Welcome to Citra Channel.๐๐ป
Replies me if you there๐.
Replies me if you there๐.
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TSupport-Advance.zip
15.9 KB
!READ THIS IMPORTANT MESSAGE!
Name :
Version :
Changes :
Features :
Name :
TSupport-Advance
Version :
R250611 ( 250611 )
Changes :
โข Fix fp.sh
Features :
- Action button for shamiko ( changing black to white list )
- Auto Target ( can be disable, can exclude a package name or force package name to use LHM or GCS )
- Auto Detect XEU and disable XEU
Inject Module
**More info read README.md inside module zip
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If you face error like these, update TSP-A to latest version. Then try one of the list below, skip others when it start to work.
โขDisable DNS. ( 5% )
โขTry Mobile/Wifi Internet. ( 10% )
โขReboot. ( 50% )
โขTry enable hotspot. ( 60% )
โขTry with/without VPN. ( 80% )
โขDisable DNS. ( 5% )
โขTry Mobile/Wifi Internet. ( 10% )
โขReboot. ( 50% )
โขTry enable hotspot. ( 60% )
โขTry with/without VPN. ( 80% )
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Will drop new update, changes :
GCS = Generated Certificate Support
LHM = Leaf Hack Mode
Auto Target feature, will now by default using auto mode.
exclude.txt now changed to customize.txt
If first line of customize.txt has only "!" GCS will set as default mode. ( only for those who has normal TEE )
Add "!" at the end of package name to use force GCS.
Add "?" at the end of package name to use force LHM.
Adding package name without any customization "!" or "?" will exclude the package name from added to target.txt mean bootloader will not spoofed for that app.
Documentation writen inside README.md in module zip.
GCS = Generated Certificate Support
LHM = Leaf Hack Mode
Auto Target feature, will now by default using auto mode.
exclude.txt now changed to customize.txt
If first line of customize.txt has only "!" GCS will set as default mode. ( only for those who has normal TEE )
Add "!" at the end of package name to use force GCS.
Add "?" at the end of package name to use force LHM.
Adding package name without any customization "!" or "?" will exclude the package name from added to target.txt mean bootloader will not spoofed for that app.
Documentation writen inside README.md in module zip.
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Guys, TSupport should not having conflict with others module.
If you fail passing Device Integrity, check your module, make sure you have Tricky Store.
If you fail its not TSupport issue. Possible issue :
- Device Environment ( Built-in PIF or GMS Spoof )
- Others Module that conflict with Tricky Store
- Install PIF by Chiteroman ( some of you may able to pass without PIF )
TSupport should be TrickyStore Support. Its support module not a module that can make you pass everything, module that make you pass Device or even Strong is Tricky Store. TSupport should be a Support module, it shouldn't have conflict.
If you found any conflict tell us in Discussion Chat.
We will take a look.
If you fail passing Device Integrity, check your module, make sure you have Tricky Store.
If you fail its not TSupport issue. Possible issue :
- Device Environment ( Built-in PIF or GMS Spoof )
- Others Module that conflict with Tricky Store
- Install PIF by Chiteroman ( some of you may able to pass without PIF )
TSupport should be TrickyStore Support. Its support module not a module that can make you pass everything, module that make you pass Device or even Strong is Tricky Store. TSupport should be a Support module, it shouldn't have conflict.
If you found any conflict tell us in Discussion Chat.
We will take a look.
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#ADVERTISEMENT
Found Keybox Seller :
**DO NOT LEAK THE BOX
Contact @KeyboxManBot for long last validity.
Join Channel @FreeKeyboxShare for free demo box.
โ No scam report
โ Behavior is normal
โ Accept able price
โ Demo / Testimony
Online from 9:00 to 23:00, UTC+5
Found Keybox Seller :
**DO NOT LEAK THE BOX
Contact @KeyboxManBot for long last validity.
Join Channel @FreeKeyboxShare for free demo box.
โ No scam report
โ Behavior is normal
โ Accept able price
โ Demo / Testimony
Online from 9:00 to 23:00, UTC+5
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Announcement!
When you flexing, hide TestID and SerialNumber. We dont want google spy see that and ban the blackbox. Thats why dont flexing.
When you flexing, hide TestID and SerialNumber. We dont want google spy see that and ban the blackbox. Thats why dont flexing.
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Guys, PIF tokay_beta fingerprint got banned, update your fingerprint and reboot your device. ( Reboot required )
TSupport has the F-Print updater, so dont ask for the file.
TSupport has the F-Print updater, so dont ask for the file.
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What you guys think about this ?
Source: https://integritywiz.pro/
Someone chat me and telling me about this module, he say this module steal code. Well I just think that this module didn't give proper credits to the real owner ?
I have seen these module before, it has PIF and TS integrated inside the module.
Source: https://integritywiz.pro/
Someone chat me and telling me about this module, he say this module steal code. Well I just think that this module didn't give proper credits to the real owner ?
I have seen these module before, it has PIF and TS integrated inside the module.
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Merry Christmas ๐โ๏ธโ๏ธ.
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Enhance your rooting experience with KernelSU-Next.
โขSupports NON-GKI kernels (4.x - 5.4 LTS).
โขGKI kernels compatible with LKM/KMI methods.
โขDedicated pre-patched SuSFS branches for effective root hiding.
โขRevamped user interface and new manager features.
โขModule installation confirmation and restoration after uninstallation.
โขOptimized sparse image size to 16GB.
โขIntegrated SuSFS library for CLI commands.
โขManager app supports auto-updates from new releases.
โขFrequent updates with more features on the way.
Learn More :
Telegram, Github, About.
โขSupports NON-GKI kernels (4.x - 5.4 LTS).
โขGKI kernels compatible with LKM/KMI methods.
โขDedicated pre-patched SuSFS branches for effective root hiding.
โขRevamped user interface and new manager features.
โขModule installation confirmation and restoration after uninstallation.
โขOptimized sparse image size to 16GB.
โขIntegrated SuSFS library for CLI commands.
โขManager app supports auto-updates from new releases.
โขFrequent updates with more features on the way.
Learn More :
Telegram, Github, About.
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Please dont advertise crypto in the chat. Advertising crypto will directly banned!!!
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Forwarded from ๐ ๐๐ข๐ช ๐๐จ๐ ๐ฃ (๐ ๐๐ข๐ช๐ป๐ฎ ๐
)
This scammer on Telegram [UID 1878505335] is spreading a dangerous Magisk module to hack/destroy phones and demand money. (stoplamers gang)
[See Screenshot 1- CHAT BETWEEN SCAMMER & VICTIM]
What Happened:
โข [UID 7576386418] Victim Ganesh's phone was hacked via Scammer's module.
โข Scammer demanded $100, threatening to destroy the phone if they didn't pay.
โข This guy alerted me to this scam.
โข I went undercover to investigate how it works
[See Screenshot 2- CHAT BETWEEN SCAMMER & Investigator] MUST READ
Here's how it went down:
There were only two things needed: "Zygisk" and the "virus module" (click to read more)
I was really surprised to find out it didn't even require a restart. Once you flashed it, it was basically done.
So I contacted the person and, pretending to be someone else, said I wanted to access my girlfriend's phone. I acted like a nibba & He seemed to believe my story and sent me the module.
To see how it works, I needed to install it. Instead of using the real module, I made two fake modules. I just copied module.prop file from his module, repacked it with my update binary, and flashed it using "kernel su".
The person was then trying to do things to my phone, but nothing was happening.๐ญ ๐คฃ I was just watching it and was really laughing hard because it wasn't working. Then he sent commands to run in the terminal, related to the service.sh file inside his module. Since I hadnโt installed the original module, the commands didn't do anything. He then seemed confused and started asking for my Android and kernel versions๐. Finally, he sent something I wouldnโt run as it was an obvious privacy concern. So, I've decided to just hold on to things for now since I have enough evidence
What Happens If You Flash This Module?:
โข Scammer gets full access to your phone (data, messages, photos, chats etc.)
โข Scammer can steal your data and money.
โข Scammer can lock or destroy your phone. (he remotely destroyed victim's device making it unbootable)
โข You will be blackmailed.
- Moral from this incident๏ปฟ
โข Do not flash modules from unknown sources
โข Only use trusted modules.
โข Be suspicious of free or "too good to be true" modules.
โข Research modules before installing.
Stay safe and share this information with your friends to help stop these scams!
~ Regards // Mona
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VIEW IN TELEGRAM
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๐ ๐๐ข๐ช ๐๐จ๐ ๐ฃ
I dont do research for this, but this posted from a big comunity.
- Never flash unknown module, especially unknown and closed source modules.Advice if your device has injected/infected with malicious code/software.
- Do some research first, before you flash.
Eject you simcard, make sure your device is not connected to Internet. In this case they remote your device ( with Internet ). To cut off the spread of your data you must disconnect from the Internet network.It's possible they used a reverse shell to connect to the target. We don't know for sure how they hacked.
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Just a reminder to those using root devices out there. Surely you already understand the risks of rooting your device. If you use the device for daily or work purposes, it is better to use a non-rooted device to make it more secure.
Please be more careful when doing anything with rooted devices. Big profits always come with big risks.
Please be more careful when doing anything with rooted devices. Big profits always come with big risks.
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happy new year!! we all hope from here at citra that you have a year full of happiness and company.
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Play Integrity Issue
Anonymous Poll
60%
Device recognition verdict : NO_INTEGRITY
30%
App recognition verdict : Unevaluate
34%
Environment details verdict : POSSIBLE_RISK
NO_INTEGRITY - Set your SeLinux to Enforcing.
UNEVALUATE - Unsigned app is Installed ( No License app ), deleted it.
POSSIBLE_RISK - Scan your Play Protect.
UNEVALUATE - Unsigned app is Installed ( No License app ), deleted it.
POSSIBLE_RISK - Scan your Play Protect.
This is Demo.
Environment details verdict: POSSIBLE_RISK
Environment details verdict: POSSIBLE_RISK
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