AMuS пишет, что ящерицу сбил в 8-м повороте Алонсо

Spinosa next, to hide his black Design,
And to his Side th' unwary to incline,
For Heav'n his Ensigns treacherous displays,
Declares for God, while he that God betrays:
For whom he's pleas'd such Evidence to bring,
As saves the Name, while it subverts the Thing

A rose in winter has an essence, in summer it has an existence also (Watts, Logic):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CTpyz63q-6c&ab_channel=%D0%9C%D1%83%D0%B7%D1%8B%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8

But above all, the Hot-brain’d Atheist Crew,
That ever Greece, or Rome, or Britain knew,
Wave all their Laurels, and their Palms to You.
Spinoza Smiles, and cries – The Work is done;
L-----T shall Finish; (Satan’s Darling Son:)
L-----T shall Finish, what Spinoza first Begun

Катехизис атеиста из работы Ч. Уолзли религиозного апологета второй половины 17 века:

Quest
DO you believe there is a God?
A. No: I believe there is none.

Q. What is the true ground of your belief?
A. Because I have no mind there should be one.

Q. What other reason do you give for it?
A. Because I never saw him.

Q. If there be a God, must he not be infinite, and so invisible?
A. Yes, if there be one, he must.

Q. Why then do you demand to see him?
A. Because I know I cannot see him, and so may have a sure ground to deny him.

Q. If there be no God, how came this world to be?
A. It made it self by meer chance.

Q. After what manner was it first pieced together?
A. By a casual hit of Atoms one against another.

Q. How came those Atoms so to hit one against another?
A. As they were eternally dancing about, in an infinite space.

Q. Whence came the reason of mankind; and all that order and regularity we find in the world?
A. From the meer accidental conjunction of those Atoms.

Q. What is that men call Religion?
A. A politick cheat put upon the world.

Q. Who were the first contrivers of this cheat?
A. Some cunning men that designed to keep the world in subjection and awe.

Q. What was the first ground of it?
A. Men were frighted with Tales, that were told them, about invisible nothings.

Q. When did this fright first seize men?
A. 'Tis very long ago: and (for ought we can find) 'tis as old as the world it self.

Q. Has this fright upon men been general?
A. Yes: The whole world, in all ages of it, have been possessed with a fear of nothing.

Q. What is the great end that every man is to live to?
A. To please himself.

Q. How prove you that?
A. Because there is nothing above him: and so he is his own Law.

Q. Are men to make any distinction in their actions?
A. No further, nor upon no other account, but as they please or displease themselves?

Q. Is there any such thing as good and evil?
A. No; 'tis a distinction the world hath been conzened with.

Q. When was that distinction first brought into the world?
A. 'Tis of the same date with those fables about a Deity; and relates wholly to them.

Q. Is there any thing for a man to hope for, or stand in fear of, beyond this world?
A. No, nothing at all.

Q. What becomes of a man when he dyes?
A. He returns into his first Atoms.

Q. What becomes of those Atoms?
A They still help to carry on the great round of the world.

(Wolseley, The unreasonableness of atheism made manifest in a discourse written by the command of a person of honour)

Кант:

Таким образом, всякий спор о природе нашего мыслящего существа и связи его с телесным миром есть лишь результат того, что пробел в той области, о которой [спорящим] ничего не известно, восполняют паралогизмами разума, превращая свои мысли в вещи и гипостазируя их <...> каждый воображает, что будто знает, нечто о предметах, о чем ни один человек не имеет никакого понятия, или превращает свои представления в предметы и таким образом вращается в вечном кругу двусмысленностей и противоречий (А395)

Занимательно, что Кант скорее всего НЕ цитирует вот это место, так как я пока не понимаю, каким образом оно должно было достигнуть его глаз, хотя, возможно, в будущем мне удастся это выяснить:

I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves (Berkeley, Three Dialogues, 188)

The formal logician now aims at an exact and highly systematic logic, comparable in these respects with mathematics. But he cannot give the exact and systematic logic of expressions of everyday speech; for these expressions have no exact and systematic logic. What he can, and does, do is to devise a set of rules which satisfies his requirements, and, at the same time, while not doing full justice to the complexities of ordinary usage, and diverging from it in many ways, does touch ordinary usage at some vital points. The formal logician, in relation to ordinary language, might be compared with a man ostensibly mapping a piece of country of which the main contours are highly irregular and shifting. But the man is passionately addicted to geometry, and insists on using in his drawings only geometrical figures for which rules of construction can be given; and on using as few of such rules as he can. Naturally his maps will never quite fit (Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, 58)

But misgivings over the notion of analyticity are warranted also at a deeper level, where a sincere attempt has been made to guess the unspoken Weltanschauung from which the motivation and plausibility of a division of statements into analytic and synthetic arise. My guess is that that Weltanschauung is a more or less attenuated holdover of phenomenalistic reductionism (Quine, Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory, 434)