I Norden er det (1.1. 2019) 260 000 innvandrere fra Syria, og tallet vokser raskt fordi det fortsatt kommer ba de flyktninger og familiegjenforente. Vel 200 000 er fra Irak, ikke mange flere enn i 2017. Det er 120 000 fra Iran (tabell 2.5).

In the Nordic region, there are (1/1/2019) 260,000 immigrants from Syria, and the number is growing rapidly because both refugees and family reunified people are still arriving. Well 200,000 are from Iraq, not many more than in 2017. There are 120,000 from Iran (table 2.5).

Fra Tyrkia (na vel 100 000 innvandrere i Norden) og Pakistan (50 000) kom det først arbeidsinnvandrere, og deretter langt flere familieinnvandrere (Østby, 2017), i tillegg til en del flyktninger, fra Tyrkia særlig de siste a rene. India med 60 000 er ogsa primært et arbeids- innvandringsland, og innvandringen herfra har tatt seg mye opp de siste a rene, som vi skal se i neste kapittel.

From Turkey (now around 100,000 immigrants in the Nordics) and Pakistan (50,000), first came labor immigrants, and then far more family immigrants (Østby, 2017), in addition to a number of refugees, especially from Turkey in recent years. India, with 60,000, is also primarily a country of labor immigration, and immigration from here has picked up a lot in recent years, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Selv i absolutte tall har Norge flere enn de andre fra Pakistan, Filippinene, Sri Lanka og Myanmar (CITI03).

Even in absolute numbers, Norway has more than the others from Pakistan (remember this, once we will talk about Breivik), the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Myanmar (CITI03).

Immigration before Utøya 80k 📈, after Utøya 📉, 2020 38k, 1997 - 2005 in 🇳🇴 30-40k

2022? >90k

During the first months after 22 July, Progress Party politicians and sympathizers tried to distance themselves from any views that might be construed as similar to Breivik’s.
However, it was difficult to ignore the similarities between anti-immigration arguments used by Progress Party politicians and those expressed by Breivik in his manifesto.