Glitch SPY: New Android RAT Distributed Through a Fake Polish Rental App
https://cyble.com/blog/glitch-spy-rat-distributed-via-fake-polish-app/
https://cyble.com/blog/glitch-spy-rat-distributed-via-fake-polish-app/
Cyble
Glitch SPY RAT Distributed Via Fake Polish Rental App
CRIL analyzes Glitch SPY, an Android RAT with 70+ commands, crypto-clipping, and a silent remote browser, giving attackers full device control.
RedWing: A Mobile Malware-as-a-Service Operation
https://zimperium.com/blog/redwing-a-mobile-malware-as-a-service-operation
https://zimperium.com/blog/redwing-a-mobile-malware-as-a-service-operation
Zimperium
RedWing: A Mobile Malware-as-a-Service Operation
true
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GoldPickaxe Returns: When Your Biometric Information is as Important as Your Money
https://zimperium.com/blog/goldpickaxe-returns-when-your-biometric-information-is-as-important-as-your-money
https://zimperium.com/blog/goldpickaxe-returns-when-your-biometric-information-is-as-important-as-your-money
Zimperium
GoldPickaxe Returns: When Your Biometric Information is as Important as Your Money
true
π22π19β€16π8
How to Bypass mTLS on Android with Frida
https://kiratliygt.iss.onedium.com/how-to-bypass-mtls-on-android-with-frida-45c5e71373e8
https://kiratliygt.iss.onedium.com/how-to-bypass-mtls-on-android-with-frida-45c5e71373e8
Medium
How to Bypass mTLS on Android with Frida
Keywords: mTLS bypass Android, Frida mTLS, Android mutual TLS bypass, Burp Suite mTLS Android, Android mTLS pentest, PKCS12 Androidβ¦
π43β€27
RedHook Android malware abuses ADB Wireless Debugging and Shizuku to get shell-level privileges
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/redhook-android-rat-upgraded/
https://www.group-ib.com/blog/redhook-android-rat-upgraded/
Group-IB
RedHook Returns with a Dangerous Upgrade
Group-IB analysts examine this resurfaced Android Remote Access Trojan, demonstrating new, sophisticated and malicious functionalities including autonomous privilege abuse, expanded command-and-control capabilities, and a robust persistence stack.
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Forwarded from The Bug Bounty Hunter
Reading Contact Photos Without READ_CONTACTS: A Google Messages Confused Deputy Bug
https://blog.devploit.dev/posts/google-messages-avatarcontentprovider-contacts-bypass/
https://blog.devploit.dev/posts/google-messages-avatarcontentprovider-contacts-bypass/
devploit / blog
Reading Contact Photos Without READ_CONTACTS: A Google Messages Confused Deputy Bug
What happens if an app without READ_CONTACTS asks Google Messages for Android to load a Contacts photo for it?
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List of 140 vulnerabilities in Samsung preinstalled Android apps reported in 2022
https://github.com/oversecured/Samsung_Vulnerabilities
https://github.com/oversecured/Samsung_Vulnerabilities
GitHub
GitHub - oversecured/Samsung_Vulnerabilities: 176 vulnerabilities in Samsung preinstalled Android apps
176 vulnerabilities in Samsung preinstalled Android apps - oversecured/Samsung_Vulnerabilities
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Fake Bahrain Civil-Defense App Turns a Phone Into a Listening Post
https://dreamgroup.com/blog/how-a-fake-bahrain-civil-defense-app-turns-a-phone-into-a-listening-post
https://dreamgroup.com/blog/how-a-fake-bahrain-civil-defense-app-turns-a-phone-into-a-listening-post
Dreamgroup
How a Fake Bahrain Civil-Defense App Turns a Phone Into a Listening Post | | Dream Security Blog
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Flying Eagle Android RAT: Leaked Source Code, 170 Active Servers, and a New Platform Called Night Dragon
https://hunt.io/blog/flying-eagle-android-rat-170-servers-night-dragon
https://hunt.io/blog/flying-eagle-android-rat-170-servers-night-dragon
hunt.io
Flying Eagle Android RAT: Leaked Source Code, 170 Active Servers, and a New Platform Called Night Dragon
Hunt.io and NetAskari trace a leaked Android RAT framework across 170 active servers, analyze the APK builder internals, and document a successor platform called Night Dragon targeting Chinese users.
π20β€11π7
Inside an N26 Impersonation Campaign: From Vishing and Fake Control 1.0 to the Copybara Android RAT
https://www.d3lab.net/inside-an-n26-impersonation-campaign-from-vishing-and-fake-control-1-0-to-the-copybara-android-rat/
https://www.d3lab.net/inside-an-n26-impersonation-campaign-from-vishing-and-fake-control-1-0-to-the-copybara-android-rat/
D3Lab
Inside an N26 Impersonation Campaign: From Vishing and Fake Control 1.0 to the Copybara Android RAT
From a fake N26 support call to the Copybara Android RAT: inside a human-operated phishing campaign designed for on-device financial fraud.
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Root My Pixel: is an Android application designed to automate root access on Google Pixel 10 devices leveraging the NebuSec IonStack exploit (CVE-2026-43499) and integrating ReSukiSU / KernelSU
https://github.com/alex193a/Root-My-Pixel
https://github.com/alex193a/Root-My-Pixel
GitHub
GitHub - alex193a/Root-My-Pixel: Jailbreak supported Google Pixel phones with CVE-2026-43499
Jailbreak supported Google Pixel phones with CVE-2026-43499 - alex193a/Root-My-Pixel
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Octagon: Technical Analysis of a Fake Bahrain Civil Defense Application
https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/octagon-technical-analysis-of-a-fake-bahrain-civil-defense-application/
https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/octagon-technical-analysis-of-a-fake-bahrain-civil-defense-application/
K7 Labs
Octagon: Technical Analysis of a Fake Bahrain Civil Defense Application
Unlike traditional Android Remote Access Trojan (RAT), Android Octagon employs a multi-stage design that dynamically loads encrypted DEX and JAR [β¦]
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H96 Android TV Boxes Used for Ad Fraud and Residential Proxies
https://www.bitsight.com/blog/fuyao-enterprise-building-ad-fraud-empire-ai-and-kids-coding-blocks
https://www.bitsight.com/blog/fuyao-enterprise-building-ad-fraud-empire-ai-and-kids-coding-blocks
Bitsight
Uncovering the Fuyao Enterprise: A Shift in Modern Ad-Fraud
Bitsight's TRACE team exposes the "Fuyao Enterprise," a hidden Android TV botnet using 120,000+ AI digital humans to power large-scale ad fraud. Learn more.
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Zero-Click File Drop on Xiaomi ShareMe (MiDrop)
https://blog.byterialab.com/zero-click-file-drop-on-xiaomi-shareme-midrop/
https://blog.byterialab.com/zero-click-file-drop-on-xiaomi-shareme-midrop/
Byteria - Mobile Application Security Blog
Zero-Click File Drop on Xiaomi ShareMe (MiDrop) - Byteria - Mobile Application Security Blog
An attacker within Bluetooth LE range (about 50 m) can write arbitrary files to a victimβs phone the moment they open Receive mode. No QR scan
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Introducing MobHunt: agentic mobile bug bounty hunting
Blog: https://ivrodriguez.com/introducing-mobhunt/
Tool: https://github.com/ivRodriguezCA/MobHunt
Blog: https://ivrodriguez.com/introducing-mobhunt/
Tool: https://github.com/ivRodriguezCA/MobHunt
Ivrodriguez
Introducing MobHunt: agentic mobile bug bounty hunting
tl;dr I built an agentic mobile security research system that runs the whole mobile bug bounty pipeline, from scoping a program to writing the report. Here is what happened when I pointed it at real programs.
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Dropping Elephant (Patchwork): Espionage APT Tactics and Tools
https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dropping-elephant-patchwork-espionage-apt-tactics-and-tools
https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dropping-elephant-patchwork-espionage-apt-tactics-and-tools
Picussecurity
Dropping Elephant (Patchwork): Espionage APT Tactics and Tools
Dropping Elephant, also called Patchwork, is an espionage APT active since 2015. Review its MITRE ATT&CK techniques and validate your controls.
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Developers: Beware of Ad Libraries that Betray Your Usersβ Location Privacy
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/developers-beware-ad-libraries-betray-your-users-location-privacy
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/developers-beware-ad-libraries-betray-your-users-location-privacy
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Developers: Beware of Ad Libraries that Betray Your Usersβ Location Privacy
An EFF investigation identified several advertising software development kits (SDKs) that publicly acknowledge collecting and sharing usersβ location by default when embedded in apps granted location
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Striking gold: Inside the GoldDigger Android malware
https://www.ibm.com/think/security/golddigger-android-malware-analysis
https://www.ibm.com/think/security/golddigger-android-malware-analysis
Ibm
Striking gold: Inside the GoldDigger Android malware | IBM
IBM Trusteer's in-depth analysis of GoldDigger malware reveals how this sophisticated Android mobile banking Trojan uses virtual environments and evasion techniques. Learn to recognize the threat and protect yourself from bad actors.
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Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Android Botnet
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/kimwolf-v7-botnet-malware/
Unit 42
Kimwolf v7: An Evolution of the Kimwolf Botnet
Discover how Kimwolf v7 targets Android IoT devices with HTTP/2 DDoS fingerprinting, Ethereum ENS C2 resolution and Tor backup routing.
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Bypassing Android Hardware Attestation from the Analyst's Chair
https://blog.quarkslab.com/bypassing-android-hardware-attestation.html
https://blog.quarkslab.com/bypassing-android-hardware-attestation.html
Quarkslab
Bypassing Android Hardware Attestation from the Analyst's Chair - Quarkslab's blog
Hardware key attestation lets an Android app prove to its backend that a key lives in secure hardware on a locked, verified device. It is also the wall that stops a security analyst working on a rooted phone. This article opens the mechanism from the analyst'sβ¦
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LLM Obfuscation Detection Framework for Android Apps
https://github.com/Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/LLMObfuscDetection
https://github.com/Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/LLMObfuscDetection
GitHub
GitHub - Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/LLMObfuscDetection: LLM Obfuscation Detection Framework for Android Apps
LLM Obfuscation Detection Framework for Android Apps - Mobile-IoT-Security-Lab/LLMObfuscDetection
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