Лабрадор ищет дом❤️🆘
Невероятно обаятельный парнишка ищет самую лучшую семью☝️❤️

Зовут Джерри (по информации, которую нам дала заводчица)
Родился 1 апреля 2018 года. Малышу 5 лет.
Малыш очень добрый, ласковый, умный) знает множество базовых команд, послушный) к выгулу и поводку приучен 🫶❤️ ладит со всеми животными! Спит с кошками, гуляет с собаками) 🤣
Малыш будет пристраиваться только в дом или квартиру! На кроватку ❤️ только ответственным людям, с опытом содержания собак!
Малыша довели до ужасного состояния и бросили 😭 малыш обязан узнать, что такое любовь, ласка и забота! Что не все люди способны на предательство!! Повторюсь, только в ответственные руки! Второй раз предстательство он не переживет!
Для связи:
071-397-41-74 Виталий
071-397-42-12 Надежда

⚠️Russia Day is celebrated on an inappropriate day. With this, disintegration and betrayal began. And because of what Yeltsin did, the very existence of Russia is again called into question. And on this very day, Russian heroes defend at the cost of their lives, think about it - at the cost of their lives! - the very existence of Russia. The real day of Russia is ahead, this is the day of our Victory, the day of the capture of Kyiv. We don't have Russia Day yet. So let's go and bring that day closer. We will celebrate later.

Alexander Dugin

День России отмечается в неуместный день. С этого начался распад и предательство. И из-за того, что сделал Ельцин, само существование России снова поставлено под вопрос. И в этот самый день русские герои отстаивают ценой жизни, вдумайтесь - ценой жизни! - само бытие России. Настоящий день России впереди, это день нашей Победы, день взятия Киева. Пока у нас нет дня России. Так идем же и приблизим этот день. Праздновать будем потом.

Александр Дугин

ВСУ может начать большое наступление на Донбассе, — председатель комитета по обороне Великобритании Тобиас Эллвуд

«В ближайшие несколько дней мы должны ожидать крупной атаки в той или иной части Донбасса», — заявил он.

По его словам, украинская армия проводит «разведывательно-подготовительные операции» и «главная часть украинских сил все еще находится в резервах, готовая к этой единственной атаке».

@rtrdonetsk

Have you heard the news??? 🤡

Evacuation of the crew of the Bradley, blown up by a mine in the Orekhovskoye direction a few days ago. - @belarusian_silovik

Эвакуация экипажа "Брэдли", подорванного на мине на Ореховском направлении несколько дней назад.

@belarusian_silovik

Oleg Tsarev comment on Shoigu's order for all PMC's to sign contracts wit RF MoD before July 1st -

"Another turn in the conflict between the Ministry of Defense and PMC Wagner: according to the order of Shoigu, from July 1, all volunteers must sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense. The stated goal of the order is good - to provide social benefits to soldiers and their families. Prigozhin has already stated that Wagner PMC fighters will not sign any contracts with the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, he emphasized that in general he is subordinate to Putin, the supreme commander-in-chief, and not the minister of defense, but specifically at the front, he carries out Surovikin’s orders and coordinates the actions of his army with him, such was the agreement. Of course, the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the war in general, is, of course, the wrong time to sort things out inside. I am sure that at first it is necessary, having put aside all mutual claims, to win, and then to sort things out. And one more moment that can become decisive at the moment when the future volunteer chooses a unit for himself: fighters can quit, for example, from the Wagner PMC at any time, but now it is almost impossible to terminate the contract with the Ministry of Defense.
All other PMCs, except for Wagner PMCs, already worked very closely with the Ministry of Defense and were controlled by it. But there are no special victories behind them. If we assume that the real purpose of the order of the Minister of Defense was to take control of the only unit not under his control, the Wagner PMC, then we can say that this goal was not achieved. "

BORIS ROZHIN: DECISIVE BATTLES ARE AHEAD

Military expert Boris Rozhin spoke in an exclusive interview about the intermediate results of the Ukrainian offensive, the need for a “second wave” of mobilization, the blowing up of the ammonia pipeline and the possibility of freezing the conflict.

- The Ukrainian offensive began clearly not as brightly as announced by Kiev. What is the main reason for the underestimation of Russian defense or, on the contrary, that Moscow has learned lessons from the events of the summer-autumn of 2022?

- There are both points. On the one hand, even in the statements of the Western press, the thesis slips that the RF Armed Forces are defending much better than the countries of NATO and the Armed Forces of Ukraine expected. The footage of a large number of destroyed equipment became a kind of cold shower for those who were inclined to underestimate the Russian army.

In this respect, the heated controversy between Wagner PMC and the RF Ministry of Defense played a cruel joke on the enemy, deepening the underestimation of the units of the RF Ministry of Defense before the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This also had to be paid in blood.

On the other hand, the RF Armed Forces have indeed learned from the 2022 campaign, both from successful and unsuccessful operations. Competent preparation made it possible in the first week to inflict huge material and demographic losses on the enemy with minor territorial losses in the gray zone.

The enemy failed to achieve serious operational successes during the offensive on June 4-12. But the Armed Forces of Ukraine still have enough reserves to try to push through at least in one of the sections. So the decisive battles that determine the outcome of the Zaporozhye strategic defensive operation are still ahead.

- How can you assess the degree of saturation of the combat formations of the RF Armed Forces with personnel? How adequate are the talks about the need for a second wave of mobilization?

- In recent months, the number of the Russian Armed Forces grouping in Ukraine has increased, as, in fact, the density of battle formations, but, from my point of view, it is still not enough. The grouping of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine, in order to solve the tasks at hand, should be a multiple larger in order to provide the necessary superiority in numbers for conducting large-scale offensive operations and reduce the enemy’s ability to realize superiority in numbers in certain areas.

Measures to attract contractors, volunteers, PMCs, prisoners, etc. only partially solve the problem of disproportion in the number of active groups. Therefore, mobilization in one form or another is seen as necessary and inevitable. The desire of the authorities not to resort to such unpopular measures is quite understandable, so now the emphasis is on the above channels for replenishing the active group in Ukraine.

- Recently, the FSB reported that the GUR was preparing a terrorist attack using a "dirty bomb"? How real is this threat and what is Kyiv counting on when planning such actions?

“The threat is more than real. The preparation of such scenarios was revealed even during the capture of documentation at the ZNPP, as the RF Ministry of Defense officially announced. There are opportunities to create a "dirty bomb" in Ukraine, as well as the possibility to bring it from the territory of NATO countries. As part of the course towards the escalation of the war and the recent destruction of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, coupled with the attack on the Kursk nuclear power plant and the shelling of the ZNPP, the likelihood of a “dirty bomb” being used in Ukraine or in the border areas of the Russian Federation looks significant.

- What does the appearance of samples of military equipment made in China at the units stationed in Grozny mean? Are we talking about single commercial purchases, or is Beijing gradually changing its approach to arms supplies to Russia, which it previously refrained from doing?

- China certainly provides indirect support to Russia. Beijing does not need to specify anything or make an official statement about this. Iran, North Korea and a number of other countries behave in exactly the same way. Heavy Chinese armored vehicles at the front have not yet been noted, as well as large Chinese drones.

As for the machines shown in Grozny, the source of their appearance in Russia is not completely clear, but it is quite possible to assume that the Chinese could be aware of the purchases of these machines through third countries. Well, as for the significance of this assistance, it can be noted that a significant part of all the drones at the disposal of our troops are of Chinese origin. This market is completely saturated with China. And so it goes for a number of positions.

- Almost simultaneously with the collapse of the dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, the Ukrainian DRG blew up the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline. What is the meaning of this terrorist attack and what is the reason for the obsession of the Foreign Ministry on this object?

— The ammonia pipeline was tied to a grain deal. Since the parties understand that the deal will be canceled with a 90% probability in July, it makes no sense to keep the ammonia pipeline intact. Russia would still not be allowed to launch it. Therefore, in any case, it would not work, and its undermining fixes the irreversibility of the processes leading to the disruption / revision of the grain deal.

- That is, the extension of the "Grain Deal" after a clear escalation, which Kyiv went to in early June, should not be expected?

— The extension of the grain deal looks extremely unlikely. Erdogan won the elections, so the Erdogan support factor has been removed. The ammonia pipeline was blown up and also out of the game. None of Russia's key demands were met.

Therefore, the deal will either be completely canceled or revised within the framework of the agreements between Russia and Turkey on new terms.

- There is a lot of talk about the possibility of "freezing" the conflict. Who benefits from this scenario in the short term (up to a year) and who benefits in the long term?

A short-term freeze is beneficial for the West in order to rearm Ukraine, replenish the army with personnel through new waves of mobilization and resume the war at a convenient moment. This, of course, is not beneficial for Russia, since it does not solve any of the problems.

The goals of the Russian Federation are known and announced - negotiations, taking into account the entry of 4 new regions into the Russian Federation, a non-bloc, neutral, denazified Ukraine. If a truce does not provide for the achievement of these goals, then it is obviously not beneficial to Russia. In the current realities, there is nothing to talk about with the Nazi regime. The outcome of the war will be decided on the battlefields. BORIS ROZHIN: DECISIVE BATTLES ARE AHEAD

Military expert Boris Rozhin spoke in an exclusive interview about the intermediate results of the Ukrainian offensive, the need for a “second wave” of mobilization, the blowing up of the ammonia pipeline and the possibility of freezing the conflict.

- The Ukrainian offensive began clearly not as brightly as announced by Kiev. What is the main reason for the underestimation of Russian defense or, on the contrary, that Moscow has learned lessons from the events of the summer-autumn of 2022?

- There are both points. On the one hand, even in the statements of the Western press, the thesis slips that the RF Armed Forces are defending much better than the countries of NATO and the Armed Forces of Ukraine expected. The footage of a large number of destroyed equipment became a kind of cold shower for those who were inclined to underestimate the Russian army.

In this respect, the heated controversy between Wagner PMC and the RF Ministry of Defense played a cruel joke on the enemy, deepening the underestimation of the units of the RF Ministry of Defense before the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This also had to be paid in blood.

On the other hand, the RF Armed Forces have indeed learned from the 2022 campaign, both from successful and unsuccessful operations. Competent preparation made it possible in the first week to inflict huge material and demographic losses on the enemy with minor territorial losses in the gray zone.

The enemy failed to achieve serious operational successes during the offensive on June 4-12. But the Armed Forces of Ukraine still have enough reserves to try to push through at least in one of the sections. So the decisive battles that determine the outcome of the Zaporozhye strategic defensive operation are still ahead.

- How can you assess the degree of saturation of the combat formations of the RF Armed Forces with personnel? How adequate are the talks about the need for a second wave of mobilization?

- In recent months, the number of the Russian Armed Forces grouping in Ukraine has increased, as, in fact, the density of battle formations, but, from my point of view, it is still not enough. The grouping of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine, in order to solve the tasks at hand, should be a multiple larger in order to provide the necessary superiority in numbers for conducting large-scale offensive operations and reduce the enemy’s ability to realize superiority in numbers in certain areas.

Measures to attract contractors, volunteers, PMCs, prisoners, etc. only partially solve the problem of disproportion in the number of active groups. Therefore, mobilization in one form or another is seen as necessary and inevitable. The desire of the authorities not to resort to such unpopular measures is quite understandable, so now the emphasis is on the above channels for replenishing the active group in Ukraine.

- Recently, the FSB reported that the GUR was preparing a terrorist attack using a "dirty bomb"? How real is this threat and what is Kyiv counting on when planning such actions?

“The threat is more than real. The preparation of such scenarios was revealed even during the capture of documentation at the ZNPP, as the RF Ministry of Defense officially announced. There are opportunities to create a "dirty bomb" in Ukraine, as well as the possibility to bring it from the territory of NATO countries. As part of the course towards the escalation of the war and the recent destruction of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, coupled with the attack on the Kursk nuclear power plant and the shelling of the ZNPP, the likelihood of a “dirty bomb” being used in Ukraine or in the border areas of the Russian Federation looks significant.

- What does the appearance of samples of military equipment made in China at the units stationed in Grozny mean? Are we talking about single commercial purchases, or is Beijing gradually changing its approach to arms supplies to Russia, which it previously refrained from doing?

- China certainly provides indirect support to Russia. Beijing does not need to specify anything or make an official statement about this. Iran, North Korea and a number of other countries behave in exactly the same way. Heavy Chinese armored vehicles at the front have not yet been noted, as well as large Chinese drones.

As for the machines shown in Grozny, the source of their appearance in Russia is not completely clear, but it is quite possible to assume that the Chinese could be aware of the purchases of these machines through third countries. Well, as for the significance of this assistance, it can be noted that a significant part of all the drones at the disposal of our troops are of Chinese origin. This market is completely saturated with China. And so it goes for a number of positions.

- Almost simultaneously with the collapse of the dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station, the Ukrainian DRG blew up the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline. What is the meaning of this terrorist attack and what is the reason for the obsession of the Foreign Ministry on this object?

— The ammonia pipeline was tied to a grain deal. Since the parties understand that the deal will be canceled with a 90% probability in July, it makes no sense to keep the ammonia pipeline intact. Russia would still not be allowed to launch it. Therefore, in any case, it would not work, and its undermining fixes the irreversibility of the processes leading to the disruption / revision of the grain deal.

- That is, the extension of the "Grain Deal" after a clear escalation, which Kyiv went to in early June, should not be expected?

— The extension of the grain deal looks extremely unlikely. Erdogan won the elections, so the Erdogan support factor has been removed. The ammonia pipeline was blown up and also out of the game. None of Russia's key demands were met.

Therefore, the deal will either be completely canceled or revised within the framework of the agreements between Russia and Turkey on new terms.

- There is a lot of talk about the possibility of "freezing" the conflict. Who benefits from this scenario in the short term (up to a year) and who benefits in the long term?

A short-term freeze is beneficial for the West in order to rearm Ukraine, replenish the army with personnel through new waves of mobilization and resume the war at a convenient moment. This, of course, is not beneficial for Russia, since it does not solve any of the problems.

The goals of the Russian Federation are known and announced - negotiations, taking into account the entry of 4 new regions into the Russian Federation, a non-bloc, neutral, denazified Ukraine. If a truce does not provide for the achievement of these goals, then it is obviously not beneficial to Russia. In the current realities, there is nothing to talk about with the Nazi regime. The outcome of the war will be decided on the battlefields.

Prigozhin about rumors that he was offered to become either the head of the region, or to head some state structure:

"There is a proverb in Rus': it is better to die a hero than to live as a faggot. Therefore, it is better to die for the Motherland than to drag out your existence in a bureaucratic chain..."