Android Security & Malware
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SSRF in Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) version 3.9.5 Beta and prior (CVE-2024-29190)
MobSF does not perform any input validation when extracting the hostnames in android:host, so requests can also be sent to local hostnames. This can lead to server-side request forgery (SSRF). An attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure
https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-wfgj-wrgh-h3r3
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BlueDucky automates exploitation of Bluetooth pairing vulnerability that leads to 0-click code execution
β–ͺ️automatically scans for devices
β–ͺ️store MAC addresses of devices that are no longer visible but have enabled Bluetooth
β–ͺ️uses Rubber Ducky payloads
https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2024/03/26/blueducky-automates-exploitation-of-bluetooth-pairing-vulnerability-that-leads-to-0-click-code-execution/
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Address Sanitizer for Bare-metal Firmware
This led to early discovery of memory corruption issues that were easily remediated due to the actionable reports produced by KASan. These builds can be used with fuzzers to detect edge case bugs
https://security.googleblog.com/2024/03/address-sanitizer-for-bare-metal.html
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A Year in Review of Zero-Days Exploited In-the-Wild in 2023
-In 2023, there were 97 zero-day vulnerabilities exploited, a significant rise of over 50% compared to 2022 (62 vulnerabilities)
-Espionage was the primary motive behind 48 out of 58 zero-day vulnerabilities analyzed
-Most of the zero-day vulnerabilities found last year were in phones, operating systems, and web browsers
https://storage.googleapis.com/gweb-uniblog-publish-prod/documents/Year_in_Review_of_ZeroDays.pdf
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Demonstration of using BlueDucky to exploit 0-click Bluetooth vulnerability of unpatched Android smartphone (CVE-2023-45866)
Exploit was triggered by Raspberry Pi 4 and then by Android running NetHunter
https://youtu.be/GOGW7U1f2RA
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After almost 7 years, new version of drozer compatible with Python 3 and modern Java was released.
If you don't know, drozer was a very popular security testing framework for Android
https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/drozer
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Google fixed 2 Pixel vulnerabilities which are being actively exploited in the wild by forensic companies
CVE-2024-29745 refers to a vulnerability in the fastboot firmware used to support unlocking/flashing/locking. Forensic companies are rebooting devices in After First Unlock state into fastboot mode on Pixels and other devices to exploit vulnerabilities there and then dump memory.
CVE-2024-29748 refers to a vulnerability providing the ability to interrupt a factory reset triggered by a device admin app. It appears they've implemented a partial solution in firmware.
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/11860-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild-fixed-based-on-grapheneos-reports
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Active Android espionage campaign targeting users mainly in India and Pakistan with apps bundled with the XploitSPY malware posing mostly as messaging services - even available on Google Play Store
https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/exotic-visit-campaign-tracing-footprints-virtual-invaders/
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