๐๐ OverrideWenku8Reading Background
An Xposed module is used to override the default reading background of the light novel library (org.mewx.wenku8) to white for a better reading experience
โณ๏ธ Author: Z-Siqi
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @mrpstorage
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ Genshin Vulkan Enable
Enabling and disabling Vulkan in Genshin Impact. More controls may be added in the future.
โณ๏ธ Author: @tryigitx
โณ๏ธ Telegram: Group
๐ฅ GitHub repository
๐ฅ GitHub releases
๐ฅ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ฃ Join: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ฃ Join: @mrpstorage
๐ฌ Chat: @mrpdiscussion
๐๐ TikTok AntiBurn
Remove interface elements from the application using a module or overlapping elements.
to prevent the screen from burning out.
โณ๏ธ Author: 0mnr0
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ Custom LKM Loader
A simple Magisk/KSU/AP module to load your custom LKMs
https://github.com/ravindu644/Custom_LKM_Loader
A simple Magisk/KSU/AP module to load your custom LKMs
https://github.com/ravindu644/Custom_LKM_Loader
GitHub
GitHub - ravindu644/Custom_LKM_Loader: A simple Magisk/KSU/AP module to load your custom LKMs, created with: https://github.coโฆ
A simple Magisk/KSU/AP module to load your custom LKMs, created with: https://github.com/ravindu644/LKM_Tools - ravindu644/Custom_LKM_Loader
๐๐ PlayStoreSelfUpdateBlocker
โ Compatibility
Blocks Google Play Store self-updates on rooted Android devices. Supports Magisk, APatch, and KernelSU. Useful for users trying to maintain valid device attestation under the newer Play Integrity API rules.
โ Compatibility
โข Root Solutions: Magisk 24+, APatch, KernelSU
โข Android: 10+ (report issues if you find any)
โข Devices: All Android devices with supported root methods
โณ๏ธ Author: himanshujjp
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ GitHub actions
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ disable_usb_debugging
Disables USB Debugging after every reboot
โณ๏ธ Author: Aakif17
๐ฅ GitHub repository
๐ฅ GitHub releases
๐ฅ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ฃ Join: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ฃ Join: @mrpstorage
๐ฌ Chat: @mrpdiscussion
๐๐ MacDroid
A minimal, fast, and colorful CLI to manage and persist custom MAC addresses on Android via Magisk. Includes an interactive TUI (macd) and bootโtime application of a saved MAC.
โณ๏ธ Author: X-croot
๐ฅ GitHub repository
๐ฅ GitHub releases
๐ฅ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ฃ Join: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ฃ Join: @mrpstorage
๐ฌ Chat: @mrpdiscussion
๐๐ PHP7 Webserver
๐ฐ Features
PHP7 Webserver Magisk Modules For CFM.
๐ฐ Features
โข Lock Band SIM1 & SIM2 (band1 & band3)
โข ExtSDCard Explorer
โข Fixed OCGen url
โข Zashboard
โข Free and Premium VPN Menu
โณ๏ธ Author: budijoi
๐ฅ GitHub repository
๐ฅ GitHub releases
๐ฅ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ฃ Join: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ฃ Join: @mrpstorage
๐ฌ Chat: @mrpdiscussion
๐๐ Install Tinymix Utility
๐ ๏ธ Requirements:
A simple Magisk module that installs tinymix executible
Tinymix is a small system utility, adopted to Android from Linux, which allows to modify advanced system audio settings, otherwise not accessible, via terminal commands. This process is very complicated and requires prior knowledge of shell scripts. Although it can be used by advanced users as it is, via terminal interface, this module is intended to be used along with Tinymix Manager apk for better experience.
๐ ๏ธ Requirements:
โข Android 4.1+
โข Apatch (I haven't tested it on anything else)
โข Tested on Pixel 8a Android 15 Stock Rom
โข Output works with Tensor M3, the apk had a couple sections DSP and R report unsupported.
โข Will work with most Qalcomm processors, not so sure about MTK.
โณ๏ธ Author: JLukassen
๐ฅ GitHub repository
๐ฅ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ฃ Join: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ฃ Join: @mrpstorage
๐ฌ Chat: @mrpdiscussion
๐๐ liboemcrypto disabler
Disables liboemcrypto.so on rooted devices to allow DRM-protected content to play (e.g. Netflix, My5, etc.).
โณ๏ธ Author: ianmacd, modded by hzy132
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ Disable Logd
Magisk module that disable logd service
โณ๏ธ Author: Xenoxis, Keinta15
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ ZDT-D
๐ฐ Key Features
A Magisk module designed to bypass DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) on the internet. It helps bypass service blocks and throttling for platforms like Discord, YouTube, and others. This module is tailored for users in Russia and comes with preconfigured settings to overcome restrictions.
๐ฐ Key Features
โข Bypass blocks and service throttling
โข User-friendly graphical interface for configuration (not supported on all devices)
โข Automatic download of up-to-date block lists and binaries from trusted repositories
โณ๏ธ Author: @GAME_OVER_op, Ggover
โณ๏ธ Telegram: Group
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @mrpstorage
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
๐๐ Sudo for Android NDK
Use sudo on Android shell.
Notice
sudo -e <filepath> need to install nano-ndk module.
โ Support Root Manager
โข Magisk, KernelSU, Apatch
โณ๏ธ Author: natsumerinchan
๐ธ GitHub repository
๐ธ GitHub releases
๐ธ MRP-Storage
๐ Bootloop Protection
๐ Telegram: @gitdroid | @magiskrootport
๐ GitHub: @magiskrootport
Nothing Phone 2a Bootloader Exploit Working
A new exploit called Fenrir targets the Nothing Phone 2a, CMF Phone 1 & other MediaTek-powered devices. It takes advantage of a flaw in how the phone starts up, allowing full control over the device before Android even loads. Even after waiting for 1 month, Nothing ignored the developer's bootloader vulnerability report affecting CMF Phone 1 and Phone 2a and thus developer made it exploit public.
When you power on your phone, it goes through several steps to make sure everything is secure and untampered. This is called the secure boot chain. Each of these steps is trusted only if the previous one verifies it.
1. BootROM โ The first code built into the chip. It loads the next part.
2. Preloader โ Loads the next component, called bl2_ext, and normally checks it.
3. bl2_ext โ This runs at the highest privilege level (EL3) and is supposed to check everything else.
4. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) โ Handles secure operations like fingerprint data and encryption.
5. GenieZone โ A MediaTek component that manages access to the secure system.
6. LK / AEE โ Boots the Android operating system and handles crash logging.
7. Linux Kernel โ This is Android. The phone is now fully booted.
This exploit abuses a flaw in the MediaTek boot chain. When the bootloader is unlocked (
Additionally, the included PoC also spoofs the deviceโs lock state as locked so you can pass strong integrity checks anywhere while being unlocked. Someone even managed to pass Basic, Device and Strong integrity on LineageOS for Phone 2a without rooting, spoofing, using pixel fingerprint or leaked keybox.
Vivo X80 Pro is also vulnerable & it has a more severe version of the flaw, as it fails to verify bl2_ext even with a locked bootloader. You can read more about the usage of exploit here:
https://github.com/R0rt1z2/fenrir
Follow @TechLeaksZone
A new exploit called Fenrir targets the Nothing Phone 2a, CMF Phone 1 & other MediaTek-powered devices. It takes advantage of a flaw in how the phone starts up, allowing full control over the device before Android even loads. Even after waiting for 1 month, Nothing ignored the developer's bootloader vulnerability report affecting CMF Phone 1 and Phone 2a and thus developer made it exploit public.
When you power on your phone, it goes through several steps to make sure everything is secure and untampered. This is called the secure boot chain. Each of these steps is trusted only if the previous one verifies it.
1. BootROM โ The first code built into the chip. It loads the next part.
2. Preloader โ Loads the next component, called bl2_ext, and normally checks it.
3. bl2_ext โ This runs at the highest privilege level (EL3) and is supposed to check everything else.
4. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) โ Handles secure operations like fingerprint data and encryption.
5. GenieZone โ A MediaTek component that manages access to the secure system.
6. LK / AEE โ Boots the Android operating system and handles crash logging.
7. Linux Kernel โ This is Android. The phone is now fully booted.
This exploit abuses a flaw in the MediaTek boot chain. When the bootloader is unlocked (
seccfg), the Preloader skips verification of the bl2_ext partition, even though bl2_ext is responsible for verifying everything that comes after it. So if bl2_ext it's not verified and can be modified, it compromises the entire secure boot process. The exploit modifies a function called sec_get_vfy_policy() inside bl2_ext, making it always return "0", so an unverified bl2_ext running at EL3 now happily loads unverified images for the rest of the boot chain.Additionally, the included PoC also spoofs the deviceโs lock state as locked so you can pass strong integrity checks anywhere while being unlocked. Someone even managed to pass Basic, Device and Strong integrity on LineageOS for Phone 2a without rooting, spoofing, using pixel fingerprint or leaked keybox.
Vivo X80 Pro is also vulnerable & it has a more severe version of the flaw, as it fails to verify bl2_ext even with a locked bootloader. You can read more about the usage of exploit here:
https://github.com/R0rt1z2/fenrir
Follow @TechLeaksZone
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