An interesting 38North analysis examines open-source information on the combat use of North Korean Hwasong-11B (KN-24) / Hwasong-11Ka (KN-23) operational-tactical ballistic missiles, primarily the KN-23, against targets in Ukraine.
The analysis reaches several conclusions that differ from mainstream Ukrainian and Western assessments. We previously highlighted some of these discrepancies as well.
By comparing missile launches conducted in North Korea, tracked through foreign technical intelligence, with launches against Ukrainian targets, and accounting for known accuracy and failure rates, the author concludes that the initial issue was apparently not poor manufacturing quality.
Instead, the missiles were being used in Ukraine under conditions absent from North Korean test launches, particularly against advanced electronic warfare (EW) and air defense systems. EW interference disrupted satellite navigation, while air defenses could damage or deflect missiles even without fully intercepting them.
The need to evade interception also forced the missiles to fly more complex trajectories, making it harder to maintain the intended point of impact. Combined with interception damage, this contributed to lower accuracy and higher failure rates.
According to the analysis, when satellite navigation was disrupted, the missiles often had to rely on their less sophisticated inertial navigation systems. Accuracy deteriorated with increasing range and trajectory complexity, falling to 1,000–3,000 meters, still potentially sufficient for nuclear strikes against large area targets.
Experience gained in Ukraine apparently led to repeated modernization of the missiles, improving their resilience against advanced EW systems. Later batches regained the accuracy demonstrated during North Korean test launches, achieving accuracy in the tens of meters even at maximum range, with later claims of 1–5 meter accuracy.
Various structural and trajectory-related improvements were also developed and tested, increasing both missile reliability and performance.
Other interesting details include the estimate that around 250 KN-23/KN-24 missiles had been transferred by September 2025.
The analysis also states that KN-23 missiles were used between November 2023 and December 2025 from only a single launcher operated by Korean People’s Army personnel.
Finally, materials from the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats in the Special Military Operation Abroad reportedly contain a reference to the participation of a KPA missile unit in the operation.
The analysis reaches several conclusions that differ from mainstream Ukrainian and Western assessments. We previously highlighted some of these discrepancies as well.
By comparing missile launches conducted in North Korea, tracked through foreign technical intelligence, with launches against Ukrainian targets, and accounting for known accuracy and failure rates, the author concludes that the initial issue was apparently not poor manufacturing quality.
Instead, the missiles were being used in Ukraine under conditions absent from North Korean test launches, particularly against advanced electronic warfare (EW) and air defense systems. EW interference disrupted satellite navigation, while air defenses could damage or deflect missiles even without fully intercepting them.
The need to evade interception also forced the missiles to fly more complex trajectories, making it harder to maintain the intended point of impact. Combined with interception damage, this contributed to lower accuracy and higher failure rates.
According to the analysis, when satellite navigation was disrupted, the missiles often had to rely on their less sophisticated inertial navigation systems. Accuracy deteriorated with increasing range and trajectory complexity, falling to 1,000–3,000 meters, still potentially sufficient for nuclear strikes against large area targets.
Experience gained in Ukraine apparently led to repeated modernization of the missiles, improving their resilience against advanced EW systems. Later batches regained the accuracy demonstrated during North Korean test launches, achieving accuracy in the tens of meters even at maximum range, with later claims of 1–5 meter accuracy.
Various structural and trajectory-related improvements were also developed and tested, increasing both missile reliability and performance.
Other interesting details include the estimate that around 250 KN-23/KN-24 missiles had been transferred by September 2025.
The analysis also states that KN-23 missiles were used between November 2023 and December 2025 from only a single launcher operated by Korean People’s Army personnel.
Finally, materials from the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats in the Special Military Operation Abroad reportedly contain a reference to the participation of a KPA missile unit in the operation.
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An FPV drone captured the powerful impacts of two Geran-2 loitering munitions striking a temporary deployment point of Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade in Dobropillia, Donetsk Oblast.
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A Russian S8000 Banderol small cruise missile crashed in a cornfield near Talmaza in southeastern Moldova, more than 20 km from the Ukrainian border.
Moldovan police secured the crash site and released images of the wreckage, while specialists began examining the missile and investigating the circumstances.
Moldovan police secured the crash site and released images of the wreckage, while specialists began examining the missile and investigating the circumstances.
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With each passing day, I’m becoming increasingly convinced that if the United States does not launch a ground invasion of Iran, the use of a nuclear weapon may eventually become inevitable.
But that would come with enormous consequences. It could open the door for other nuclear-armed states to use their own weapons, giving them a precedent, or an excuse, to deploy nuclear weapons against their enemies. Russia would almost certainly be one of the countries to take advantage of such a precedent.
But that would come with enormous consequences. It could open the door for other nuclear-armed states to use their own weapons, giving them a precedent, or an excuse, to deploy nuclear weapons against their enemies. Russia would almost certainly be one of the countries to take advantage of such a precedent.
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Donald Trump demanded $10 billion from South Korea in exchange for U.S. security guarantees.
Shortly, he’ll probably announce that he’s in love with Kim Jong Un lol
Shortly, he’ll probably announce that he’s in love with Kim Jong Un lol
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Forwarded from Mediterranean Man (Veritas)
Btw, do you guys maybe know where all those people disappeared to who in January 2025 were so passionately saying that the world had been saved, wars would end, the US would become better, the right-wing wave in Europe could no longer be stopped, and a conservative revolution would take over the entire world?
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The Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) conducted two airstrikes against ISIS hideouts in the Zaghaytun Valley, west of Kirkuk, killing several ISIS members.
The strikes were carried out based on precise intelligence from the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which had detected the movement of ISIS members at the site.
The strikes were carried out based on precise intelligence from the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which had detected the movement of ISIS members at the site.
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Earlier tonight, an Iranian drone struck a fuel tank in Tasluja, Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraqi Kurdistan.
Correction: Unrelated to any strike.
Correction: Unrelated to any strike.
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Unconfirmed reports say that Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft carried out four airstrikes on the runway of Abu al-Duhur Air Base in the eastern countryside of Idlib, northwestern Syria, where Turkish forces are stationed.
I highly doubt this happened, but let’s wait and see.
I highly doubt this happened, but let’s wait and see.
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Earlier today, a Russian Su-35S operating near Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, attempted to shoot down a possible Ukrainian MiG-29MU2 Multirole Fighter that was launching glide bombs at Russian positions in Kostyantynivka from west of Kramatorsk. The Su-35S engaged the aircraft with an R-37 or R-77 air-to-air missile.
Later, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that a Russian fighter had shot down a Ukrainian MiG-29.
Later, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that a Russian fighter had shot down a Ukrainian MiG-29.
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OSINTWarfare
This morning, Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles struck the Rocket and Space Centre “Progress” in Samara, Samara Oblast. Progress, one of Roscosmos’s key enterprises, is involved in the production of Soyuz-2 launch vehicles and their associated electronics…
Satellite imagery shows the aftermath of a strike by two FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles on one of the workshops at the Rocket and Space Centre “Progress” in Samara on August 15.
The facility is important to Russia’s space industry, as it manufactures Soyuz-2 launch vehicles, including the Soyuz-2.1b, which is used to place satellites for the Rassvet low-Earth-orbit communications constellation, operated by the private Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, into orbit.
Ukraine’s heavy reliance on Starlink has given it a clear understanding of the advantages that similar technology could provide to the Russian Armed Forces. As the launch of the Rassvet constellation approaches, Ukraine is therefore likely to increasingly target facilities associated with Russia’s space industry.
The facility is important to Russia’s space industry, as it manufactures Soyuz-2 launch vehicles, including the Soyuz-2.1b, which is used to place satellites for the Rassvet low-Earth-orbit communications constellation, operated by the private Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, into orbit.
Ukraine’s heavy reliance on Starlink has given it a clear understanding of the advantages that similar technology could provide to the Russian Armed Forces. As the launch of the Rassvet constellation approaches, Ukraine is therefore likely to increasingly target facilities associated with Russia’s space industry.
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OSINTWarfare
Unconfirmed reports say that Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft carried out four airstrikes on the runway of Abu al-Duhur Air Base in the eastern countryside of Idlib, northwestern Syria, where Turkish forces are stationed. I highly doubt this happened, but…
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The Israeli Air Force (IAF) carried out another airstrike on Abu al-Duhur Air Base in the eastern countryside of Idlib, northwestern Syria.
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A Russian jet-powered Geran-4 loitering munition crashed at an unspecified location in Ukraine. It remains unclear whether it malfunctioned or was brought down by electronic warfare (EW).
Jet-powered Gerans are increasingly being used as a tool to put pressure on Ukraine’s rear areas. While these variants initially appeared only sporadically in Russian strikes, their share has grown significantly over the past year.
In July, Ukrainian data suggested that jet-powered drones accounted for up to 20% of Russian attack UAVs in some strikes. In August, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat stated that their share had reached as high as two-thirds in some attacks.
For Ukraine, this presents a growing air-defense challenge. Their higher speed reduces reaction times and makes them more difficult for low-cost interceptor drones to engage. These interceptors have become one of Ukraine’s primary means of countering conventional piston-powered Gerans, prompting Ukrainian and Western companies to accelerate the development of faster interceptor drones.
Jet-powered Gerans are increasingly being used as a tool to put pressure on Ukraine’s rear areas. While these variants initially appeared only sporadically in Russian strikes, their share has grown significantly over the past year.
In July, Ukrainian data suggested that jet-powered drones accounted for up to 20% of Russian attack UAVs in some strikes. In August, Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat stated that their share had reached as high as two-thirds in some attacks.
For Ukraine, this presents a growing air-defense challenge. Their higher speed reduces reaction times and makes them more difficult for low-cost interceptor drones to engage. These interceptors have become one of Ukraine’s primary means of countering conventional piston-powered Gerans, prompting Ukrainian and Western companies to accelerate the development of faster interceptor drones.
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Hezbollah has released footage from the final days before the ceasefire (imaginary), showing fiber-optic FPV drone strikes targeting IDF personnel and vehicles on the southern outskirts of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah in southern Lebanon.
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