📌Насчет снарядного голода, о котором снова заговорили. История из личного опыта.

Сидел я как-то ночью на пункте управления одного из штурмовых отрядов ЧВК «Вагнер» - смотрел на большом экране, как наши БПЛАшники находят в Бахмуте противника и потом в онлайн-режиме все это накрывается артой.

И вот, спустя определенное количество успешных попаданий по любителям гулять ночью, дежурный на ВОПе говорит птичке в радейку: «все улетай оттуда, я ночной лимит исчерпал. Не могу смотреть, как они там лазать дальше будут».

То есть противник там дальше по кайфу выгуливался не потому, что мы его не видели. А потому, что ночной лимит снарядов на его поражение исчерпали. Понятно, лимит есть всегда. Но текущий был уж совсем небольшой. Мне так обидно стало. Что уж про парней говорить, по которым эти гуляющие недобитки потом стрелять будут.

Не должно же так быть?

@brussinf

NATO military equipment in Artyomovsk.

@ukraine_watch

From Rangelonininews

Seven years ago in early May, in a village on the front line not far from Donetsk, I met the "Old Man" for the first time, a lieutenant colonel of the Donetsk People's Militia, at the time the commander of one of the Donetsk Guard battalions. Zakharchenko. Andrey was an outspoken, wise, sincere and above all true person. He was good, but severe when needed, always alongside his men who saw in him a solid point of reference, a beacon even in the darkest moments. He was able to unite, to discover talents and potential in any person. A strong friendship was born with him right away, we shared many adventures. In my book I could not fail to mention him, although he never wanted to show off. Andrey has always wanted to leave room for those who didn't wear stars on their uniforms, recognizing his merits to his men.

He was a person who deeply loved life and his land, fighting with conviction and courage for all that was dear to him, dreaming of peace and prosperity for Donbass. Nine days ago Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Borisovich Novikov fell fighting, on the front line, leading his boys through the heavy fighting around Avdeevka, north of his Donetsk.

Ответы Пригожина на вопросы, почему ЧВК Вагнер выходит из Бахмута.
https://telegra.ph/Otvety-Evgeniya-Prigozhina-na-glavnye-voprosy-kotorye-est-u-obshchestva-05-06

/Автор канала не высказывает свою точку зрения по поводу изложенных фактов, а лишь приводит дословно текст опубликованный на официальном канале/.

I. What did Wagner PMC do in Bakhmut? Why was Bakhmut needed?


1. PMC "Wagner" entered the territory of the settlement of Pervomaiskoye on March 19, 2022, due to the fact that the Russian Armed Forces could not cope with the assigned tasks, advance the front in a westerly direction and break through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine along the line of 2014.

2. PMC "Wagner" successfully coped with the task of breaking through the fortified defense area of ​​the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the first point of which was the settlement of Popasnaya, by May 9, 2022. The presence of these fortified areas was not included in the plans of the NWO. We were supposed to take Popasnaya by May 14-15, but we balked at doing it according to tradition on Victory Day.

3. After the flight of the units of the RF Ministry of Defense from the Kherson, Nikolaev, Kharkiv and Luhansk regions (Krasny Liman, Kupyansk, Izyum), the units of the PMC "Wagner" held back the onslaught of the enemy on the front with a length of 148 km, while in a day they set up positions on a part of the front with a length of 38 km.

4. On October 8, 2022, together with General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, it was decided to launch the operation "Bakhmut meat grinder" - an assault on the village of Bakhmut in order to provoke Vladimir Zelensky to throw in as many forces as possible to hold Bamkhut. In Bakhmut, we grinded APU, hence the name - “Bakhmut meat grinder”.

5. The purpose of the operation "Bakhmut meat grinder" was to enable the units of the Russian army to take advantageous defense lines, mobilize, re-equip, train personnel and increase their combat potential.

6. The period of the operation, together with Army General S. Surovikin, was a period of 6 months (conditionally until April 8, 2023).

7. The settlement of Bakhmut has no strategic importance for further advancement to the west.

8. Of strategic importance for the advancement of the Russian army is the capture of the settlements of Kramatorsk, Slavyansk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka - the “Donbas Ring”, to the west of which flat territories open up, on which it is difficult for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to maintain defense in the event of an offensive by superior forces of the Russian army.


II. Why did “shell hunger” arise?


9. Against the backdrop of the promotion of PMC "Wagner", which occupied 1500 sq. km and 71 settlements, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation suffered setbacks: defeats on the fronts, lack of control, scandals with mobilization, problems with supplies, discipline, and so on.

10. To compensate for their failures, due to envy, when trying to intrigue, the Ministry of Defense decided to start countering the Wagner PMC:

- the recruitment of volunteers among prisoners was prohibited;

- the supply of weapons has been stopped;

- reduced the supply of ammunition to 30% of applications (from May 2023 - up to 10%).



11. The Department of Defense created other problems:

- the issuance of well-deserved orders and medals to the dead has ceased;

- PMC "Wagner" was denied the possibility of air flights for the transfer of personnel from Africa to the NVO zone;

- persons from the Ministry of Defense interacting with PMC "Wagner" were forbidden to communicate with units of PMC "Wagner";

– special connection is disabled;

- Aircraft for the operational transfer of ammunition were denied.



12. Despite the opposition of the Ministry of Defense, Wagner PMC continued to successfully conduct military operations.



13. In order to ensure a complete "shell blockade", which does not consist in an artificial shortage of shells, but in a complete cessation of supplies, Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev was fired.



14. PMC "Wagner" has the opportunity to acquire shells in other ways, not from the stocks of the Russian army. However, PMC Wagner, together with foreign partners, was refused assistance in facilitating its own supplies and production of ammunition.



III. Why is Wagner PMC leaving Bakhmut?

15. PMC "Wagner" has been fighting for almost 400 days, since March 19, 2022. After conducting military operations (for which, according to all current military standards, 25 days are allotted), practically all units are withdrawn for reorganization, retraining and rest.

16. For seven months of the "Bakhmut meat grinder" PMC "Wagner" has lost its combat potential. The reason for this was the restrictions on the reception of personnel, created in February 2023, the lack of the required amount of weapons, the lack of the required amount of ammunition (artificially created "shell hunger").

17. It should be noted that the operation "Bakhmut meat grinder" was designed mainly not to take the settlement of Bakhmut, but to grind the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and organize a respite for the Russian army to restore combat capability.

18. The Bakhmut meat grinder has fully completed its task.

19. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said on March 7, 2023 that taking control of Bakhmut would pave the way for a further offensive deep into the defenses of the Ukrainian army. He called Bakhmut an important center of defense for Ukrainian troops in the Donbass. In the direction of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, the operational space is already open, and the remainder of 2.42 sq. km does not matter for operational space.



IV. What will Wagner PMC do after leaving Bakhmut?



20. After leaving Bakhmut, Wagner PMC will go to training camps to restore combat capability, retrain units, and will stay there until the threat to Russia and Russian citizens disappears as part of this military operation. In the event of a threat, PMC "Wagner" will certainly immediately stand up for the defense of their homeland.

21. Most of the fighters and commanders joined the Wagner PMC, leaving the units of the Ministry of Defense, as they completely lost confidence in them. Therefore, the divisions of PMC "Wagner" made a decision on the impossibility of joining the structures of the Ministry of Defense. It should also be noted that Wagner PMC is a team of like-minded people. Most "Wagnerians" would rather go on a well-deserved rest than go to other units. PMC "Wagner" is not a place of service, it is a vocation and philosophy.



V. How is the ammunition rate calculated?

(All figures are somewhat distorted, but the general meaning and proportions are observed)



22. So, how is the calculation of ammunition. We take as a basis the conditional grouping of PMC "Wagner" in 30 thousand people on combat missions in Bakhmut.

- Opposite PMC "Wagner" there is an enemy in the amount of about 80 thousand people. And directly in the Bakhmut agglomeration there are about 35 thousand enemy people.

- When attacked, the standard ratio of forces according to the standards should be 3: 1. That is, for every defender, there are three attackers.

- With the enemy grouping of 35 thousand people and the number of weapons [X], PMC "Wagner" should be 105 thousand people, and the number of weapons [X] x 3.

- Thus, the combat potential of PMC "Wagner" should be three times the potential of the enemy.

- In fact, the combat potential of PMC "Wagner" is less than the combat potential of the enemy by 1.2-2 times (that is, 3.6-6 times less than required for offensive operations).

- Despite the lack of numbers of units, weapons and ammunition, PMC "Wagner" compensates for this lack of serious superiority in the level of organization, interaction and training.

23. PMC "Wagner" spends an average of 6 thousand shells per day. And he submits his applications, based on the required quantity, solely on the experience of previous days.

24. Until May 2023, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense signed from 10 to 30% of the requirements of the ammunition specified in the application, depending on the period. However, thanks to the actions of the responsible officers of the Ministry of Defense, we were able to receive them more than signed - namely, from 30 to 60% of the need.

25. Thus, on average, from October 2022 to May 2023, we received 38% of the requested requirement.

26. The same situation with weapons and military equipment: the supply of Wagner PMC in terms of tanks, artillery and armored vehicles amounted to 30-40% of the required amount for combat missions.

27. How to calculate the required amount of ammunition? There are many different options:

- First: from the experience of conducting combat operations, taking into account the number, including the missing tanks, artillery, armored vehicles and weapons for the previous period. So, in our opinion, this is the most practical option.

- Second: according to the norms determined by the Rules for firing and fire control, the consumption of ammunition for suppressing an enemy platoon stronghold is 180 shells per 1 hectare. The average length of the Wagner front, taking into account different periods, is 80 km. This is about 400 strongholds of the enemy. To suppress them, 180 x 400 are needed, that is, 72 thousand shells per day. And so every day.

- Third: to suppress one NATO mechanized division for a conditional operation (25 days), about 270 thousand calculated ammunition (152 mm) is needed, according to the methodology of operational-tactical calculations. One NATO division is 12 thousand people. 35 thousand is three divisions. Three divisions - 270 thousand times 3 (for suppression) - 810 thousand shells. We divide by 25 days - we get 32 ​​thousand shells per day for suppression.

28. I remind you: we asked for 6,000 shells a day, they signed us from 600 to 1,000 shells, and we received 1,5-2,000 shells a day.

29. For example, in order not to reveal secrets: 10 types of ammunition that were ordered for the first decade of May. Requested by PMC "Wagner" 45 thousand, signed for the issuance of 5800 shells.


30. Thanks to Colonel General Mizintsev for giving out a little more than they signed at the General Staff. Very little, but at least something. Since May 1, after his dismissal, they are no longer issued at all.



VI. How does the lack of ammunition affect sanitary losses?



31. To maintain combat effectiveness during a full-scale war, losses (“200s” and “300s”) of 10-12% in 25 days (the duration of a conditional military operation) are considered acceptable.



The arithmetic is very simple:

- If they give 18 thousand shells per day, the losses are 10%;

- If they give 6 thousand shells per day, the losses are 24%;

- If they give 2 thousand shells per day, the losses are 35% or more.

Nobody expects 10% of ammunition from the norm. In this case, the unit is doomed to death. Now we get 10%.



32. PMC "Wagner" according to military calculations should give 18 thousand shells per day. And there should be weapons [X] x 3. In this case, the losses would be 10-12% in a full-fledged war. The Wagner PMC had not [X] x 3, but [X] weapons, so we asked not 18, but 6 thousand shells. In this situation, our losses should have been 24%, with 6 thousand shells. But we were given 2,000 thanks to the efforts of the responsible generals and Mizintsev. Therefore, our calculated loss should have been 35% for every 25 days. That is, PMC "Wagner" for 6 months "Bakhmut meat grinder" was supposed to lose 200% of the personnel.

33. It should be noted that with a loss of 30%, the unit is considered not combat ready. We had to complete one combat mission (25 days): die and reformat, and so on 14 times in a row. Instead, we have been at war for 14 months in a row. This speaks of the insane effectiveness of Wagner PMC. These are standard calculations taught at the General Staff.

34. Of course, the losses, once again, thanks to the highest level of training, management and interaction, are lower than calculated. But PMC "Wagner" still suffered significant losses, and despite this, we are alive: interaction, control and morale have not been lost.

35. PMC "Wagner" is artificially brought to non-combat readiness due to the artificially created "shell hunger".

36. How do we survive? The answer is simple. Management, optimization, military tricks, interaction, immediate repair, restoration and modernization: both military equipment and personnel who, having been wounded, undergo a quick recovery course and again rush to perform combat missions. Because we are a monolithic team of like-minded people.

37. These qualities allowed us to grind about 50 thousand soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine killed and prevent the enemy’s counteroffensive until today along the entire front line.



VII. Where are the projectiles?



38. The Russian military industry has reached the volume of production of shells sufficient to provide in full about 5 such combat-ready formations as the Wagner PMC, with a front length of 120-150 km and a simultaneous offensive along all sectors of the front.

39. The volume of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition makes it possible to provide for everyone, including in standard quantities.

40. It is safe to say that two-thirds of the sanitary losses of PMC "Wagner" are caused exclusively by artificially created "shell hunger". These are tens of thousands of killed and wounded citizens of the Russian Federation who died and suffered severe injuries due to the artificially created “shell hunger”.

41. It must be borne in mind that many other units are also experiencing "shell hunger." It was assumed that if they received shells, they would share them with the Wagner PMC. Therefore, the termination of the activities of PMC "Wagner" will have a positive impact on other units and subunits, and will provide them with ammunition.

‼️ Под свистом снарядов облагораживают город! Коммунальщики латают дороги в Петровском районе.

Сегодня они работали там, где буквально несколько часов назад ложились снаряды ВСУ, а среди мирных были раненые. Но с риском для жизни сотрудники красят остановки, подметают улицы и латают дороги в прифронтовом районе.

Источник: ТРК "Юнион"

☝️ По оперативным линиям СЦКК ДНР за 6 мая по состоянию на 19:00 поступила дополнительная информация о жертвах среди гражданских лиц в городах Республики:

г. Донецк (Петровский район):
🧨 Обстрел в 10:45:
- по переулку Красноармейcкий, дом 7 погибла женщина 1937 года рождения.
🧨 Обстрел в 17:40:
- по улице Ингулецкая, дом 2 погибла женщина 1976 года рождения.

❗️ Поступила дополнительная информация о повреждениях в результате обстрелов ВСУ городов Республики:

г. Донецк (Петровский район):
- улица 40 лет Украины, дом 6 "а" - многоквартирный жилой дом;
- улица Карнавальная, дома 56 и 77 – частные жилые дома.

Words of Wisdom from The Commander, Alexander Khodakovsky - (VERY important info here, if you can read between the lines.)

"Many volunteers of the fourteenth year ended up in PMCs, giving such a phenomenon as a private military company a purely Russian connotation. We had an unequivocal attitude towards American PMCs - mercenaries. But knowing that motivated people went to the PMCs created by us, who before that, completely free of charge, stood up in defense of high meanings and ideals - it was impossible to say about our PMCs that this is a bunch of military adventurers who value nothing but good money. And now it is even more impossible - no amount of money can compensate for the risks and losses.

The experience of this war showed that in a private structure it is possible to introduce the most effective methods of management, minimizing the negative impact of the military bureaucracy. I certainly can’t imagine the soap consumption logs in PMCs. And many were carried away by the formula for organizing military work in PMCs, especially in matters of interaction and decision-making, which still remains a considerable problem for the army. However, when, after joining Russia, the security forces in the DPR, who are not part of the Ministry of Defense, were asked about joining the proposed PMC, Vostok refused, clearly deciding on the direction - to the National Guard.

Now those features of PMCs that have not yet shown themselves have become apparent. If, according to the presidential decree, "state" military personnel are not fired until the end of the war, with the exception of certain categories, then this does not apply to PMCs, and the owner, for whatever reason, can make a separate decision in this matter. Not only that: at the expiration of the contract, the owner is obliged to release the employee if he does not want to renew the contract, and when it comes to thousands of people at the same time, this gives rise to a crisis that, along with a general shortage of shells and natural combat losses, puts the owner in front of a difficult choice.

In the course of a changeable war, both the strengths and weaknesses of private traders were revealed to us. The private traders showed us how to organize the work in order to squeeze the maximum efficiency out of the available forces and means. But at the same time, we saw how little the state can influence its private "partner" if he has his own ideas. If we were able to take the best and quickly put it into practice, this would be a good result of a public-private partnership. But, unfortunately, what can be implemented within the framework of a small system does not take root well within the framework of a large system - a different physics of processes. And, nevertheless, we have only one prospect: to build an effective state force, subordinated not to private will, but to the interests of the country, without abandoning PMCs in other areas where state intervention would be unprofitable."

Много добровольцев четырнадцатого года в итоге оказалось в ЧВК, придав такому явлению, как частная военная компания, сугубо российский оттенок. К американским ЧВК отношение у нас было однозначным - наёмники. Но зная, что в создаваемые у нас ЧВК пошли люди мотивированные, которые перед этим совершенно бесплатно грудью встали на защиту высоких смыслов и идеалов - сказать про наши ЧВК, что это сборище военных авантюристов, не ценящих ничего, кроме хороших денег, было нельзя. А сейчас нельзя тем более - никакие деньги не компенсируют рисков и потерь.

Опыт этой войны показал, что в частной структуре можно внедрить самые эффективные методики управления, минимизировав отрицательное влияние военной бюрократии. Вот уж точно не представляю себе журналов учёта расходования мыла в ЧВК. И многие увлеклись формулой организации военной работы в ЧВК, особенно в вопросах взаимодействия и принятия решений, что для армии по-прежнему остается немалой проблемой. Однако, когда после присоединения к России перед силовиками в ДНР, не входящими в систему Минобороны, поставили вопрос о вхождении в предполагаемую ЧВК , то "Восток" отказался, чётко определившись по направлению - в Росгвардию.

Сейчас стали очевидны и те особенности ЧВК, которые до сих пор себя не проявляли. Если согласно указа президента "государственных" военнослужащих не увольняют до окончания войны, за исключением отдельных категорий, - то на ЧВК это не распространяется, и собственник в силу каких-либо причин может принимать в этом вопросе отдельное решение,. Мало того: по истечению срока контракта собственник обязан отпустить сотрудника, если тот не хочет продлевать контракт, а когда речь идёт о тысячах человек одновременно, то это рождает кризис, который наряду с общим снарядным дефицитом и естественными боевыми потерями ставит собственника перед тяжёлым выбором.

В ходе переменчивой войны перед нами открылись и сильные, и слабые стороны частников. Частники показали нам, как можно организовать работу, чтобы выжать из имеющихся сил и средств максимум эффективности. Но одновременно мы увидели, насколько слабо может государство влиять на своего частного "партнера", если у того возникают собственные соображения. Если бы мы умели брать лучшее и быстро внедрять это в практику - это было бы хорошим результатом государственно-частного партнёрства. Но, к сожалению, что может быть внедрено в рамках малой системы - плохо приживается в рамках системы большой, - другая физика процессов. И, тем не менее, перспектива у нас только одна: строить эффективную государственную силу, подчинённую не частной воле, а интересам страны, не отказываясь от ЧВК на других направлениях, где вмешательство государства было бы невыгодным.