts to universalise the American-centric world order, the United States has moved to its consolidation and defence, and from the “post-Cold War” era to the era of a new global confrontation.

US foreign policy is undergoing an important transition. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan drew a final and symbolic line under the period of its foreign policy, which began not on September 11, 2001, but in the early 1990s — what’s commonly called the “post-Cold War” period. 

The abandonment of the paradigm of universalisation of the American-centric world order is in no way a signal of the readiness of the United States to form a joint multipolar world order with non-Western centres of power, primarily with China and Russia. 

Liberal ideology in its newest left-liberal form is turning from a means of expansion into an instrument for consolidating the “collective West”, defining “us and them” and splitting the international community into opposing blocs, writes Valdai Club expert Dmitry Suslov.

🔗 New Paradigm of US Foreign Policy and Relations with Russia

#Conflict_and_Leadership #UnitedStates #Biden #worldorder #geopolitics

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇦🇺🇬🇧🇺🇸 The AUKUS agreement, and particularly the nuclear-submarines component, appear to be part of a broader plan to bolster US capacity in the Asia-Pacific, reassure regional allies of the US commitment to defence of the region, and perhaps above all, to counter the perception of a “rising” and more assertive China.

At the same time, it will look to many like US double standards and even reflective of a neo-colonial attitude to nuclear proliferation where some countries are deemed “responsible” nuclear operators and others are not, writes Valdai Club expert Andrew Futter.

🔗 Unpacking the AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership: Politics, Proliferation and Propulsion

#Conflict_and_Leadership #AUKUS #Australia #UK #UnitedStates #China #AsiaPacific

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇷🇺🇺🇦 The costs of a possible war between Russia and Ukraine far outweigh the benefits.

1️⃣ First, such a military conflict is unlikely to culminate in any intelligible agreement. A victory over the armed forces of Ukraine will not by itself lead to a fast peace. The war could develop into a long and sluggish confrontation.

2️⃣ Second, the conflict would inevitably lead to a sharp change in the Western approach toward providing Ukraine with modern weapons and military equipment. Large-scale military aid from the West would prolong the conflict. The United States and its allies will not enter open military confrontation with Moscow. However, the level of support for the Ukrainian army will grow significantly.

3️⃣ Third, regarding the Ukrainian issue, Russia would find itself in diplomatic isolation. It is unlikely that any country would voice support for Moscow’s actions. Unlike Crimea and Donbass, we’re talking about a large-scale and open clash between the armed forces, that is, about a full-fledged war. Russia would certainly be on the offensive. This would allow its actions to be classified as aggression without any problems.

4️⃣ Fourth, all key Western players would introduce qualitatively new sanctions and restrictions against Russia. The cumulative damage to the Russian economy would be colossal in scale.

5️⃣ Fifth, controlling Ukraine, even its eastern part, could be problematic. Taking into account the Western sanctions blockade, any transactions with the territories of Ukraine under Russian control would be impossible. Russia would have to take on a huge territory.

6️⃣ Sixth, the loyalty of the population of Eastern Ukraine to Russia is not obvious. Despite all the internal disagreements, over the past 30 years Ukraine has developed its own civic identity. The population of the eastern regions may have a negative attitude towards excessive nationalism. However, this does not guarantee their loyalty to Russia.

7️⃣ Finally, seventh, the war is fraught with destabilisation of the situation inside Russia itself. There is no demand in society for a war with a neighbour, even despite the odiousness of the anti-Russia discourse in Ukraine.

The war is fraught with significant risks to the economy, political stability and Russian foreign policy. It fails to solve key security problems, while it creates many new ones, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.

🔗 War Between Russia and Ukraine: A Basic Scenario?

#Ukraine #Russia #war #conflict #geopolitics

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🛡🏰 It is not yet clear what will replace the post-Cold War order in Europe.

🔹 Russia professes an increasing turn toward Eurasia; the most recent Russian national security strategy barely mentions Europe.

🔹 The US has identified China as its major rival and security challenge in the foreseeable future, and seeks to enlist Europe in this effort.

🔹 The EU is still adjusting to the loss of a major member state and contributing economy, while also deliberating its future security and defense capabilities and posture, given a possible reduction in American involvement in Europe.

🔹 The OSCE is preparing to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 2025, but it remains unclear whether any of the major participating states is prepared to use the Organization as a forum or instrument for anything truly important. 

So, what will the emerging European security order look like? Writes William Hill, Global Fellow at Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

🔗 The Post-Cold War European Security Order Is Gone: What Will Replace It?

#Conflict_and_Leadership #Europe #ColdWar #security #NATO #OSCE

📷 ©Reuters

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇺🇦🇷🇺 Ukraine is gradually becoming a mere circumstance factor for Russia.

Of course, this circumstance cannot be ignored, but the difference between a foreign policy circumstance and a problem is that it is customary to solve the latter, and “make adjustments” in policy to cope with the fortmer.

So, it becomes obvious that an active Russian policy regarding Ukraine cannot emerge in the near future: neither strategic expectations nor instruments suitable for changing such a “circumstance” are associated with it, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.

🔗 Red Lines of Russia and the Ukrainian Problem

#Conflict_and_Leadership #Ukraine

📷 ©Reuters

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🌏 Thirty years after the end of the Soviet Union is a sufficient period to assess the effectiveness of the foreign policy strategies of all post-Soviet states. Although in the historical perspective thirty years is a short period, one can already notice the delimitation of states according to certain models of national strategy.

1️⃣ The first group of countries took a course towards nationalism in foreign policy. The nationalist model is based on a black-and-white picture of the world that allows much to achieve and to act with great energy in international politics. Such a model, of course, is demonstrated today by Ukraine, which is unceremoniously trying to find an independent way in resolving the crisis in the east of the country, regardless of its neighbours’ opinion.

2️⃣ The second group of countries followed the path of liberalisation — at least the elites of these countries think so, although this can often come down to nationalist mimicry. According to the elites of such countries, their main problem is their geography. They would like to be somewhere in the Central or Western Europe, but happened to be, for example, in the Caucasus. First of all, this is Georgia.

3️⃣ The third group of states builds their foreign policy strategy from the standpoint of pragmatism. Of course, such countries should include Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which are developing relations with both eastern and western neighbours.

The incomplete nature of the collapse of the USSR echoes current politics and complicates the equation of successful foreign policy for the young states. Will we be able to state in next 30 years that all of the state experiments, which began in 1991, have been successful? Writes Andrey Sushentsov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.

🔗 Thirty Years of Post-Soviet States’ Foreign Policy: Is It Enough for Maturity?

#Conflict_and_Leadership #CIS #Geopolitics

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇰🇷 Presidential elections will be held in South Korea in early March.

Given that there will be about a dozen candidates, as one might expect, everyone understands that the real struggle for the presidency will be led by representatives of the country’s two main political camps: Yoon Seok-youl, representing the right-wing conservative camp, which is now in opposition, and Lee Jae-myung, representing the moderate left-wing nationalists, who have been in power since 2017.

Nobody can predict the outcome of the elections: as often happens in Korea, polls show that both main candidates have almost equal support, so that everything will be decided in the last days or even hours.

Both the right-wing conservative and the progressive camps are almost equally emphasising their readiness to orient themselves towards Washington. Nevertheless, the conservatives accuse their opponents of not being pro-American enough in their stance. 

Of course, these accusations, like any election propaganda, are an exaggeration, but there is some small grain of truth in them, writes Valdai Club expert Andrei Lankov.

🔗 South Korean Presidential Election: Why Former Left-Wing Radicals Become Staunch US Allies

#Conflict_and_Leadership #SouthKorea

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🌐 2021 was a year of growing confusion and a jubilee year for the New Peace, which ended the Cold War thirty years ago.

It was the second year of the pandemic, which is increasingly being perceived as the new normal, a kind of common life.

2021 was a year in which the old world order continued to crumble, and through the cracks, the contours of the new order are beginning to emerge. The increasingly complex vortex of international life makes it difficult to implement foreign policy for most countries. The polycentricity towards which Russia has been striving so much, is yielding more and more surprises.

The erosion of American hegemony has opened up a wide scope for the activities of medium and small countries amid crises in Eastern Europe — primarily in Ukraine and Belarus. In these situations, we observe medium-sized and small countries such as Poland, Lithuania and Latvia engaging in especially risky behaviour. However, this behaviour is not accompanied by an awareness of their responsibility for peace and stability in Europe.

The increasingly complex vortex of international life makes it difficult to implement foreign policy for most countries. The polycentricity towards which Russia has been striving so much, is yielding more and more surprises, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Andrey Sushentsov.

🔗 The Crumbling of the World Order and Its Friends: Results of 2021

#Conflict_and_Leadership #Valdai_WrapUp2021 #worldorder

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇺🇸🇪🇺🇨🇳 It’s in the interest of the European countries that Washington not take for granted an automatic solidarity in the event of war.

Their interest is to avoid a new and uncontrollable escalation of tensions. The best way for the Europeans to prevent hawks from taking the lead in Washington is to tell America that their appreciation and behaviour depends on that of the US, writes Valdai Club expert Pascal Boniface. 

🔗 USA, Europe and Containment of China

#Conflict_and_Leadership #China #EU #UnitedStates

📷 ©Reuters

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club

🇮🇷🇦🇿🇦🇲 What are Iran’s perceptions of the border tensions between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia? And what issues have caused concern for Iran?

In his article, Dr. Vali Kaleji, a Tehran-based expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies, believes that informing Tehran of the results of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border commission, creating a complementary agreement to clarify Article 9 of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement for clarifying Zangezur corridor and continuing the meeting of 3 + 3 format can reduce Iran’s concerns about the border tensions between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan and also help peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

🔗 Iran’s Perceptions and Concerns of Border Tensions Between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan

#Conflict_and_Leadership #NagornoKarabakh #Iran

@valdai_club — The Valdai Discussion Club