Ukraine Updates

Reasons for few changes in the map of control in Ukraine

🇷🇺 The Russian Army does not intend to advance anywhere outside of the Donbass at this time.
🇺🇦 The Ukrainians are unable to launch serious counterattacks against the Russian line.
🇷🇺 Even in the Donbass, most Russian units are currently engaged in heavy urban warfare and progressing slowly. A large portion of the forces will be stuck at Popasnaya and the Severodonetsk front for the foreseeable future.
🇷🇺 Thousands upon thousands of Russian troops are serving in Mariupol now. Once the resistance there is extinguished, they will be free to redeploy to other fronts where the advance will continue

Conclusion: Most of the fronts will be stagnant until the end of significant resistance in Mariupol.

Once those at Mariupol are freed up, where will they be redeployed? It's anyone's guess.

🇷🇺 The fronts in Kherson region on the west bank of the Dnieper are almost certain to remain stagnant until the end of the war
🇷🇺 There have been rumors of a planned offensive in the Zaporozhia region, and some minor advances were carried out recently to this end. It is not likely (edit: extremely unlikely) that Russian forces would attack the city itself, but move through its rural eastern countryside to outflank Ukrainian units in the Donbass and cut off their paths of retreat
🇷🇺 The front in the western and northern countryside of the Donetsk region is as of now stable and it is difficult to see Russians making significant gains before being bogged down in urban battles at Bakhmut (Artemovsk) and other larger towns
🇷🇺 The Severodonetsk front could use more troops
🇷🇺 Russians do not seem poised to break out of their Izyum bridgehead just yet, but a potential offensive towards Barvenkovo would do a lot to make the lives of the Ukrainian units in the Donbass significantly harder.
🇷🇺 The fronts north and east of the city of Kharkov will likely be stagnant for the remainder of the war.

So the larger goal here, as I see it, seems to be finally accomplishing the strategy of forcing a withdrawal from the Donbass by threat of encirclement. The offensive out of Izyum towards Barvenkovo in particular is very WWII-era Red Army-esque. That front is particularly difficult, but rural Zaporozhya is much more lightly defended by the Ukrainians, and their morale is apparently low there.

So, the final crystal ball prediction from the only surviving admin of @UkraineUpdates is as follows:

After Mariupol, expect twin Russian offensives aimed at surrounding the Donbass: one controlled pincer movement, involving heavy fighting for every village along the way, out of the Izyum bridgehead towards Barvenkovo; with the second being an episode of tanks rolling through the pastoral Zaporozhia countryside with relative ease- the latter will accomplish much larger gains upon its immediate launch, but both are equally important.

Expected operational dates: Mid-Late April 2022 - Early-mid May 2022. Try not to overlook the symbolism of Victory Day (9 May).

How do the Ukrainians respond?
Unless they intend to manage the Russian breakout out of Zaporozhia, the Ukrainian command would likely be wise to withdraw from the Donbass while it still can. Of course, it will probably not do this, and will potentially find huge parts, of the Ukrainian army, tens of thousands of men, completely besieged in the northern part of the Donetsk province. It is not clear if many of them would fight back at that point. And after that "pocket" is dealt with, it is hard to see Russia continuing offensive operations in any other direction.

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