(Final Report) N97883 Cessna 172 Newport News Virginia 06 OCT 2022
3 POB - 1 Fatal & 2 Serious
Pilot Flight Time:
Instructor - 333.8 hours (Total, all aircraft)
Student - 0 hours (Total, all aircraft)
On October 6, 2022, at 1507 eastern daylight time, N97883, a Cessna 172, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain on takeoff from the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF), Newport News, Virginia. The flight instructor was fatally injured, and the student pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were seriously injured.
A review of airport surveillance video revealed that after the airplane departed runway 20, it entered a steep, nose-high pitch attitude and climbed to an altitude of about 50-100 ft above the runway before the left-wing dropped rapidly. The airplane then entered a descending left turn before it impacted terrain west of the runway.
A witness, who was a flight instructor, was taxiing south on taxiway Alpha when he observed the accident airplane in a nose-high pitch attitude (about 30° nose up) on takeoff. He said the airplane reached a height of about 200 ft above the ground when the left wing “stalled” and dropped. The witness thought the instructor of the accident airplane tried to recover from the stall because the airplane’s wings leveled out momentarily before the left wing dropped again, and the airplane hit the ground on its belly. The witness described what he observed as a “power on stall.”
The pilot-rated passenger onboard the accident airplane, who was seated behind the student pilot in the rear left seat, knew the student pilot from school. The student pilot had asked him to go on the flight because he was nervous about this being his first training flight. The pilot rated passenger said the flight instructor had the student pilot assist with the takeoff. She had him place his hands on the control wheel and advised him that she would tell him when to start pulling back during the takeoff roll. The pilot-rated passenger said the takeoff roll was normal, and when the airplane reached rotation speed, the flight instructor told the student pilot to start pulling back on the control wheel. The student pilot pulled back on the control wheel and the airplane lifted off the runway. The pilot-rated passenger said everything was normal "at first" and the airplane began to climb. But the student pilot kept pulling back on the control wheel and the airplane pitched up, the stall horn came on, and the airplane began to stall before it “nose-dived” to the ground. The stall horn stayed on until impact. The pilot-rated passenger said the flight instructor was trying hard to get control of the airplane before it hit the ground. He thought she may have pushed the nose over at one point, but by the time she could get control, “it was too late.”
The student pilot said that this was his first training flight. He was more “excited than nervous” and the pilot-rated passenger was there because he just wanted to come along and “see the flight.” The student pilot said he met the flight instructor once before the flight and she told him the first lesson would involve learning how to performa a preflight inspection of an airplane followed by a flight around the local area. The student pilot said that before boarding the airplane the flight instructor showed him how to perform a preflight inspection of the airplane.
The student pilot said that he did not recall portions of the accident, but he did recall the flight instructor starting the engine and taxiing to the runway. He did not recall if the flight instructor told him how they were going to perform the takeoff roll, or the actual takeoff roll itself. However, he remembered being airborne and the airplane “stalling.” He said the nose of the airplane “was really high” and the back of the airplane was low. The student pilot did not recall hearing the stall horn, but remembered the flight instructor was “yelling.” He did not remember what she was saying, and he did not recall if his hands were on the control wheel.
3 POB - 1 Fatal & 2 Serious
Pilot Flight Time:
Instructor - 333.8 hours (Total, all aircraft)
Student - 0 hours (Total, all aircraft)
On October 6, 2022, at 1507 eastern daylight time, N97883, a Cessna 172, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain on takeoff from the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF), Newport News, Virginia. The flight instructor was fatally injured, and the student pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were seriously injured.
A review of airport surveillance video revealed that after the airplane departed runway 20, it entered a steep, nose-high pitch attitude and climbed to an altitude of about 50-100 ft above the runway before the left-wing dropped rapidly. The airplane then entered a descending left turn before it impacted terrain west of the runway.
A witness, who was a flight instructor, was taxiing south on taxiway Alpha when he observed the accident airplane in a nose-high pitch attitude (about 30° nose up) on takeoff. He said the airplane reached a height of about 200 ft above the ground when the left wing “stalled” and dropped. The witness thought the instructor of the accident airplane tried to recover from the stall because the airplane’s wings leveled out momentarily before the left wing dropped again, and the airplane hit the ground on its belly. The witness described what he observed as a “power on stall.”
The pilot-rated passenger onboard the accident airplane, who was seated behind the student pilot in the rear left seat, knew the student pilot from school. The student pilot had asked him to go on the flight because he was nervous about this being his first training flight. The pilot rated passenger said the flight instructor had the student pilot assist with the takeoff. She had him place his hands on the control wheel and advised him that she would tell him when to start pulling back during the takeoff roll. The pilot-rated passenger said the takeoff roll was normal, and when the airplane reached rotation speed, the flight instructor told the student pilot to start pulling back on the control wheel. The student pilot pulled back on the control wheel and the airplane lifted off the runway. The pilot-rated passenger said everything was normal "at first" and the airplane began to climb. But the student pilot kept pulling back on the control wheel and the airplane pitched up, the stall horn came on, and the airplane began to stall before it “nose-dived” to the ground. The stall horn stayed on until impact. The pilot-rated passenger said the flight instructor was trying hard to get control of the airplane before it hit the ground. He thought she may have pushed the nose over at one point, but by the time she could get control, “it was too late.”
The student pilot said that this was his first training flight. He was more “excited than nervous” and the pilot-rated passenger was there because he just wanted to come along and “see the flight.” The student pilot said he met the flight instructor once before the flight and she told him the first lesson would involve learning how to performa a preflight inspection of an airplane followed by a flight around the local area. The student pilot said that before boarding the airplane the flight instructor showed him how to perform a preflight inspection of the airplane.
The student pilot said that he did not recall portions of the accident, but he did recall the flight instructor starting the engine and taxiing to the runway. He did not recall if the flight instructor told him how they were going to perform the takeoff roll, or the actual takeoff roll itself. However, he remembered being airborne and the airplane “stalling.” He said the nose of the airplane “was really high” and the back of the airplane was low. The student pilot did not recall hearing the stall horn, but remembered the flight instructor was “yelling.” He did not remember what she was saying, and he did not recall if his hands were on the control wheel.
The student pilot said he “blacked out” (he thought due to shock), and he did not remember the airplane impacting the ground. His next memory was waking up in the hospital.
The flight instructor’s logbook was not recovered. Information provided by the flight school that operated the airplane revealed that she had accrued about 333.8 total flight hours at the time of the accident, about 75.5 hours of which were as a flight instructor.
The airplane came to rest in a ditch on a magnetic heading of about 090°. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site and there was no postimpact fire. The engine was pushed into the firewall and the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage sustained substantial damage. The tail control surfaces exhibited minor to no damage. Flight control continuity was established from all major flight control surfaces to the cockpit. The flap actuator was in the fully retracted position and the elevator trim tab actuator was found in the 5° tab up position.
The engine was separated from the airframe and examined. When the engine was manually rotated via the propeller, valvetrain continuity and compression were established on each cylinder. A lighted borescope was used to examine the interior of each cylinder and no anomalies were noted. All eight spark plugs were removed from the engine and exhibited normal wear/color per the Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine and no damage was noted. Both magnetos produced spark from all ignition towers when rotated by hand.
Examination of the fuel system revealed that both wing fuel tanks were breached from impact and contained an unmeasured amount of fuel. Both fuel caps were secure to each wing. Air was blown through the fuel/vent lines and no blockages were noted. The fuel selector was on “both” and a small amount of 100LL fuel was observed in the airframe fuel filter bowl. Some debris was noted in the bowl, but the filter screen was absent of debris. The carburetor remained attached to the engine and no external damage was noted. The throttle cable remained attached to the carburetor throttle control arm and the arm was positioned in a mid range position. The cockpit throttle control knob was also observed in a mid-range position.
A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
A review of the flight school’s Flight Course Syllabus – Flight Lesson 1 - Introductory Flight, revealed the following objectives:
Review and understand the use of checklists during the preflight Inspection, engine starting, before-takeoff, after-landing parking, and securing procedures.
Identify the required certificates and documents on board the airplane.
Locate and understand how to use onboard safety equipment including the fire extinguisher and first aid kit.
Understand the technique for the positive exchange of flight controls.
Understand how to taxi the airplane including using the brakes.
Become familiar with collision avoidance procedures.
Become familiar with a normal takeoff and climb; and normal approach and landing.
Understand how to conduct basic maneuvers including straight-and-level flight, climbs, descents, level offs, and medium-banked turns.
Understand how to use the trim controls to relieve control pressures.
The student said he did not recall any instruction provided by the flight instructor before takeoff. According to the pilot-rated passenger, he did not recall the flight instructor discussing the technique used for a positive exchange of the flight controls with the student pilot before takeoff.
Probable Cause and Findings:
The flight instructor’s failure to monitor the student pilot on takeoff and her delayed remedial action to stop him from exceeding the airplane’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in a low altitude aerodynamic stall from which she was unable to recover.
The flight instructor’s logbook was not recovered. Information provided by the flight school that operated the airplane revealed that she had accrued about 333.8 total flight hours at the time of the accident, about 75.5 hours of which were as a flight instructor.
The airplane came to rest in a ditch on a magnetic heading of about 090°. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site and there was no postimpact fire. The engine was pushed into the firewall and the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage sustained substantial damage. The tail control surfaces exhibited minor to no damage. Flight control continuity was established from all major flight control surfaces to the cockpit. The flap actuator was in the fully retracted position and the elevator trim tab actuator was found in the 5° tab up position.
The engine was separated from the airframe and examined. When the engine was manually rotated via the propeller, valvetrain continuity and compression were established on each cylinder. A lighted borescope was used to examine the interior of each cylinder and no anomalies were noted. All eight spark plugs were removed from the engine and exhibited normal wear/color per the Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine and no damage was noted. Both magnetos produced spark from all ignition towers when rotated by hand.
Examination of the fuel system revealed that both wing fuel tanks were breached from impact and contained an unmeasured amount of fuel. Both fuel caps were secure to each wing. Air was blown through the fuel/vent lines and no blockages were noted. The fuel selector was on “both” and a small amount of 100LL fuel was observed in the airframe fuel filter bowl. Some debris was noted in the bowl, but the filter screen was absent of debris. The carburetor remained attached to the engine and no external damage was noted. The throttle cable remained attached to the carburetor throttle control arm and the arm was positioned in a mid range position. The cockpit throttle control knob was also observed in a mid-range position.
A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
A review of the flight school’s Flight Course Syllabus – Flight Lesson 1 - Introductory Flight, revealed the following objectives:
Review and understand the use of checklists during the preflight Inspection, engine starting, before-takeoff, after-landing parking, and securing procedures.
Identify the required certificates and documents on board the airplane.
Locate and understand how to use onboard safety equipment including the fire extinguisher and first aid kit.
Understand the technique for the positive exchange of flight controls.
Understand how to taxi the airplane including using the brakes.
Become familiar with collision avoidance procedures.
Become familiar with a normal takeoff and climb; and normal approach and landing.
Understand how to conduct basic maneuvers including straight-and-level flight, climbs, descents, level offs, and medium-banked turns.
Understand how to use the trim controls to relieve control pressures.
The student said he did not recall any instruction provided by the flight instructor before takeoff. According to the pilot-rated passenger, he did not recall the flight instructor discussing the technique used for a positive exchange of the flight controls with the student pilot before takeoff.
Probable Cause and Findings:
The flight instructor’s failure to monitor the student pilot on takeoff and her delayed remedial action to stop him from exceeding the airplane’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in a low altitude aerodynamic stall from which she was unable to recover.
PK-PPI Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX Ilaga Indonesia 25 AUG 2025
(Runway Overrun) 2 POB - Minor Injuries
Aminggaru Airport
(Runway Overrun) 2 POB - Minor Injuries
Aminggaru Airport
Density altitude is the effective altitude at which an aircraft performs as if it were at that altitude, even if the actual elevation is lower. It is a measure of air density and is affected by high temperatures, high humidity, and high actual altitude, all of which decrease air density. A high density altitude leads to reduced aircraft performance, resulting in a longer takeoff roll and slower climb rates, while a low density altitude improves performance. Pilots must always calculate the density altitude before flying, especially in hot, high-elevation environments, as it is a critical factor for safe takeoff and landing.
What is Density Altitude?
An indicator of performance:
Density altitude is not an actual altitude but a way to express how dense the air is, which directly affects how an aircraft will perform.
Corrected for temperature and humidity:
It's essentially the pressure altitude adjusted for the current temperature and humidity.
How High Temperatures, High Humidity, and High Elevation Affect Air Density
Warm air:
Warmer air has more energetic molecules and is less dense, leading to lower performance.
Humid air:
While humidity is less significant than temperature, it does reduce engine power.
High elevation:
At higher altitudes, there are fewer air molecules above, resulting in lower air density.
The Effect on Aircraft Performance
Low Density Altitude (e.g., Cold, Dry Air at Sea Level):
Air is denser, providing more lift and engine power.
This results in a shorter takeoff roll and better climb performance.
High Density Altitude (e.g., Hot, Humid Air at 5,000 ft):
Air is thinner, leading to less lift and engine power.
An aircraft will require a longer takeoff roll and have a reduced climb rate.
Pilot's Guide
Calculate density altitude:
Always check the density altitude before flying to understand how it will impact your aircraft.
Plan for performance limitations:
On a hot day at a high-altitude airport, you might need a longer runway or need to delay your flight until conditions are cooler and air density is higher.
Go-around if in doubt:
If takeoff or landing performance is questionable, perform a go-around to ensure safety.
What is Density Altitude?
An indicator of performance:
Density altitude is not an actual altitude but a way to express how dense the air is, which directly affects how an aircraft will perform.
Corrected for temperature and humidity:
It's essentially the pressure altitude adjusted for the current temperature and humidity.
How High Temperatures, High Humidity, and High Elevation Affect Air Density
Warm air:
Warmer air has more energetic molecules and is less dense, leading to lower performance.
Humid air:
While humidity is less significant than temperature, it does reduce engine power.
High elevation:
At higher altitudes, there are fewer air molecules above, resulting in lower air density.
The Effect on Aircraft Performance
Low Density Altitude (e.g., Cold, Dry Air at Sea Level):
Air is denser, providing more lift and engine power.
This results in a shorter takeoff roll and better climb performance.
High Density Altitude (e.g., Hot, Humid Air at 5,000 ft):
Air is thinner, leading to less lift and engine power.
An aircraft will require a longer takeoff roll and have a reduced climb rate.
Pilot's Guide
Calculate density altitude:
Always check the density altitude before flying to understand how it will impact your aircraft.
Plan for performance limitations:
On a hot day at a high-altitude airport, you might need a longer runway or need to delay your flight until conditions are cooler and air density is higher.
Go-around if in doubt:
If takeoff or landing performance is questionable, perform a go-around to ensure safety.
FINAL REPORT - A dark-night IFR into Gaithersburg, Maryland, turned into national news when a Mooney M20J ended up hanging from a powerline tower. On November 27, 2022, N201RF was inbound for the RNAV 14 approach in dense fog—ceilings around 200 feet and visibility barely a mile. Another airplane ahead had already gone missed. Still, the Mooney pressed on.
The pilot had about 1,475 hours with 500 in type, but not much recent actual IMC. He asked for the lower-minimums approach, but automation setup became a problem. Mis-programmed avionics meant no vertical guidance; effectively, he was flying LNAV-only, with higher minimums. ADS-B shows the airplane consistently low—crossing fixes hundreds of feet below published altitudes, and drifting left of course.
At 1.25 miles from the runway, in fog and off the centerline, the Mooney struck a powerline tower and came to rest suspended 100 feet in the air. Miraculously, both occupants survived and were rescued after hours on live TV.
The pilot later admitted he saw the ground out the side window and tried to “pull the airport out of the soup.” That mindset—continuation bias, chasing glimpses instead of flying the published numbers—turned a marginal approach into a trap.
The lessons aren’t new, but they’re sharp reminders: know your avionics, fly the published altitudes, respect DA/MDA, and if the runway isn’t there—go missed or divert. Safety is about margins, not convenience.
The pilot had about 1,475 hours with 500 in type, but not much recent actual IMC. He asked for the lower-minimums approach, but automation setup became a problem. Mis-programmed avionics meant no vertical guidance; effectively, he was flying LNAV-only, with higher minimums. ADS-B shows the airplane consistently low—crossing fixes hundreds of feet below published altitudes, and drifting left of course.
At 1.25 miles from the runway, in fog and off the centerline, the Mooney struck a powerline tower and came to rest suspended 100 feet in the air. Miraculously, both occupants survived and were rescued after hours on live TV.
The pilot later admitted he saw the ground out the side window and tried to “pull the airport out of the soup.” That mindset—continuation bias, chasing glimpses instead of flying the published numbers—turned a marginal approach into a trap.
The lessons aren’t new, but they’re sharp reminders: know your avionics, fly the published altitudes, respect DA/MDA, and if the runway isn’t there—go missed or divert. Safety is about margins, not convenience.
* Final Report * Ground Collision
N420AW CRJ-200 Air Wisconsin Flight 6181 Chicago Illinois 01 FEB 2025
1 Serious Injury
Pilot Flight Time:
PIC - 17000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 14500 hours (Total, this make and model)
Copilot - 1190 hours (Total, all aircraft), 259 hours (Total, this make and model)
A serious injury was sustained by a tug driver following a collision with the left wing of Air Wisconsin flight 6181, a CRJ-200, during taxi operations at Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD). No injuries were reported among the airplane’s crew or passengers. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.
Flight 6181 landed at ORD and was initially held at the B Pad for an open gate. Once cleared, the aircraft proceeded southbound on Taxiway A under a standard clearance. The first officer was actively monitoring both ramp and ground control frequencies during the taxi.
The captain reported first observing the tug on Taxiway B as the tug began crossing at the access road. The tug appeared to be slowing down suggesting an intent to stop. The captain could not recall whether the tug’s headlights were illuminated and believed he saw the vehicle using ambient lighting.
After briefly diverting attention toward the gate area, the captain looked back and recognized an imminent collision with the tug. Braking was initiated immediately by the captain, but the impact occurred shortly thereafter. The captain described the impact as “not that bad” and believed the tug had struck the wingtip. The flight crew then communicated with the flight attendants, followed by dispatch via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS).
According to the tug driver, while returning from the international terminal, the vehicle approached the service road leading to the L gates. Before entering the road and crossing taxiway B, the tug came to a complete stop at the designated stop sign and the driver observed an airplane taxiing outbound on Taxiway B. The driver checked both directions and waited until the outbound aircraft cleared the taxiway. The driver also verified that no aircraft were approaching from behind or the opposite direction before proceeding to cross the taxiways (A&B).
The driver stated that as the tug was crossing the taxiways, the left wing of flight 6181, approaching on taxiway A, was not visible until the last moment, leaving insufficient time to react. He also noted the absence of a nose-gear light on flight 6181, which may have contributed to the tug driver not detecting the presence of flight 6181 before the collision.
The collision resulted in the tug overturning and trapping the driver, leading to serious injury. Post-flight inspection revealed substantial damage to the leading-edge front spar of the airplane’s left wing. The tug driver emphasized that had he been aware of the airplane’s presence, he would not have entered the intersection.
According to the Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA) ground motor vehicle operating regulations manual, dated August 2023, a driver must stop prior to initiating the crossing of the taxiways A, B, and V to determine if the crossing could be accomplished without stopping in the islands between the taxiways. Vehicles on service roads must yield to vehicles crossing taxiways.
Probable Cause and Findings:
The tug driver’s failure to ensure the taxiway was clear of aircraft prior to crossing, resulting in a collision with the left wing of the taxiing aircraft. Contributing to the accident was the limited visibility of the aircraft due to ambient lighting conditions and the absence of the aircraft’s nose-gear light, which reduced the tug driver’s ability to detect the aircraft’s presence in time to avoid the collision.
N420AW CRJ-200 Air Wisconsin Flight 6181 Chicago Illinois 01 FEB 2025
1 Serious Injury
Pilot Flight Time:
PIC - 17000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 14500 hours (Total, this make and model)
Copilot - 1190 hours (Total, all aircraft), 259 hours (Total, this make and model)
A serious injury was sustained by a tug driver following a collision with the left wing of Air Wisconsin flight 6181, a CRJ-200, during taxi operations at Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD). No injuries were reported among the airplane’s crew or passengers. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.
Flight 6181 landed at ORD and was initially held at the B Pad for an open gate. Once cleared, the aircraft proceeded southbound on Taxiway A under a standard clearance. The first officer was actively monitoring both ramp and ground control frequencies during the taxi.
The captain reported first observing the tug on Taxiway B as the tug began crossing at the access road. The tug appeared to be slowing down suggesting an intent to stop. The captain could not recall whether the tug’s headlights were illuminated and believed he saw the vehicle using ambient lighting.
After briefly diverting attention toward the gate area, the captain looked back and recognized an imminent collision with the tug. Braking was initiated immediately by the captain, but the impact occurred shortly thereafter. The captain described the impact as “not that bad” and believed the tug had struck the wingtip. The flight crew then communicated with the flight attendants, followed by dispatch via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS).
According to the tug driver, while returning from the international terminal, the vehicle approached the service road leading to the L gates. Before entering the road and crossing taxiway B, the tug came to a complete stop at the designated stop sign and the driver observed an airplane taxiing outbound on Taxiway B. The driver checked both directions and waited until the outbound aircraft cleared the taxiway. The driver also verified that no aircraft were approaching from behind or the opposite direction before proceeding to cross the taxiways (A&B).
The driver stated that as the tug was crossing the taxiways, the left wing of flight 6181, approaching on taxiway A, was not visible until the last moment, leaving insufficient time to react. He also noted the absence of a nose-gear light on flight 6181, which may have contributed to the tug driver not detecting the presence of flight 6181 before the collision.
The collision resulted in the tug overturning and trapping the driver, leading to serious injury. Post-flight inspection revealed substantial damage to the leading-edge front spar of the airplane’s left wing. The tug driver emphasized that had he been aware of the airplane’s presence, he would not have entered the intersection.
According to the Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA) ground motor vehicle operating regulations manual, dated August 2023, a driver must stop prior to initiating the crossing of the taxiways A, B, and V to determine if the crossing could be accomplished without stopping in the islands between the taxiways. Vehicles on service roads must yield to vehicles crossing taxiways.
Probable Cause and Findings:
The tug driver’s failure to ensure the taxiway was clear of aircraft prior to crossing, resulting in a collision with the left wing of the taxiing aircraft. Contributing to the accident was the limited visibility of the aircraft due to ambient lighting conditions and the absence of the aircraft’s nose-gear light, which reduced the tug driver’s ability to detect the aircraft’s presence in time to avoid the collision.
2003 Iranian Air Force IL-76 Crash – 275 Lost in Fog & Silence | Pro Plane Pilot
https://proplanepilot.com/2003-iranian-air-force-il-76-crash/
https://proplanepilot.com/2003-iranian-air-force-il-76-crash/
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2003 Iranian Air Force IL-76 Crash – 275 Lost in Fog & Silence | Pro Plane Pilot
Read about the 2003 Iranian Air Force IL-76 crash in Kerman that killed 275 people. Full details, timeline, and key facts.