#Lithuania, national parliament election (2nd round):

With all precincts counted, the right-wing National Alliance (NS→ECR) is expected to enter parliament with 1 seat. It is the second national parliamentary election NS has contested.

➤ https://europeelects.eu/lithuania

#Italy (#Liguria), regional elections:

1179/1785 polling stations counted

Bucci (*-EPP|ECR|PfE): 48.2% (+0.3)
Orlando (PD-S&D): 47.9% (-0.3)
...

+/- 50% counted

➤ https://europeelects.eu/italy

#Italy (#Liguria), regional elections:

1423/1785 polling stations counted

Bucci (*-EPP|ECR|PfE): 48.4% (+0.2)
Orlando (PD-S&D): 47.8% (-0.1)
...

+/- 66% counted

➤ https://europeelects.eu/italy

#Italy (#Liguria): right-wing candidate and mayor of Genoa Marco Bucci (*) wins the election against centre-left candidate Andrea Orlando (PD-S&D).

The right-wing alliance (EPP|ECR|ID|RE) retains the presidency of the region.

➤ https://europeelects.eu/italy

#Croatia, 2x1 komunikacije poll:

Presidential election

Milanović (*-S&D): 47% (+9)
Primorac (*-EPP): 28% (n.a.)
Selak-Raspudić (*): 13% (n.a.)
Kekin (Možemo-G/EFA): 8% (n.a.)
Jonjić (HSP-*): 4%

+/- June 2024

Fieldwork: 13-28 September 2024
Sample size: 1,041

➤ https://europeelects.eu/croatia/

#Croatia, Promocija Plus poll:

Presidential election

Milanović (*-S&D): 42%
Primorac (*-EPP): 27% (+3)
Selak-Raspudić (*): 11% (+2)
Kekin (Možemo-G/EFA): 8% (+2)
Lozo (DOMiNO-ECR): 4% (n.a.)
Bulj (Most→ECR): 3% (n.a.)
…

+/- 2-5 September 2024

Fieldwork: 15-17 October 2024
Sample size: 1,000

➤ https://europeelects.eu/croatia/

#Croatia, Promocija plus poll:

Presidential run-off election

Scenario: Milanović (*-S&D) vs. Primorac (*-EPP)

Milanović (*-S&D): 61% (+5)
Primorac (*-EPP): 39%

+/- 2-5 September 2024

Fieldwork: 15-17 October 2024
Sample size: 1,000

➤ https://europeelects.eu/croatia/

#Portugal, CESOP-UCP poll:

AD-EPP|ECR: 33% (+2)
PS-S&D: 29% (-4)
CH-ID: 18% (+4)
IL-RE: 6% (-1)
BE-LEFT: 4%
CDU-LEFT|G/EFA: 3%
L-G/EFA: 3%
PAN-G/EFA: 2%

+/- vs. 7-13 July 2024

Fieldwork: 17-23 October 2024
Sample size: 1,025

➤ https://europeelects.eu/portugal

#Slovenia, Mediana poll:

SDS-EPP: 33% (+1)
GS-RE: 17% (-7)
SD-S&D: 10% (+1)
L-LEFT: 7% (+2)
NSi-EPP: 7%
Vesna-G/EFA: 5%
Resnica→NI: 5% (+1)
SNS→PfE: 3%

+/- vs. 30 September-3 October 2024

Fieldwork: 21-24 October 2024
Sample size: 725

➤ https://europeelects.eu/slovenia

#Bulgaria, national parliament election: the preliminary final result shows the right-wing Velichie-* party at 3.999%, 25 votes shy from the 4% threshold. If the Central Election Commission (CIK) finalizes the result, the party would lose national parliament representation.

➤ https://europeelects.eu/bulgaria/

#Bulgaria, national parliament election:

Preliminary final result

GERB/SDS-EPP: 26.4% (+1.7)
PP/DB-RE|EPP: 14.2 % (-0.1)
V-ESN: 13.4% (-0.4)
DPS/NN-RE: 11.9% (new)
BSPOL-S&D|LEFT: 7.6% (+0.5)
APS-RE: 7.5% (new)
ITN-ECR: 6.8% (+0.8)
MECh-*: 4.6% (+1.6)
Velichie-*: 3.999% (-0.7)
...

+/- vs. June 2024 election

➤ https://europeelects.eu/bulgaria/

#Georgia: On top of the electoral integrity violations reported by observers, the widespread tampering in favour of the government is visible also in the detailed official results counts.

Europe Elects was independently able to reproduce the markings of fraud.

The biggest telltale sign of tampering with the results is implausible deviations from normal distribution when it comes to vote shares of a relevant party.

In more rural municipalities, the governing GD raked up disturbingly high vote shares much in excess of the expected.

As a contrast, for example the vote distribution of the opposition Unity (EPP|RE) party shows distinctly more trimmed and slim tails.

In the 2020 Georgian parliamentary election, deviations from a normal distribution were observed somewhat less when it comes to GD, indicating increased tampering with the results in a closely contested election in 2024.

The examples from Georgia above tend to be spiky and less clean-cut because of the limited volume of electoral stations and detailed breakdown.

We can witness for example in Italy that parties tend to produce a neat normal distribution with high volumes of data.

We wrote in 2023 about the flagrant vote rigging taking place in Russia. Detecting fraud does not need to happen only with election observers.

Instead, released election results can be turned against the autocratic government purporting them to be real.

https://europeelects.eu/2023/11/13/russia-understanding-the-flagrant-vote-rigging-with-graphs/

One of these statistical rules that is hard to go around with detailed election results is the observation that a distribution of electoral stations across certain variables like party support or voter turnout is most often unimodal—that there is only a single peak.

Second is that the tails of these distributions tend not to be too pronounced.

It makes intuitive sense that a party would rack up relatively an average share of votes in more places than they rack up relatively high or low share of votes. Producing a normal distribution.

Yet the distribution of vote shares is not the only variable that can be employed to uncover indications of fraud.

Another important sign, also with Georgia’s case, is the so-called comet tail of increasingly higher vote shares, leading to higher vote count peak than expected.

The name of such phenomenon comes from Russian vote distributions where the custom is blatant and well observed. Increasing turnout leads to increasing vote share.

Image: Golos (https://golosinfo.org/en/articles/146617)

In the case of Georgian Dream we notice a similar drift of progressively higher vote shares in election stations outside the ‘honest cloud’ of more legitimate and plausible clustering.

Which likewise leads to unconvincingly high peak, much in excess that are observed elsewhere.