ππ liboemcrypto disabler
Disables liboemcrypto.so on rooted devices to allow DRM-protected content to play (e.g. Netflix, My5, etc.).
β³οΈ Author: ianmacd, modded by hzy132
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ Disable Logd
Magisk module that disable logd service
β³οΈ Author: Xenoxis, Keinta15
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ ZDT-D
π° Key Features
A Magisk module designed to bypass DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) on the internet. It helps bypass service blocks and throttling for platforms like Discord, YouTube, and others. This module is tailored for users in Russia and comes with preconfigured settings to overcome restrictions.
π° Key Features
β’ Bypass blocks and service throttling
β’ User-friendly graphical interface for configuration (not supported on all devices)
β’ Automatic download of up-to-date block lists and binaries from trusted repositories
β³οΈ Author: @GAME_OVER_op, Ggover
β³οΈ Telegram: Group
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @mrpstorage
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ Sudo for Android NDK
Use sudo on Android shell.
Notice
sudo -e <filepath> need to install nano-ndk module.
β Support Root Manager
β’ Magisk, KernelSU, Apatch
β³οΈ Author: natsumerinchan
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
Nothing Phone 2a Bootloader Exploit Working
A new exploit called Fenrir targets the Nothing Phone 2a, CMF Phone 1 & other MediaTek-powered devices. It takes advantage of a flaw in how the phone starts up, allowing full control over the device before Android even loads. Even after waiting for 1 month, Nothing ignored the developer's bootloader vulnerability report affecting CMF Phone 1 and Phone 2a and thus developer made it exploit public.
When you power on your phone, it goes through several steps to make sure everything is secure and untampered. This is called the secure boot chain. Each of these steps is trusted only if the previous one verifies it.
1. BootROM β The first code built into the chip. It loads the next part.
2. Preloader β Loads the next component, called bl2_ext, and normally checks it.
3. bl2_ext β This runs at the highest privilege level (EL3) and is supposed to check everything else.
4. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) β Handles secure operations like fingerprint data and encryption.
5. GenieZone β A MediaTek component that manages access to the secure system.
6. LK / AEE β Boots the Android operating system and handles crash logging.
7. Linux Kernel β This is Android. The phone is now fully booted.
This exploit abuses a flaw in the MediaTek boot chain. When the bootloader is unlocked (
Additionally, the included PoC also spoofs the deviceβs lock state as locked so you can pass strong integrity checks anywhere while being unlocked. Someone even managed to pass Basic, Device and Strong integrity on LineageOS for Phone 2a without rooting, spoofing, using pixel fingerprint or leaked keybox.
Vivo X80 Pro is also vulnerable & it has a more severe version of the flaw, as it fails to verify bl2_ext even with a locked bootloader. You can read more about the usage of exploit here:
https://github.com/R0rt1z2/fenrir
Follow @TechLeaksZone
A new exploit called Fenrir targets the Nothing Phone 2a, CMF Phone 1 & other MediaTek-powered devices. It takes advantage of a flaw in how the phone starts up, allowing full control over the device before Android even loads. Even after waiting for 1 month, Nothing ignored the developer's bootloader vulnerability report affecting CMF Phone 1 and Phone 2a and thus developer made it exploit public.
When you power on your phone, it goes through several steps to make sure everything is secure and untampered. This is called the secure boot chain. Each of these steps is trusted only if the previous one verifies it.
1. BootROM β The first code built into the chip. It loads the next part.
2. Preloader β Loads the next component, called bl2_ext, and normally checks it.
3. bl2_ext β This runs at the highest privilege level (EL3) and is supposed to check everything else.
4. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) β Handles secure operations like fingerprint data and encryption.
5. GenieZone β A MediaTek component that manages access to the secure system.
6. LK / AEE β Boots the Android operating system and handles crash logging.
7. Linux Kernel β This is Android. The phone is now fully booted.
This exploit abuses a flaw in the MediaTek boot chain. When the bootloader is unlocked (
seccfg), the Preloader skips verification of the bl2_ext partition, even though bl2_ext is responsible for verifying everything that comes after it. So if bl2_ext it's not verified and can be modified, it compromises the entire secure boot process. The exploit modifies a function called sec_get_vfy_policy() inside bl2_ext, making it always return "0", so an unverified bl2_ext running at EL3 now happily loads unverified images for the rest of the boot chain.Additionally, the included PoC also spoofs the deviceβs lock state as locked so you can pass strong integrity checks anywhere while being unlocked. Someone even managed to pass Basic, Device and Strong integrity on LineageOS for Phone 2a without rooting, spoofing, using pixel fingerprint or leaked keybox.
Vivo X80 Pro is also vulnerable & it has a more severe version of the flaw, as it fails to verify bl2_ext even with a locked bootloader. You can read more about the usage of exploit here:
https://github.com/R0rt1z2/fenrir
Follow @TechLeaksZone
β€1
ππ Telegram Tweaks
[LSPosed/lspatch] Remove action bar stories in the Telegram messenger (+block unmute button)
β’ Action bar stories fix (hide or move to the drawer)
β’ Mute/unmute chat bottom button fix (make it chat/channel's notifications status label)
β’ Chat bottom gift button fix (hide it to prevent accidental taps)
β’ (Added) lspatch support
β’ (Added) block internal Telegram updates check
β³οΈ Author: MichaelZhuravsky
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ Privacy Guard
π οΈ Requirements
Protect your apps from unwanted capture.
When enabled for an app, Privacy Guard will block screenshots, block screen recording and hide app content in Recents.
π οΈ Requirements
β’ Magisk with Zygisk enabled
β’ LSPosed (Zygisk variant)
β’ Android 8.1+ recommended (tested 12β14)
β³οΈ Author: tan-dew
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
βοΈ LSPosed CLI Tools
https://github.com/rogy153/ScopeForge---LSPosed-CLI-Manager
Advanced command-line tools for managing LSPosed modules with intelligent scope discovery, automatic backup, and batch operations.
https://github.com/rogy153/ScopeForge---LSPosed-CLI-Manager
Advanced command-line tools for managing LSPosed modules with intelligent scope discovery, automatic backup, and batch operations.
GitHub
GitHub - rogy153/ScopeForge: A CLI Manager for LSPosed without using GUI apk manager
A CLI Manager for LSPosed without using GUI apk manager - rogy153/ScopeForge
ππ NextRAM
A powerful Magisk module that enhances Android device performance through intelligent memory management, ZRAM optimization, and kernel-level tuning.
β³οΈ Author: @rexamm1t, @matrix_5858
β³οΈ Telegram: Channel | Group
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
β€1
ππ Systemless APNs
Systemless Apns is a required component for the SIM Spoof utility.
β³οΈ Author: UhExooHw
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ jni_trace
android jni trace for arm64 for magisk module!
β³οΈ Author: xbyl1234
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ Syncthing for KernelSU
Syncthing is a continuous file synchronization program. It synchronizes files between two or more computers.
Syncthing for Magisk
β³οΈ Author: Laputa0
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ Gboard Lite Online Installer
π οΈ Requirements
A lightweight, optimized Google Keyboard experience for rooted Android devices
Transform your typing experience with Gboard Lite - a streamlined version of Google's flagship keyboard that delivers premium features without the bloat.
π οΈ Requirements
β’ Android Version 8.1+ (API 27+) (Android 8.1 to Android 16)
β’ Root Method KernelSU or Magisk
β’ Architecture ARM, ARM64, x86, x86_64
β’ Storage 50MB free space
β’ Internet Required for initial download
β³οΈ Author: @artistaproducer
β³οΈ Telegram: Channel | Group
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
Wild Kernel (fork of KernelSU Next) π²
Wild_KSU_Manager βΆοΈ
https://github.com/WildKernels/Wild_KSU
GKI_KernelSU_SUSFS π»
https://github.com/WildKernels/GKI_KernelSU_SUSFS
OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS 1οΈβ£
https://github.com/WildKernels/OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS
Sultan_KernelSU_SUSFS π¨βπ»
https://github.com/WildKernels/Sultan_KernelSU_SUSFS
Wild_KSU_Manager βΆοΈ
https://github.com/WildKernels/Wild_KSU
GKI_KernelSU_SUSFS π»
https://github.com/WildKernels/GKI_KernelSU_SUSFS
OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS 1οΈβ£
https://github.com/WildKernels/OnePlus_KernelSU_SUSFS
Sultan_KernelSU_SUSFS π¨βπ»
https://github.com/WildKernels/Sultan_KernelSU_SUSFS
ππ RevengeXposed
Xposed module to use Revenge on rooted Android
Revenge is a client modification for Discord Android.
β³οΈ Author: PalmDevs, revenge-mod
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport
ππ G-News Control
A Magisk & KernelSU module that allows you to enable or disable the Google news feed on your device's home screen using the ACTION button in your Root manager or through the Terminal. This feature is useful for devices that do not allow this to be done natively. WITHOUT DISABLING THE GOOGLE APP ITSELF OR REMOVING ANY OF ITS FUNCTIONALITY!
β³οΈ Author: mango0oo
πΈ GitHub repository
πΈ GitHub releases
πΈ MRP-Storage
π Bootloop Protection
π Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
π GitHub: @magiskrootport