🇬🇧 English version
Over the past year, the Ukrainian front has doubled in length, growing from 800 km — 300 km of which were only lightly active along the Dnipro — to 1,600 km. This expansion is the result of prolonged incursions along the Russia–Ukraine border, particularly in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions.
In spring 2023, Ukraine conducted cross-border operations in Bryansk and Belgorod using anti-Putin Russian groups. These were the first such actions since Russia’s withdrawal from northern and northeastern Ukraine in May 2022. The incursions continued into spring 2024 but were halted due to heavy losses and increased Russian border fortifications.
In response, Moscow created the “North/Sever” corps specifically designed for cross-border raids into Ukraine. As soon as the corps was announced in May 2024, it crossed into northern Kharkiv, seizing around 80 km² near Lyptsi and 120 km² near Vovchansk — occupying even half of that small city. The offensive was mostly carried out on foot.
Ukraine had to redeploy several units to protect Kharkiv oblast while also reinforcing positions in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions. The Russian offensive had limited results and failed to significantly threaten Kharkiv or achieve strategic gains.
In early August 2024, Ukraine’s Chief of General Staff, Syrskyi, launched a bold offensive into Russian territory with the goal of destroying the Sever corps and sowing chaos. The operation was kept completely secret. Several battalions, detached from their brigades, were quietly mobilized in the forests of Sumy to avoid attention. The plan remained undisclosed until execution.
According to @LovelyLad_, who produced the most detailed analysis on the subject, the offensive aimed to strike the rear of Russian forces on Russian soil. It opened a new front and disrupted the balance of forces, forcing Moscow to redeploy troops from Donbas.
This move also bought Ukraine time before Russian forces could enter Sumy oblast from the north. But this delay was temporary. Ten months later, Russian troops are now advancing along elevated terrain toward the city of Sumy, likely aiming to gain a position from which they can shell the city.
It was this same topography that had motivated Ukraine’s previous summer offensive. Beyond elevation, terrain is another key factor. The Russian offensive in Sumy is particularly worrying and accounts for most of Russia’s recent territorial gains — around 180 km².
With three Russian incursions now active — in Vovchansk, Lyptsi, and Sumy — a new front line is emerging. Both sides are compelled to mobilize more logistics and resources.
Border regions are being bombarded more frequently. Both armies are initiating attacks. Ukraine, for example, is targeting Tetkino, a large village posing a serious threat to Ukrainian logistics. It lies near two major routes: Sumy–Konotop and Sumy–Hlukhiv, and serves as an ideal launch point for drone attacks deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Drones are playing a central role. These border regions are at the forefront of daily deep strikes by both sides. Ukraine benefits from dense forests and urban areas to shield and coordinate its night attacks safely.
While one might expect this expanded front to be met with stronger fortifications, that hasn’t really been the case — apart from a few circular trenches around cities like Chotska, Konotop, Hlukhiv, Putyl, and Buryn. However, in such densely wooded terrain, trenches are difficult to detect from the air or on satellite imagery.
Ukraine has nonetheless been strengthening defenses north of Kharkiv, and Russia has been doing the same on its side of the border since last summer. A complete mapping of these fortifications is still underway and will be updated progressively.
The deeper issue behind these border raids is logistics: the redirection of men, equipment, munitions, drones, and entire units from the eastern front to the north and northeast.
Over the past year, the Ukrainian front has doubled in length, growing from 800 km — 300 km of which were only lightly active along the Dnipro — to 1,600 km. This expansion is the result of prolonged incursions along the Russia–Ukraine border, particularly in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions.
In spring 2023, Ukraine conducted cross-border operations in Bryansk and Belgorod using anti-Putin Russian groups. These were the first such actions since Russia’s withdrawal from northern and northeastern Ukraine in May 2022. The incursions continued into spring 2024 but were halted due to heavy losses and increased Russian border fortifications.
In response, Moscow created the “North/Sever” corps specifically designed for cross-border raids into Ukraine. As soon as the corps was announced in May 2024, it crossed into northern Kharkiv, seizing around 80 km² near Lyptsi and 120 km² near Vovchansk — occupying even half of that small city. The offensive was mostly carried out on foot.
Ukraine had to redeploy several units to protect Kharkiv oblast while also reinforcing positions in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions. The Russian offensive had limited results and failed to significantly threaten Kharkiv or achieve strategic gains.
In early August 2024, Ukraine’s Chief of General Staff, Syrskyi, launched a bold offensive into Russian territory with the goal of destroying the Sever corps and sowing chaos. The operation was kept completely secret. Several battalions, detached from their brigades, were quietly mobilized in the forests of Sumy to avoid attention. The plan remained undisclosed until execution.
According to @LovelyLad_, who produced the most detailed analysis on the subject, the offensive aimed to strike the rear of Russian forces on Russian soil. It opened a new front and disrupted the balance of forces, forcing Moscow to redeploy troops from Donbas.
This move also bought Ukraine time before Russian forces could enter Sumy oblast from the north. But this delay was temporary. Ten months later, Russian troops are now advancing along elevated terrain toward the city of Sumy, likely aiming to gain a position from which they can shell the city.
It was this same topography that had motivated Ukraine’s previous summer offensive. Beyond elevation, terrain is another key factor. The Russian offensive in Sumy is particularly worrying and accounts for most of Russia’s recent territorial gains — around 180 km².
With three Russian incursions now active — in Vovchansk, Lyptsi, and Sumy — a new front line is emerging. Both sides are compelled to mobilize more logistics and resources.
Border regions are being bombarded more frequently. Both armies are initiating attacks. Ukraine, for example, is targeting Tetkino, a large village posing a serious threat to Ukrainian logistics. It lies near two major routes: Sumy–Konotop and Sumy–Hlukhiv, and serves as an ideal launch point for drone attacks deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Drones are playing a central role. These border regions are at the forefront of daily deep strikes by both sides. Ukraine benefits from dense forests and urban areas to shield and coordinate its night attacks safely.
While one might expect this expanded front to be met with stronger fortifications, that hasn’t really been the case — apart from a few circular trenches around cities like Chotska, Konotop, Hlukhiv, Putyl, and Buryn. However, in such densely wooded terrain, trenches are difficult to detect from the air or on satellite imagery.
Ukraine has nonetheless been strengthening defenses north of Kharkiv, and Russia has been doing the same on its side of the border since last summer. A complete mapping of these fortifications is still underway and will be updated progressively.
The deeper issue behind these border raids is logistics: the redirection of men, equipment, munitions, drones, and entire units from the eastern front to the north and northeast.
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This is all happening before a front has even been opened in Chernihiv or Bryansk, which could increase the strain on Russian resources even further.
This widening of the front line highlights a crucial challenge: how to manage and distribute forces across a growing and fragmented front. Monitoring this evolution remains a top priority — particularly in terms of defensive infrastructure and troop placement.
I will continue to map out and analyze these developments. I’m now also posting my threads on Telegram — feel free to follow me there for quick updates and mirrored content across platforms.
This widening of the front line highlights a crucial challenge: how to manage and distribute forces across a growing and fragmented front. Monitoring this evolution remains a top priority — particularly in terms of defensive infrastructure and troop placement.
I will continue to map out and analyze these developments. I’m now also posting my threads on Telegram — feel free to follow me there for quick updates and mirrored content across platforms.
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Réponse à ce thread : https://x.com/ChristopheMutet/status/1931716467206087161
Merci pour ce retour, plusieurs points :
-L'offensive russe de Kharkiv n'a jamais eu pour objectif de progresser en profondeur, mais l'armée russe espérait pouvoir mettre Kharkiv dans le viseur des MLRS et faire peser une menace, notamment en capturant Vovchansk. En réalité, l'opération fut une réussite, en attirant des troupes ukrainiennes et poussant une forte bataille d'attrition dans Vovchansk. Mais elle ne pose pas de menace concrète.
-Pour le silence de l'opération de Koursk, comme je l'ai dit au général Kempf, j'évoque en particulier la volonté de ne pas ébruiter l'opération (presse, états majors locaux ou occidentaux) ainsi qu'un déploiement discret de bataillons.
-Pour ce qui est de l'échec de l'opération, il est vrai qu'elle n'a pas permis le redéploiement des troupes du Donbass. Mais d'un autre côté, les nouvelles recrues russes ont été orientées vers Koursk plutôt que Pokrovsk, jusqu'à la reprise du territoire russe.
-Enfin, pour ce qui est du passage en posture défensive, je dirai que dès le 3ème jour, l'armée ukrainienne est stoppée et forcée d'employer ses réserves qui étaient chargées de l'exploitation et qu'après 2 semaines, puisqu'aucun résultat n'a été enregistré, la décision a été prise de stopper l'offensive.
-Et pour l'analyse de Lovely Lad, dès les premiers jours, l'armée ukrainienne met en place cette logique de raids en profondeur, je me souviens de 4 exemples (une colonne de MRAP ukrainien qui progresse jusqu'à Safonovka, une colonne de blindés qui avance jusqu'à Kauchuk, de même pour une autre qui contourne Malaya Loknya et avance au nord, ou encore la colonne de BTR 82A qui avance en profondeur sur la route Soudja Belitsa mais qui subit une embuscade. Sans ces embuscades, je suis certains qu'il aurait lancé des raids toujours plus profond. Reste à savoir la préparation logistique de cette force...
Merci pour ce retour, plusieurs points :
-L'offensive russe de Kharkiv n'a jamais eu pour objectif de progresser en profondeur, mais l'armée russe espérait pouvoir mettre Kharkiv dans le viseur des MLRS et faire peser une menace, notamment en capturant Vovchansk. En réalité, l'opération fut une réussite, en attirant des troupes ukrainiennes et poussant une forte bataille d'attrition dans Vovchansk. Mais elle ne pose pas de menace concrète.
-Pour le silence de l'opération de Koursk, comme je l'ai dit au général Kempf, j'évoque en particulier la volonté de ne pas ébruiter l'opération (presse, états majors locaux ou occidentaux) ainsi qu'un déploiement discret de bataillons.
-Pour ce qui est de l'échec de l'opération, il est vrai qu'elle n'a pas permis le redéploiement des troupes du Donbass. Mais d'un autre côté, les nouvelles recrues russes ont été orientées vers Koursk plutôt que Pokrovsk, jusqu'à la reprise du territoire russe.
-Enfin, pour ce qui est du passage en posture défensive, je dirai que dès le 3ème jour, l'armée ukrainienne est stoppée et forcée d'employer ses réserves qui étaient chargées de l'exploitation et qu'après 2 semaines, puisqu'aucun résultat n'a été enregistré, la décision a été prise de stopper l'offensive.
-Et pour l'analyse de Lovely Lad, dès les premiers jours, l'armée ukrainienne met en place cette logique de raids en profondeur, je me souviens de 4 exemples (une colonne de MRAP ukrainien qui progresse jusqu'à Safonovka, une colonne de blindés qui avance jusqu'à Kauchuk, de même pour une autre qui contourne Malaya Loknya et avance au nord, ou encore la colonne de BTR 82A qui avance en profondeur sur la route Soudja Belitsa mais qui subit une embuscade. Sans ces embuscades, je suis certains qu'il aurait lancé des raids toujours plus profond. Reste à savoir la préparation logistique de cette force...
This area was designated by various accounts as the zone of the 2nd spider web opeartion, announced by Ukrainian forces yesterday.
However, there was already a fire there yesterday, and it does not originate from the railway.
There is no sign of any train in this particular area. We will wait for furthur confirmations, videos, satellite images.
However, there was already a fire there yesterday, and it does not originate from the railway.
There is no sign of any train in this particular area. We will wait for furthur confirmations, videos, satellite images.
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French version 🇫🇷
EXCLUSIF
Les images satellite prises aujourd'hui ne montrent aucun signe du bombardement d'un train transportant du ravitaillement et du carburant par des drones ukrainiens dans l'oblast de Kherson.
Cette zone a été désignée par divers témoignages comme la zone de la deuxième opération « toile d'araignée », annoncée hier par les forces ukrainiennes.
Cependant, un incendie s'y est déjà déclaré hier, et il ne provient pas de la voie ferrée.
Il n'y a aucune trace de train dans cette zone. Nous attendons confirmations, vidéos et images satellite.
EXCLUSIF
Les images satellite prises aujourd'hui ne montrent aucun signe du bombardement d'un train transportant du ravitaillement et du carburant par des drones ukrainiens dans l'oblast de Kherson.
Cette zone a été désignée par divers témoignages comme la zone de la deuxième opération « toile d'araignée », annoncée hier par les forces ukrainiennes.
Cependant, un incendie s'y est déjà déclaré hier, et il ne provient pas de la voie ferrée.
Il n'y a aucune trace de train dans cette zone. Nous attendons confirmations, vidéos et images satellite.
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Dnipropetrovsk oblast border
Frontière de l'oblast de Dnipropetrovsk
Frontière de l'oblast de Dnipropetrovsk
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English version 🇬🇧:
Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces also reinforced their defensive positions
As it advanced, the Russian army dug new trenches and positions, in addition to using the wide range of abandoned Ukrainian 🇺🇦 defenses to its advantage. North of the town of Vouhledar, a Ukrainian stronghold between 2022 and 2024, a new line of Russian trenches recently appeared on satellite images. New trenches have been identified along the entire length of the line leading to Velika Novosilka. These new trenches are positioned at this location due to the absence of major captured Ukrainian fortifications and due to the terrain, large open fields where a counterattack could hypothetically be possible.
Elsewhere, such as on the road from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk, few new positions have been spotted due to the abundance of large Ukrainian trench and dugout networks that are being reused by the Russian military, particularly for drone pilots. In southern Ukraine, I observed a slight strengthening of existing defense lines with new trenches, but without any major new defensive works. Using satellite images from 2024 in the Kherson region, I was able to complete the map of Russian fortifications that were extended along the Dnieper River and sometimes beyond.
These fortifications mainly consist of small trenches and firing positions. In the south of Ukraine, I was able to identify several interesting areas of concentration of Russian troops: dozens of positions in hedges hiding men and equipment, it is probably in these areas that the reserves, men, equipment, logistics are concentrated...
41.12341 60.15604
In the border regions of Russia, I was able to continue the mapping begun last summer, showing a vast network of fortifications in front of Kursk, Kurchatov and Lgov. I was also able to locate new defenses in front of Rylsk and behind Kurchatov. I was also able to map a defense line on the borders of the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and a series of new structures in front of the city of Belgorod. Obviously, I imagine there are many more defenses now that need to be mapped. I still have to map multiple Russian trenches and defensive lines inside Russia, near the border, such as the one here next to Vovchansk.
Additionally, there are new Google Earth images for Vuhledar from April 2024. We can see a bunch of interesting stuffs. How hidden trenches in treeline are important (multiple artillery strikes all around).
How much destroyed Russian armoured vehicles there are, before they adopt new tactics and when the frontline was heavily fortified and mined. How destroyed Vuhledar is. The effect of artillery and air strikes in the fields, but also of all the cluster bombs such as this one.
Russian 🇷🇺 armed forces also reinforced their defensive positions
As it advanced, the Russian army dug new trenches and positions, in addition to using the wide range of abandoned Ukrainian 🇺🇦 defenses to its advantage. North of the town of Vouhledar, a Ukrainian stronghold between 2022 and 2024, a new line of Russian trenches recently appeared on satellite images. New trenches have been identified along the entire length of the line leading to Velika Novosilka. These new trenches are positioned at this location due to the absence of major captured Ukrainian fortifications and due to the terrain, large open fields where a counterattack could hypothetically be possible.
Elsewhere, such as on the road from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk, few new positions have been spotted due to the abundance of large Ukrainian trench and dugout networks that are being reused by the Russian military, particularly for drone pilots. In southern Ukraine, I observed a slight strengthening of existing defense lines with new trenches, but without any major new defensive works. Using satellite images from 2024 in the Kherson region, I was able to complete the map of Russian fortifications that were extended along the Dnieper River and sometimes beyond.
These fortifications mainly consist of small trenches and firing positions. In the south of Ukraine, I was able to identify several interesting areas of concentration of Russian troops: dozens of positions in hedges hiding men and equipment, it is probably in these areas that the reserves, men, equipment, logistics are concentrated...
41.12341 60.15604
In the border regions of Russia, I was able to continue the mapping begun last summer, showing a vast network of fortifications in front of Kursk, Kurchatov and Lgov. I was also able to locate new defenses in front of Rylsk and behind Kurchatov. I was also able to map a defense line on the borders of the Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and a series of new structures in front of the city of Belgorod. Obviously, I imagine there are many more defenses now that need to be mapped. I still have to map multiple Russian trenches and defensive lines inside Russia, near the border, such as the one here next to Vovchansk.
Additionally, there are new Google Earth images for Vuhledar from April 2024. We can see a bunch of interesting stuffs. How hidden trenches in treeline are important (multiple artillery strikes all around).
How much destroyed Russian armoured vehicles there are, before they adopt new tactics and when the frontline was heavily fortified and mined. How destroyed Vuhledar is. The effect of artillery and air strikes in the fields, but also of all the cluster bombs such as this one.
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