Middle East Coverage
🇪🇺/🇮🇱/🇱🇧: EU diplomats discussed the possibility of sending a mission to support the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces Reuters
🇪🇺/🇱🇧: The European Union is sending a three-year military and civilian mission to advise and train Lebanese forces.
The mission will focus on strengthening land border regiments, improving intelligence capabilities, and enhancing maritime security.
Reuters
The mission will focus on strengthening land border regiments, improving intelligence capabilities, and enhancing maritime security.
Reuters
-🇮🇱/🇱🇧 BREAKING ❗️: According to preliminary reports the IDF just struck a car in the region of Nabatiyeh.
Middle East Coverage
-🇮🇱/🇱🇧 BREAKING ❗️: According to preliminary reports the IDF just struck a car in the region of Nabatiyeh.
Reports indicate at least two dead so far
🇱🇧/🇮🇱 : The Israeli Army announced the death of an Israeli soldier last night during clashes with Hezbollah near Nabatyieh
🇱🇧/🇮🇱: The newly signed deal between Israel and Lebanon raises many questions. Is it a realistic agreement? Is it merely a way for Israel to save face after facing pressure from Trump and a way to end this campaign in Lebanon without losing credibility in an election year for Netanyahu? Or is it just another meaningless deal that will end up in the trash bin of history, like so many before it?
Well, it’s a bit of all of that.
Let’s start with the positive aspects of this deal.
On paper, it’s good for everyone except Iran and Hezbollah. But guess who isn’t part of the agreement? Obviously Iran and Hezbollah. That’s a bit of a problem when you’re making an agreement without the main protagonists being bound by it. Some would argue that Lebanon speaks on their behalf and that Hezbollah is merely a political party, but we all know that’s not the case—otherwise, we wouldn’t be in this situation.
This deal was fairly predictable. What isn’t predictable is how the different parties will react to it. We can already predict Hezbollah’s reaction. Naim Qassem and various Hezbollah officials have already stated that they consider this agreement non-binding and that they will not abide by it. Israel, meanwhile, has stated that it will continue dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure and keep operating against Hezbollah south of the Litani. In other words, the two main protagonists will keep fighting.
What this agreement does accomplish, however, is placing the Lebanese state in the anti-Iran camp. Needless to say, that’s true only on paper for now. And that’s what this agreement is really about. First and foremost, it’s about the Lebanese state. Will it have the courage—and the capabilities—to act against Hezbollah and enforce these terms? Or will it continue dodging the issue and caving in to Hezbollah’s threats of a renewed civil war?
That is the core of the agreement. Not Iran. Not Israel. Not Hezbollah. The Lebanese state.
It has taken a first step by signing this agreement. Now it’s up to it to act.
In my opinion, I wouldn’t expect much from this agreement. The Lebanese state has repeatedly demonstrated both its inability and its unwillingness to act. I don’t see anything changing in the near future.
But let’s wait and see. After all, this agreement is not intended for those you might think it is.
What’s written in this agreement is nothing more than the public positions each side has already taken. The only difference is that they’re now written down in a single document.
And you know who loves paper and agreements? Trump, obviously—you probably thought that’s who I meant. But this time I’m talking about someone else: the European Union and the Western world in general.
This agreement undercuts the argument of those claiming that Israel is acting unlawfully in Lebanon. Of course, supporters of the Islamic Republic and many of the pro-Palestinian Islamo-leftists in Europe don’t really care about Lebanese sovereignty and were quick to label the Lebanese president a Zionist. But this agreement deprives them of the legal basis for continuing to protest in the name of the Lebanese state and international law.
The Lebanese state has spoken. It has made its position clear.
Now it’s up to it to uphold its end of the bargain.
Well, it’s a bit of all of that.
Let’s start with the positive aspects of this deal.
On paper, it’s good for everyone except Iran and Hezbollah. But guess who isn’t part of the agreement? Obviously Iran and Hezbollah. That’s a bit of a problem when you’re making an agreement without the main protagonists being bound by it. Some would argue that Lebanon speaks on their behalf and that Hezbollah is merely a political party, but we all know that’s not the case—otherwise, we wouldn’t be in this situation.
This deal was fairly predictable. What isn’t predictable is how the different parties will react to it. We can already predict Hezbollah’s reaction. Naim Qassem and various Hezbollah officials have already stated that they consider this agreement non-binding and that they will not abide by it. Israel, meanwhile, has stated that it will continue dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure and keep operating against Hezbollah south of the Litani. In other words, the two main protagonists will keep fighting.
What this agreement does accomplish, however, is placing the Lebanese state in the anti-Iran camp. Needless to say, that’s true only on paper for now. And that’s what this agreement is really about. First and foremost, it’s about the Lebanese state. Will it have the courage—and the capabilities—to act against Hezbollah and enforce these terms? Or will it continue dodging the issue and caving in to Hezbollah’s threats of a renewed civil war?
That is the core of the agreement. Not Iran. Not Israel. Not Hezbollah. The Lebanese state.
It has taken a first step by signing this agreement. Now it’s up to it to act.
In my opinion, I wouldn’t expect much from this agreement. The Lebanese state has repeatedly demonstrated both its inability and its unwillingness to act. I don’t see anything changing in the near future.
But let’s wait and see. After all, this agreement is not intended for those you might think it is.
What’s written in this agreement is nothing more than the public positions each side has already taken. The only difference is that they’re now written down in a single document.
And you know who loves paper and agreements? Trump, obviously—you probably thought that’s who I meant. But this time I’m talking about someone else: the European Union and the Western world in general.
This agreement undercuts the argument of those claiming that Israel is acting unlawfully in Lebanon. Of course, supporters of the Islamic Republic and many of the pro-Palestinian Islamo-leftists in Europe don’t really care about Lebanese sovereignty and were quick to label the Lebanese president a Zionist. But this agreement deprives them of the legal basis for continuing to protest in the name of the Lebanese state and international law.
The Lebanese state has spoken. It has made its position clear.
Now it’s up to it to uphold its end of the bargain.
🇧🇭/ 🇰🇼/🇮🇷/🇺🇸 : Bahreini and Kuwaiti authorities announced they intercepted Iranian missiles and drones last night.
🇸🇮/🇮🇱/🇵🇸: The newly elected Slovenian Prime Minister has withdrawn recognition of the Palestinian state and announced the relocation of Slovenia’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
🇸🇦/🇶🇦/🇮🇱 : An Haaretz investigation revealed that Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries sold hundreds of millions of advanced Israeli weapon systems to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, including missile defense systems and combat helmets, despite the absence of official diplomatic ties between both countries
🇮🇶/ 🇮🇷 : A large scale arrest of pro-Iran Iraqi politicians occurred last night in the green zone in Baghdad. All this is happening just a few months after the election of a new prime minister in Iraq.
🇺🇸/🇮🇷 : Following the mutual attacks, Negotiation talks in Switzerland between the U.S. and Iran have been canceled (Wall Street Journal).
🇪🇺/🇪🇸: The Decay of European Democracy
Spanish left-wing Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has just announced that he has given the green light to the regularization of one million immigrants in Spain, the overwhelming majority of whom are Arabs or Muslims. Spain has essentially decided to commit cultural suicide—not out of despair, but as a deliberate policy. It is a deliberate move by the Spanish government to erase Western culture and allow the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam to gain a stronger foothold in Spain. Six hundred years after the Reconquista, Islam is regaining a stronghold in Europe. But this time, I’m not sure most Spaniards and Europeans are willing to put up a fight.
Where did all of this start?
The Great Replacement, if you look it up on Wikipedia, is defined as a “far-right conspiracy theory.” Laughable, isn’t it? All one needs to do is look at the figures to see the harsh reality behind this so-called theory. Across Europe, the number of Muslims has steadily grown. From making up less than 2–3% of the population in the 1970s, Muslims now account for roughly 10% of France’s population, 8% in Germany, 8% in Sweden, 8% in Belgium, and so on. And those numbers continue to grow—rapidly.
Yet this is the first time a European prime minister has openly admitted his willingness to facilitate this replacement. Pedro Sánchez, who has led the charge against Israel in Europe, has effectively given the Muslim Brotherhood a stronger foothold on the continent. It’s not difficult to see the connection for anyone willing to look.
Pedro Sánchez’s wife and several people close to him are facing corruption investigations. I wouldn’t be surprised if Qatar and its affiliates end up being implicated at some point. The support Sánchez offered Iran during this war was, in my view, more outspoken than that of many Muslim countries. That speaks volumes. But it is not surprising. Sánchez and his left-wing allies have always had this replacement project in the back of their minds; they simply lacked the credibility and political support to implement it.
So how do you get people to support you? You find a scapegoat—namely, Israel. Israel is a gift for politicians. You can secure a large share of the Muslim vote simply by taking a stance against Israel. There is no need for economic promises, social reforms, or policies in any other field. Just say “Free Palestine,” and you automatically gain support from many voters.
Now Sánchez and those left-wing ideologues have found the political base they needed to pursue their Great Replacement agenda. And the opposition, though it exists, is scattered and struggling. Most Spaniards reject this plan, but they are incapable of uniting. Why? The answer is simple. Too many Spaniards and Europeans refuse to see this cultural conflict as an existential one. They still naively believe that what happened in the Middle East, where Islam largely replaced Christianity in many areas, cannot happen in Europe. God knows why they refuse to see it.
The war has already started. And the Islamo-left is winning it—not because it is stronger than the other side, but because the other side refuses to admit that it is in a war.
Spanish left-wing Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has just announced that he has given the green light to the regularization of one million immigrants in Spain, the overwhelming majority of whom are Arabs or Muslims. Spain has essentially decided to commit cultural suicide—not out of despair, but as a deliberate policy. It is a deliberate move by the Spanish government to erase Western culture and allow the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam to gain a stronger foothold in Spain. Six hundred years after the Reconquista, Islam is regaining a stronghold in Europe. But this time, I’m not sure most Spaniards and Europeans are willing to put up a fight.
Where did all of this start?
The Great Replacement, if you look it up on Wikipedia, is defined as a “far-right conspiracy theory.” Laughable, isn’t it? All one needs to do is look at the figures to see the harsh reality behind this so-called theory. Across Europe, the number of Muslims has steadily grown. From making up less than 2–3% of the population in the 1970s, Muslims now account for roughly 10% of France’s population, 8% in Germany, 8% in Sweden, 8% in Belgium, and so on. And those numbers continue to grow—rapidly.
Yet this is the first time a European prime minister has openly admitted his willingness to facilitate this replacement. Pedro Sánchez, who has led the charge against Israel in Europe, has effectively given the Muslim Brotherhood a stronger foothold on the continent. It’s not difficult to see the connection for anyone willing to look.
Pedro Sánchez’s wife and several people close to him are facing corruption investigations. I wouldn’t be surprised if Qatar and its affiliates end up being implicated at some point. The support Sánchez offered Iran during this war was, in my view, more outspoken than that of many Muslim countries. That speaks volumes. But it is not surprising. Sánchez and his left-wing allies have always had this replacement project in the back of their minds; they simply lacked the credibility and political support to implement it.
So how do you get people to support you? You find a scapegoat—namely, Israel. Israel is a gift for politicians. You can secure a large share of the Muslim vote simply by taking a stance against Israel. There is no need for economic promises, social reforms, or policies in any other field. Just say “Free Palestine,” and you automatically gain support from many voters.
Now Sánchez and those left-wing ideologues have found the political base they needed to pursue their Great Replacement agenda. And the opposition, though it exists, is scattered and struggling. Most Spaniards reject this plan, but they are incapable of uniting. Why? The answer is simple. Too many Spaniards and Europeans refuse to see this cultural conflict as an existential one. They still naively believe that what happened in the Middle East, where Islam largely replaced Christianity in many areas, cannot happen in Europe. God knows why they refuse to see it.
The war has already started. And the Islamo-left is winning it—not because it is stronger than the other side, but because the other side refuses to admit that it is in a war.
🇴🇲/🇮🇷/🇺🇸: Oman recently sent an official proposal to the United States and Western countries that shipping companies would pay service fees for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman’s proposal is partly based on arrangements in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, where a private foundation collects voluntary donations to fund navigation safety. In theory, payments in the Strait of Hormuz should also be voluntary, but an Iranian source claimed that from Tehran’s perspective these payments would be mandatory. (NYT)
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Middle East Coverage
🇴🇲/🇮🇷/🇺🇸: Oman recently sent an official proposal to the United States and Western countries that shipping companies would pay service fees for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Oman’s proposal is partly based on arrangements in the Straits of Malacca…
🇮🇷/🌍: Why Iran is extremely unlikely to impose transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz.
Calls for Iran to start charging every ship crossing the Strait of Hormuz resurface whenever tensions rise. In reality, such a move is highly unlikely—not only for economic reasons, but also because it would run contrary to the long-standing legal regime governing one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait used for navigation between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Under the rules reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships and aircraft enjoy a right of transit passage through such straits. That regime is designed to ensure continuous and unimpeded international navigation and does not provide a basis for a coastal state to unilaterally impose transit tolls on vessels simply for passing through.
Even though Iran has not ratified UNCLOS, it has signed the convention, and many of its navigation provisions are widely regarded as reflecting customary international law. More importantly, the overwhelming majority of the world’s maritime trading nations rely on freedom of navigation and would strongly oppose any attempt to establish unilateral passage fees.
Such a measure would likely trigger diplomatic protests, legal disputes, and potentially freedom of navigation operations by affected states. Countries importing Gulf oil—from China and India to Japan, South Korea, and European states—have little incentive to accept a precedent that would allow a coastal state to tax international transit through one of the world’s busiest maritime routes.
In other words, while Iran can periodically threaten to disrupt shipping or close the strait as a form of political pressure, permanently imposing transit fees on international shipping would face major legal, diplomatic, and practical obstacles. That is why the proposal remains far more plausible as political messaging than as a realistic long-term policy.
It’s not only the US-iran deal this time but rather Iran Vs the rest of the world. Highly unlikely to see the world agreeing to Iran piracy.
Calls for Iran to start charging every ship crossing the Strait of Hormuz resurface whenever tensions rise. In reality, such a move is highly unlikely—not only for economic reasons, but also because it would run contrary to the long-standing legal regime governing one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait used for navigation between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Under the rules reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships and aircraft enjoy a right of transit passage through such straits. That regime is designed to ensure continuous and unimpeded international navigation and does not provide a basis for a coastal state to unilaterally impose transit tolls on vessels simply for passing through.
Even though Iran has not ratified UNCLOS, it has signed the convention, and many of its navigation provisions are widely regarded as reflecting customary international law. More importantly, the overwhelming majority of the world’s maritime trading nations rely on freedom of navigation and would strongly oppose any attempt to establish unilateral passage fees.
Such a measure would likely trigger diplomatic protests, legal disputes, and potentially freedom of navigation operations by affected states. Countries importing Gulf oil—from China and India to Japan, South Korea, and European states—have little incentive to accept a precedent that would allow a coastal state to tax international transit through one of the world’s busiest maritime routes.
In other words, while Iran can periodically threaten to disrupt shipping or close the strait as a form of political pressure, permanently imposing transit fees on international shipping would face major legal, diplomatic, and practical obstacles. That is why the proposal remains far more plausible as political messaging than as a realistic long-term policy.
It’s not only the US-iran deal this time but rather Iran Vs the rest of the world. Highly unlikely to see the world agreeing to Iran piracy.
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🇮🇷/🇺🇸: The United States has informed Iran that some frozen assets will be released if it lifts the Strait of Hormuz transit fees. Tehran has currently rejected this offer. (WSJ)
🇮🇱/🇱🇧: Ongoing fighting in southern Lebanon between Israeli troops and Hezbollah operatives. Preliminary reports talk about one Israeli soldier in critical condition
🇺🇸/🇴🇲/🇰🇼/🇸🇦/🇶🇦/🇧🇭/🇾🇪 : The US Central Command (CENTCOM) held a conference in Bahrain, bringing together twelve military commanders from the region. Admiral Brad Cooper, CENTCOM Commander, presided over the event, which was attended by representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
🇱🇧/ 🇮🇱BREAKING ❗️: For the first time since the brokered ceasefire sirens sounded in Northern Israel
🇮🇱/ 🇵🇸 : A Palestinian police force will begin training in the coming weeks to take over law enforcement duties in the experimental areas in Rafah.
- Members of the police force will be equipped with electric stun guns and their non-affiliation with Hamas will be confirmed.
- Two security circles will be established around the experimental areas under the responsibility of the international stabilization force.
- The Israeli army will deploy in the outer circle to separate Hamas and the stabilization force in the experimental areas.
Source : Israel Hayom
- Members of the police force will be equipped with electric stun guns and their non-affiliation with Hamas will be confirmed.
- Two security circles will be established around the experimental areas under the responsibility of the international stabilization force.
- The Israeli army will deploy in the outer circle to separate Hamas and the stabilization force in the experimental areas.
Source : Israel Hayom
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🇮🇷 : The Iranian opposition compares attendance at Freddie Mercury’s concert at Wembley in London (July 1985) with 72,000 people, and attendance at Ali Khamenei’s prayers and funeral at the Tehran mosque (July 2026).
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The Future of Iran’s Proxy Strategy After the 2024–2026 Regional Conflicts
Iran and its proxies have suffered tremendous losses over the past three years. Most of them still exist, but not all of them carry the same strategic value for Tehran. The question now is not whether the Axis of Resistance survives, but how Iran will choose to rebuild it.
Iran remains indispensable to its proxies for two primary reasons: money and diplomacy.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Iran has become the only sovereign state within the so-called Axis of Resistance. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis, it possesses diplomatic legitimacy, embassies, and representation at international institutions. It is therefore the political and diplomatic voice of the Axis, defending its allies’ interests and narratives on the international stage.
Yet diplomacy alone does not sustain proxy organizations.
Money does.
Over the past three years, Iran and nearly all of its regional allies have suffered significant military and economic losses. Regardless of the exact figures, the reconstruction costs facing the Axis are enormous. Every major proxy now requires substantial financial assistance to recover.
Hezbollah illustrates this challenge particularly well.
For decades, Hezbollah has maintained its legitimacy among Lebanon’s Shiite population by providing welfare, healthcare, education, and financial support where the Lebanese state has often failed. Today, however, the organization faces unprecedented financial pressure. Thousands of families expect compensation, wounded fighters require long-term care, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure demands vast resources.
At the same time, the collapse of the Assad regime has disrupted the regional networks that reportedly generated significant revenue for Hezbollah, including the Captagon trade. Iran increasingly appears to be Hezbollah’s principal remaining financial backer.
Hamas faces a different—but equally difficult—reality.
Its military capabilities have been severely degraded, and while many expected Arab states to finance Gaza’s reconstruction, substantial reconstruction funding linked to Hamas has yet to materialize. Moreover, several regional actors have made clear that they do not envision Hamas governing Gaza in the future. Iran therefore remains one of the few states openly committed to maintaining Hamas as a military and political actor.
The Houthis are arguably in a stronger position militarily, but they too remain dependent on Iranian assistance. Although the U.S.-led bombing campaign achieved limited military results, it imposed additional economic costs on an already impoverished territory. Sustaining prolonged military operations requires continued external financing, and Iran remains their principal sponsor.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has seen one of its most important long-term strategic investments collapse. After more than a decade of political, military, and financial involvement in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Tehran’s regional strategy.
Iran itself has also suffered severe economic damage. While estimates vary considerably, analysts broadly agree that recent conflicts have imposed substantial costs on the Iranian economy, further reducing Tehran’s financial flexibility.
In short, every major actor within the Axis of Resistance now needs the same thing: money.
⸻
A Competition for Limited Resources
This is where Tehran faces its greatest strategic dilemma.
despite the temporary suspension of the sanctions, it became clear to them that no bank in the West is willing to do business with them for two months. They are offering steep discounts, but have not sold even one barrel of oil. In addition, no asset was unfrozen. The Gulf states have no desire to lift a finger for them.
Consequently, Iran must now prioritize.
Iran and its proxies have suffered tremendous losses over the past three years. Most of them still exist, but not all of them carry the same strategic value for Tehran. The question now is not whether the Axis of Resistance survives, but how Iran will choose to rebuild it.
Iran remains indispensable to its proxies for two primary reasons: money and diplomacy.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Iran has become the only sovereign state within the so-called Axis of Resistance. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis, it possesses diplomatic legitimacy, embassies, and representation at international institutions. It is therefore the political and diplomatic voice of the Axis, defending its allies’ interests and narratives on the international stage.
Yet diplomacy alone does not sustain proxy organizations.
Money does.
Over the past three years, Iran and nearly all of its regional allies have suffered significant military and economic losses. Regardless of the exact figures, the reconstruction costs facing the Axis are enormous. Every major proxy now requires substantial financial assistance to recover.
Hezbollah illustrates this challenge particularly well.
For decades, Hezbollah has maintained its legitimacy among Lebanon’s Shiite population by providing welfare, healthcare, education, and financial support where the Lebanese state has often failed. Today, however, the organization faces unprecedented financial pressure. Thousands of families expect compensation, wounded fighters require long-term care, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure demands vast resources.
At the same time, the collapse of the Assad regime has disrupted the regional networks that reportedly generated significant revenue for Hezbollah, including the Captagon trade. Iran increasingly appears to be Hezbollah’s principal remaining financial backer.
Hamas faces a different—but equally difficult—reality.
Its military capabilities have been severely degraded, and while many expected Arab states to finance Gaza’s reconstruction, substantial reconstruction funding linked to Hamas has yet to materialize. Moreover, several regional actors have made clear that they do not envision Hamas governing Gaza in the future. Iran therefore remains one of the few states openly committed to maintaining Hamas as a military and political actor.
The Houthis are arguably in a stronger position militarily, but they too remain dependent on Iranian assistance. Although the U.S.-led bombing campaign achieved limited military results, it imposed additional economic costs on an already impoverished territory. Sustaining prolonged military operations requires continued external financing, and Iran remains their principal sponsor.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has seen one of its most important long-term strategic investments collapse. After more than a decade of political, military, and financial involvement in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Tehran’s regional strategy.
Iran itself has also suffered severe economic damage. While estimates vary considerably, analysts broadly agree that recent conflicts have imposed substantial costs on the Iranian economy, further reducing Tehran’s financial flexibility.
In short, every major actor within the Axis of Resistance now needs the same thing: money.
⸻
A Competition for Limited Resources
This is where Tehran faces its greatest strategic dilemma.
despite the temporary suspension of the sanctions, it became clear to them that no bank in the West is willing to do business with them for two months. They are offering steep discounts, but have not sold even one barrel of oil. In addition, no asset was unfrozen. The Gulf states have no desire to lift a finger for them.
Consequently, Iran must now prioritize.