🇺🇦🇷🇺 As per popular request, here's the version with the current frontline and topographic map.

У кацапів -1 Су-34.
Один з членів екіпажу здох.

https://t.iss.one/kypyansk/9715

31st March, Ukrainian presence in central Kivsharivka.

https://t.iss.one/ptashkaDoDo/2963

Russian attack stopped by drones, barbed wire and a chokepoint.

https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2039293821230452943

Proof of remaining Ukrainian positions in Ivanopillya, from which I often report small arms fire towards Russian infiltrations.

Конечно я видел нашу разбитую колонну на Покровском направлении. Как и несколько подобных колонн от того же самого подразделения. 425-м полком Скеля в учебках пугают новобранцев, всем СЗЧшникам обещают отправку в Скелю, репутация у Скели в ЗСУ хуже некуда. Это подразделение активно пытается перенимать российские тактики, вроде мотоциклетных штурмов и просачивания двойками. 

Тем не менее Скеля относится к Управлению штурмовых войск. А не для кого не секрет, что они под защитой Сырского. 

Если спросите меня, то штурмовые полки как отдельная структура это бессмысленно. Для быстрого перебрасывания войск и проведения локальных штурмовых действий у нас есть ДШВ, десантно-штурмовые войска. Зачем нам десяток отдельных полков которые делают то же самое, но при этом расстрачивают больше ресурсов? Да еще и копируя порой худшие российские тактики. 

Не знаю.

My opinion.
It is precisely things like these that anger many in the Ukrainian army, but also online, me included: avoidable losses.
Oftentimes, Ukrainians "joke" about the fact that their leadership sometimes kills more than the Russians themselves do, and this is a perfect example.
An attack that mirrors the failed December attack into northwestern Pokrovsk, along the same exact road (that was mined back then and was mined this time, too), without favorable weather conditions like fog, rain, or snow, against elite Russian drone operators, and right on open treelines instead of an urban area, where the dismounts could've hidden more effectively in case of failure of the attack.
The officers responsible for ordering this military suicide, obviously, will never face any consequences, as the unit itself is one of the "preferred" ones by the high command (in particular, Sirsky, which probably received reports about how successful everything was and how little losses were taken).
I can only hope that, somehow, such problems will be worked on and solved. It has been and remains one of the biggest problems in the Ukrainian Army, which, among other things, gives a horrendous impression to the people, who, no wonder, are getting more and more dubious about joining the Army, knowing that they will be sent on such assaults without even a reliable back that cares about them.

https://t.iss.one/skala425/827

Fair and decently respectful statement from Skala.
I don't agree, though, with some of the provided data and conclusions. Some more opinions of mine:

1.

"Mr. Sternenko used in his assessment of the regiment's actions data and videos from Russian sources, which deliberately combined the data of attacks on different days in different areas of the front and do not directly relate to the March 31 operation. Based on the distorted Russian data, Mr. Sternenko made conclusions that do not correspond to reality, but rather serve the goals of Russian propaganda."

This doesn't seem to be true: a good amount of the footage has already been geolocated (example: https://map.ukrdailyupdate.com/?lat=48.302680&lng=37.091646&z=15&d=20543&c=1&l=0), and other Ukrainian sources have already confirmed the losses shown in the videos released by the Russians.

2.

"To support our soldiers and destroy the advancing enemy, it is necessary to conduct counterattacks. Otherwise, the enemy could encircle some of our positions, and all people would die without rotation, evacuation, or reinforcements."

In my modest opinion, without having seen the full picture that Skala has, it is not always necessary to conduct counterattacks in order to support friendly forces. Instead, if the situation was such that the Russians were trying to encircle some positions, the correct course of action might sometimes be to pull out those forces to better defendable positions, instead of reinforcing them even more.

3.

"Favorable weather conditions were used."

Questionable, but possible. Russian FPV videos showed good visibility, but it's possible that the fog had lifted at that time.

In conclusion, I remind you that these are just my personal conclusions using the data I see, and it is obvious and not questionable that the Skala regiment knows infinitely more than most of us do, but some things are fishy to many, and I'm just expressing my point of view on this matter (as many subscribers also requested).

🇺🇦 Шановний Бійцю! Якщо ви зараз перебуваєте у напрямку Часів Яр, Гуляйполе, Покровська, Новопавлівки, Лимана, Сіверська, Куп'янська або Сум, будь ласка, зв'яжіться зі мною особисто в Telegram (@Playfra) або в Signal чи WhatsApp (передам особисто).
Дякую!

Kostyantynivka. Bad news, Russian infiltrations into the center are starting to be more and more frequent according to information from the field.
Ukrainian drone teams are keeping the situation under their eye, for now without any precise information about the actual situation there.